ŁÓDŹ
STUDIES IN LANGUAGE

Edited by
Barbara Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk and Łukasz Bogucki

36

Joanna Jabłońska-Hood

A Conceptual Blending Theory of Humour

Selected British Comedy Productions in Focus

PETER LANG
EDITION

The book presents an analysis of humour in a selection of British comedy productions. The conceptual integration theory devised by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, also known as *blending*, provides the tool for explaining the creation of humour in detail. It seems that blending can elaborate on the origin and cause of funniness, and, therefore, should be included as a linguistic theory of humour in the wide range of contemporary humour theories available. The backdrop against which any humour may be analysed is provided in this study by comparing and contrasting various humour theories which are popular among scholars dealing with comedy and laughter.

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Introduction

The ability to perceive and appreciate humour, in a manner that differentiates man from other species and which may be equated with the intellect, can be regarded as unique among man's numerous faculties, which certainly differentiates him from other species, and which may only be equated with the intellect. As surprising as it may be, laughter and wit are likely to be the exclusive domain of mankind and thus have the potential to awaken a deep desire for greater understanding of the human mind and cognition. It is exactly for this reason that humour, as a form of intelligence, has attracted interest, thus entering the research fields of all areas of study. The general pursuit has been to formulate some universal theory that could effectively and effortlessly provide insight into the nature of the comic as well as explain why at all we find things or situations amusing. Nevertheless, this tendency to capture humour's essence has proved to be somewhat of an enigma leaving the puzzled scholar even more confused than before the initial stage of research. The answer as to why this is so, that humour throws obstacles into the path of its researchers, possibly remains a mystery, and will remain so for many years to come. This, of course, does not mean that one should not study humour at all. Thousands of papers and books on the subject show that despite its complexity, linguists, philosophers and psychologists are not deterred from attempting to take a fresh look at the phenomenon of humour. This study is just one such attempt. Using the theory of conceptual integration (CIT) (Fauconnier 1995, Fauconnier and Turner 2002, Turner 2014 &2015), we shall adventure on a journey in search of answers to the nature of the humour, as found in a selection of British comedy productions.

As humour is inextricably linked with the mind, it is, therefore, only justifiable that we study it in connection with cognitive processes of thinking and categorisation. At a first glance, it becomes apparent that the human mind appears to have far more in common with wit than one would imagine. At a second glance, we are struck by the sudden realisation that, to a certain degree, our mind is responsible for generating, comprehending or evaluating humour, which is basically the prerequisite to follow in humour studies. Also humour, as part of cognition, results from a manipulation of our conceptual system of thought, incorporating effects such as metaphor, metonymy, analogy, symmetry, or opposition, and perhaps many more. Humour then can be said to originate, just like any other type of intelligent thought, from basic human operations of the brain that underlie cognition, the position that has recently been given to the

blending of mental spaces. Such a cognitive integration view of humour presupposes that it may explain the nature of the comic in depth. An immediate question arises, however, in that it is doubtful how blending processes, applicable easily to many other disciplines as distinct as art, mathematics, or law, is capable of explicating humour as well. Is this a coincidence that blending mechanisms can illuminate such varied domains? Perhaps it ought to be treated as a weakness of the approach. However, there is another dimension to this, if we adopt a more 4D perspective. If man can, via his intellect, create and evolve objects of art, mathematical regulations or legal principles in pretty much the same manner in which he produces and interprets humour, there is no reason why all the abovementioned things could not be regarded as consequential from one and the same process, i.e. blending.

Conceptual integration is not only reputed to provide insight into science, but most importantly, it is considered part of our everyday interaction with the world. This viewpoint interrelates with yet another observation that could verify blending as a genuine cognitive capacity, namely the fact that both humour and mind do not float in some abstract space, so to say, entirely detached from reality and human beings. On the contrary, both belong to individuals who use their minds in order to perceive humour, among others, via their bodily form, which is one of the most fundamental characteristics of contemporary science. Specifically, the fact that cognition is embodied and utilises image schemas or mental spaces to gain orientation in the world, in the literal and figurative sense of the expression, accounts for the statement that meaning is also embodied, no matter whether it is a truthful or comical meaning that we seek to convey. This experiential realism (cf. Lakoff 1987, Lakoff & Johnson 1980) together with mental spaces and their projections into the blended structures formulates the basis of human cognition, a part of which belongs to the mind generating humour and thoughts. In order to ascertain the association, it is enough to investigate the contemporary methodologies of language, the more and more of which turn to blending or other mechanisms connected with it in their pursuit of science development, frequently advocating multi-modal and interdisciplinary approaches to language (Turner 2014 & 2015).

For years philosophers and linguists assumed the dualism between body and mind. This Descartian notion of complete distinction between body and mind accounted for the fact that the latter was examined with absolutely no reference to the former. Such a rationalist approach, as it was referred to, has had a great number of followers, e.g. Chomsky or Montague, who scrutinised languages as a highly systematic computational mechanisms, disposing of any potential links with the human body or experience for that matter. It is only in recent years

that cognitive linguistics surfaced as a movement drawing on psychological and philosophical traditions that held in great esteem values such as human-oriented cognition and language affected by experience and body (for a discussion see Evans & Green 2006). This empiricist stance advocates that mind cannot possibly be studied without reference to body, this is basically known as embodiment. How it manifests itself is predominantly through the categorisation and the perception of reality, both being achieved via the physiognomy and physical nature of human body. As our human morphology (Evans and Green 2006: 44-50) is fairly specific in comparison with other species, this specificity is responsible for the manner in which we perceive the world as well as categorise, which is called variable embodiment. This, on the other hand, is associated with the neurological basis for the human mind, which differs considerably from that of other species, again the fact that is inextricably linked with cognition. The idea of language being connected with the human neural system will be mentioned further (Evans and Green 2006: 44-45).

At this point it is necessary to at least outline the cognitive processes which underlie the embodied human thought, i.e. image schemas, metaphors and metonymies, or cognitive integration. These phenomena undoubtedly reflect in what manner the body exists in the mind, irrespective of the level of intelligence or the ability to appreciate the comic on the part of a language user. Firstly, it is essential to define image schemas (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Johnson 1987), since their understanding necessitates the comprehension of other related entities. Image schemas can be defined as basic concepts of location or position, for example container or distance, etc., which are derived directly from the experience a human body acquires with the surrounding world in early years of development. Such image-schematic experience is not abstract but rather originates from the human senses that we use to familiarise ourselves with the reality, i.e. touch, sight or smell, and we can refer to it as pre-conceptual experience (cf. Evans & Green 2006: 46). How is it achieved? Mandler conducted experiments with infants, who were only two months old, that indicate that such infants are captivated by objects and experience them in a spacial and geometrical context, the idea of which they later transfer into meaning in the process of perceptual meaning analysis. It is possible to draw the following conclusion then: '[O]ne of the foundations of the conceptualizing capacity is the image schema, in which spatial structure is mapped into conceptual structure' (Mandler 1992: 597 after Evans and Green 2006: 47). It has been argued that such image schemas can be further extended by means of conceptual projection in order to categorise some more elaborate concepts, e.g. love or anger, etc. This is where we encounter metaphor and metonymy – the phenomena that exist due to such projections of

image schematic nature from the source onto the target, and explain the higher-order relations such as emotion, for instance. Similarly, the projections between varying mental spaces that amalgamate into the blended structure are a more sophisticated realisation of basic image schemas in the process of conceptual integration. Specifically, parabolic thinking where we compress and decompress conflicting stories together, to gain understanding of more complicated processes are also worth mentioning here (Turner 2014 & 2015). The above-mentioned processes of cognitive projection will be of particular relevance for our study of humour.

Embodied experience is crucial to the understanding of human mind and comprehension. Yet this is not to say that through such perceptive and bodily experiences we are capable of accessing the reality and the world directly. As the objectivists (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980) would put it, there is a world and reality outside our bodies and through embodied cognition we are able to use language in the manner that reflects that reality objectively. On the contrary, the cognitivists argue that our perception and embodied experience provide us with the means to use language in the way that is representative and referential of the world around us (Evans and Green 2006: 48). This view is called experiential realism.

Having introduced the notion of image-schema and its consequences for the study of language, we shall now return to the biological basis of the term in question. As already mentioned, embodiment is considered semantic or symbol grounding, i.e. a process by which we attribute meaning as arbitrary symbols. According to Lakoff (1987), it is ICMs that ground abstract concepts in meaning via more concrete concepts. There is a taxonomy of ICMs, which Lakoff divides as follows: Image-Schematic ICMs, Propositional ICMs, Metaphoric ICMs, Metonymic ICMs and Symbolic ICMs. Following Fauconnier and Turner (2008 on-line), we certainly could add mental spaces and blending, as well as model structuring to the above. However, it is not the taxonomies as such that are crucial but rather the fact that substantial evidence exists suggesting that the human brain works in terms of ICMs, whether of metaphorical or mental spaces kind is of secondary importance. The evidence originates from psychological studies of metaphor by John O'Keefe (1990), and it points to the conclusion that metaphorical relations are acquired by means of the same circuits in the hippocampus that are also used in other ways for acquiring spacial relations (O'Keefe & Nadel 1978, O'Keefe 1990 and Howell 2000 on-line). It is precisely O'Keefe who argues that metaphor, thanks to hippocampus, is most central in embodied experience. This position is adopted by Lakoff (2006 & 2012) who goes further and hypothesises that it is therefore only right to search for evidence of categorisation

processes in the neural networks. By way of an analogy, we could also assume that if metaphor possesses biological basis in the human brain, there is no reason why other ICMs could not be similar in this respect. We could thus assume that metonymy, symbols or blends are also neurologically prompted. A suggestion has, therefore, been put forward by Lakoff that it is of importance to look for cognitive models (i.e. image-schemas, metaphor, etc.) in the neural networks, since if these can be found, then we could advance the PDP (parallel distributed processing neural networks) model of the process of language acquisition as well as usage. As observed by Ritchie (2004) or Turner (2014 & 2015) himself, this interest in the biological and neural basis of language goes hand in hand with computational modelling and artificial intelligence, all of which assume that it is possible to view language as a mechanism definable by algorithmic equations.

Embodied mind also suggests that humour, as a linguistic and conceptual process, can be regarded as embodied experience, which is exactly the position that is going to be taken in this paper. It is believed that humour can be understood and explained with reference to perception, gestures or other bodily experiences (after Vigliocco, Perniss & Vinson 2014 as well as Barsalou 2010). Hence, this paper sets itself a task of examining the comic of British film productions by means of one such possible cognitive network, i.e. conceptual integration. The proponents of conceptual integration claim that the concept of a topological projection between mental spaces into the blend ought to be regarded as a basic universal human brain operation that is applicable to the analysis of all human cognitive processes, such as metaphor, metonymy, or analogy, etc. Fauconnier and Turner (2008 online, as well as Turner 2014 & 2015) also assert that the further research into mental spaces ought to be computational and algorithmic. Hence, this study of humour conducted by means of such a universal, as it would seem, and such an embodied process as cognitive integration can reveal itself as truly underlying human cognition, here with regard to the comic.

It should be apparent that the embodied notion of humour is subjective, and relates to taste and cultural differences, which, as we aim to prove, fit perfectly well into cognitive integration network approach, especially with regard to blending's newly developed characteristics, such as (de)compression, mental simulation, fusion or subjectivity. By means of these, blending achieves human scale and intensifies so-called vital relations within the blended space. All these are applicable to humour in comedies, but also to many other processes, including art evaluation, mathematical processes or modality within language, a great variety of which certainly provided evidence that conceptual integration may be proposed to be treated as a universal process, with projection as a general operation of the human brain. Along the same lines, it is feasible to link blending

with relevance theoretic accounts of interaction, that might just provide another perspective on humour. Together, the paradigms might collaborate to achieve a multidimensional, deeper understanding of humour cognition.

Such a perspective on humour is not only classed as a humour theory, possibly universal, should otherwise not be found in further research with regard to other media of the comic, e.g. jokes or witty remarks etc., but it also prepares ground for humour to be viewed as an algorithmic operation accessible by means of pragmatically-oriented blends, an approach which seems to be favoured by many these days. Certainly, it would agree with Fauconnier and Turner's proposition to examine blending in computational perspective (e.g. Fauconnier and Turner 1997 or 2002, as well as Turner 2014 & 2015). Hence, the choice of apparatus and the task to examine comedy series via blending which ought to be context-dependent. In addition to this, blending's feature of online meaning proves crucial for the purpose of humour studies. The creation of online meaning assumes the extension of the blended space's relationships, considering other contexts outside blending, for example a conceptualiser's beliefs, knowledge or nationality, so at the same time incorporating the notion of situated cognition (Barsalou 2010), thus making this project truly multi-modal in relation to humour. If these could be proven to be neurologically anchored, which is precisely the proposition stipulated here as a further research development both in the field of cognitive linguistics and humour, it could constitute the breakthrough achievement pointing to a possible realisation that human cognition, language as well as humour are biologically preconditioned, which for the time being remains within the realms of pure science, and science fiction.

Chapter 1: Conceptual process in meaning construction: blending, metaphor and metonymy

1. Introduction

In this chapter 'cognitive integration theory' (CIT), as envisaged by Fauconnier and Turner (1995: 199, 2002) (section 1.1), will be presented, together with the appropriate opponents' critique (section 1.1.9), Only then shall I proceed to the key issues, i.e. blends, which may be perceived against a background of other related phenomena, e.g. metaphor or metonymy. Initially, the blends are displayed as resulting from mental spaces, in accordance with the CIT principles (section 1.1.3). Further, blends are proposed to be interpreted with reference to metaphor (section 1.2) as well as metonymy (section 1.3), and a suggestion is put forward to consider blends as having a possible metaphorical or metonymic basis, the relations between which are to be configured via mental spaces and blending (section 1.2.5.6). Such a view is evidently frequent and possible, yet not omnipresent and mandatory (section 1.2.5.6). This position is adopted here so as to present the blending of mental spaces of a potentially but not exclusively, metaphorical or metonymic nature, as a linguistic theory likely to explain the comic (chapter 2, section 2.4) in an exhaustive manner, when enriched by certain pragmatic paradigms (chapter 2, section 2.3.4 and 2.4), and eventually to conduct an analysis of humour in this light (chapter 3, section 3.2). CIT as enhanced via some pragmatic principles will serve here as a tool to be applied to comedy in order to explicate humour in a gestalt fashion. However, the aim of the book is not just to show that blending and pragmatics together can work to explain the origin of humour. It is as much to search for potential issues in humour research when we apply pragmatically-oriented CIT to elaborate on the comic (chapter 3 and 4). Such a perspective on comedy will ensure that the humour studies are developed and some relevant, novel conclusions are reached at the end of this enterprise with reference to humour and the lookout for a general humour theory.

1.1. The early blending theory

The cognitive integration theory (CIT), otherwise referred to as "blending", relies on the notion of mental spaces, the theory developed by Gilles Fauconnier. Fauconnier defines mental spaces as 'constructs distinct from linguistic structures but built up in any discourse according to guidelines provided by the linguistic

expressions' (Fauconnier 1997: 16). More specifically, mental spaces are to be interpreted as 'partial structures that proliferate when we think and talk, allowing a fine-grained partitioning of our discourse and knowledge structures' (Fauconnier 1997: 11). Thus mental spaces are regarded as particular cognitive fields of associations which arise during the cognitive processes of the human mind (Turner 2014: 11; Fauconnier and Turner 1998: 6; Bing and Scheibman 2014: 29, Grady 2005: 1595-1596; Per Ange Brandt 2005: 1579-1580). According to Fauconnier (Fauconnier 1997: 17), it is these linguistic units that construct mental spaces and form elements of, as well as relations between, various mental spaces or within them. Crucially,

> A mental space is built up in part by recruiting from (possibly many) conceptual domains and from local context. We can build different and incompatible spaces by recruiting from the same conceptual domain.' (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 331),

This suggests that the correspondences between mental spaces are of a complex nature and can be extended by the information which does not necessarily originate exclusively from the spaces in question, (i.e. from contextual information), but can also originate from a number of conceptual domains related to such mental spaces, for example a local context. Indeed, the internal structure of mental spaces is motivated in both a conceptual and experiential manner (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 333; Turner 2014: 11-13). In addition to this, the associations between various mental spaces, which link them and aid their construal, are called mappings. 'A mapping (…) is a correspondence between two sets that assign to each element in the first a counterpart in the second' (Fauconnier 1997: 1). Mappings, then, are connotations between particular lexical items [or rather particular concepts that lexical items stand for], and they are activated when an individual conceptualises the surrounding world. Mappings are culturally and lexically rooted, hence they lie at the heart of semantic comprehension, language interpretation and mental construction (Fauconnier 1997: chapter 1, and Fauconnier and Sweetser 1996: 5-6). Mappings may be metaphorical or metonymic relations between concepts, and they are possible due to the Identification (ID) Principle that allows for the mental connection of the two concepts:

> If two objects (in the most general sense), a and b, are linked by a pragmatic function F(b = F(a)), a description of a, da, may be used to identify its counterpart b (Fauconnier 1994: 3; Fauconnier and Sweetser 1996: 7)

Thus, the following sentence: *The gastric ulcer in room 12 would like some coffee* (Fauconnier 1997: 11; Coulson & Oakley on-line) may be easily understood via the following mapping, where an illness represents a patient who needs to quench his thirst:

Figure 1. The Identification Principle

Mental spaces are structured on the basis of the so-called space builders which can be defined as follows:

> (…) linguistic units that either prompt for the construction of a new mental space or shift attention back and forth between previously constructed mental spaces; they require a hearer to set up a scenario beyond the 'here and now', whether this scenario reflects past or future reality, hypothetical situations, ideas, beliefs, etc. (Evans & Green 2006: 371)

The gastric ulcer from Figure 1 above is an example of a space builder. This expression helps us to construct a mapping between the illness and a hospitalised patient, which enhances the additional relations that might be emphasised, e.g. the fact that it might be a standard practice for nurses to refer to all patients by the name of their illnesses. In this way, we could imagine that there are possibly people in the hospital called the appendicitises, the heart transplants or the "heart attacks".

From the example just mentioned it becomes apparent that mental spaces and the meanings that they create are closely associated with the discourse context[1]. What follows from this is that a meaning resulting from the associations between mental spaces will always be construed in many different ways, with regard to a particular discourse context (Evans & Green 2006, 371). Hence, such meaning is always of a dynamic nature. We shall discuss the dynamic construction of meaning in CIT below.

1.1.1. How do mental spaces function?

From the description so far, mental spaces can be regarded as temporary structures, constructed simultaneously with the ongoing discourse. This can include either pre-existing elements of our conceptual system or elements construed online (Fauconnier 1997: 1-18). For the time being, I shall focus predominantly on

1 The notion of mental space has been examined by Hutchins (2003 on-line) who proposes to view such mental spaces as material anchors. The term material anchor refers to the input structure whose material structure is transposed onto that of the blended space. Thus the conceptual structure is proved to be strongly linked with the material structure, which may be exemplified in fictive motion, for example. More material anchors are presented within the study by Hutchins (see 2003 on-line).

the mental spaces theory, though I shall return to the notion of on-line meaning creation and present its detailed explanation later in this chapter. Mental spaces are structured by means of frames or ICMs, all of which are understood to be related concepts (Evans and Green 2006: 269-270). The mental space, which allows for the creation of meaning, is the so-called base, defined as 'the space that remains accessible for the construction of a new mental space' (Evans & Green 2006: 373-374). What this means is that for any number of mental spaces to be combined there is always a space builder originating from one mental space, i.e. the base. The space builder justifies all the resulting correspondences. The base is also directly associated with the generic space, the former being the realisation of the latter. Again supporting the explanation with the use of the gastric ulcer example, we may refer to the mental space of the illness as a base against which all the correspondences are arrived at.

According to Fauconnier (1994: 3-9) different elements in different mental spaces are joined by connectors, which establish the mappings between the appropriate elements of two, or more, different spaces. Such counterparts are based on the function of identity, which is summarised by the Access Principle as follows: 'an expression that names or describes an element in one mental space can be used to access a counterpart of that element in another mental space' (Fauconnier 1997: 41). For instance, in the *gastric ulcer* scenario, the illness acts as a connector which, in search of its counterpart, is mapped onto the patient identified by the corresponding illness. Hence, our connectors can join upwards (with the target), as just quoted in the metonymic relation of different elements of one and the same mental space, or downwards (functioning as a trigger) between spaces (Evans & Green 2006: 363-399). It is, therefore, connectors that ensure the establishing of the various mappings between corresponding mental spaces, or their counterpart elements. It is important to bear in mind the metonymic as well as the metaphorical basis of the mental spaces and their mappings, to which we shall return in the final section of this chapter.

1.1.2. The cognitive integration theory (CIT)

Having discussed conceptual integration, I shall now focus on the process of blending itself, a process which relies on mental spaces. Blending is a cognitive operation that involves two input mental spaces (or more), a generic space that maps onto the input spaces, and a fourth space called the blend. According to Fauconnier (1997: 149), 'the blend inherits partial structure from input spaces and has an emergent structure of its own', the assumption behind which is that only certain elements from the input mental spaces form correspondences, while others may remain irrelevant, and only such mappings that are topological are

projected to the blended space and elaborated through the emerging structure of the blend. For two input spaces to be blended, the following conditions should be satisfied:

(1) CROSS-SPACE MAPPING: there is a partial mapping of counterparts between the input spaces [i.e. not all the elements from input space 1 and 2 are utilised]
(2) GENERIC SPACE: there is a generic space, which maps onto each of the inputs. This generic space reflects some common, usually more abstract, structure and organisation shared by the inputs and defines the core cross-space mapping between them.
(3) BLEND: the inputs are partially projected onto a fourth space, the blend
(4) EMERGENT STRUCTURE: the blend has emergent structure not provided by the inputs. This happens in three (interrelated) ways: COMPOSITION: taken together, the projections from the inputs make new relations available that did not exist in the separate inputs [i.e. the movement of elements from the inputs guarantees the new relations and associations in the blend]. COMPLETION: knowledge of background frames, cognitive and cultural models, allows the composite structure, projected into the blend from the inputs, to be viewed as part of a larger self-contained structure in the blend. The pattern in the blend triggered by the inherited structures is "completed" into the larger emergent structure [i.e. the ability of the blended sphere to be conceptualised as a novel self-efficient composite with the aid of the encyclopaedic and background knowledge, it involves the evoking of other closely connected frames or ICMs]. ELABORATION: the structure in the blend can then be elaborated, (…) that is it consists of cognitive work performed within the blend, according to its own emergent logic [i.e. the blended structure is further refined and expanded on, which brings about new meanings, connotations and additional semantic components that do not stem from the inputs, but are rather achieved via the mixture of information in the blend] (Fauconnier 1997: 149-157).

The most abstract and general mental space, i.e. the generic space, provides an overall layout for the mappings between the inputs. For example, it may specify elements such as participants, activities or objects that are further developed by the concrete input spaces. The inputs draw correspondences between themselves, which are projected as mapping relations onto the blend. Finally, the blended structure acquires its own emergent structure by (I) composition, which equates the mappings into proper relations; and (II) by completion, which links the novel relations together in a wider context with other interconnected frames or ICMs, the associations being based on the cultural, background or encyclopaedic knowledge of language users[2] (Fauconnier and Turner 1998: 5). The blended space in the completion processes functions as a self-contained unit that can be treated as

2 A concept of a grounded blend has been proposed by Liddell (1998 on-line) and it is an interesting perspective on CIT. The concept involves the act of blending of a mental space

a whole. Ultimately, the elaboration is achieved via manipulations and extensions of the blended contents itself, bringing new meanings or contexts onto the blend, in accordance with the blend's own logical relations. This is how cognitive integration operates, which can be represented graphically in the following manner:

Figure 2. A schematic representation of blending processes, i.e. a conceptual integration network



The above schema is called the conceptual integration network (Fauconnier 1994: 16-21), and as it stands, a generic space provides the elements that entirely conform to both of the input spaces. Then, in accordance with the cross-space mapping principle, first partial correspondences between the inputs are drawn, and eventually the fragmentary mappings from the input spaces are projected onto the blend. The blended space may display a certain degree of incongruity due to its dual, varied origin (Fauconnier & Turner 1999: 77-80). The last stage of blending – elaboration – takes place 'as we imagine, given this conceptual starting point, what else might ensue, adding an indefinite amount of detail to the narrative' (Grady et al 2002: 335-336; Coulson & Grady & Oakley on-line;

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together with the elements of the immediate physical environment, which can incorporate non-linguistic elements used in communication, e.g. gestures.

Coulson & Oakley on-line). Hence, the blend ensures that even the ideas loosely-connected with it, yet conjured up by the mental thinking processes in relation to the very blend, might emerge during such a comprehension.

Fauconnier and Turner describe the process of assigning correspondences between mental spaces and their interrelation as follows:

> Mappings themselves are the imaginative products of blending, whether simple or complex, and are not predictable from the language forms used to evoke them. The meaning of the whole is not predictable from the meanings of the parts, but the mapping scheme of the whole is predictable from the mapping schemes of the parts. (Fauconnier & Turner 2003b: 147)

It is important to note the mental operation of blending precisely, whereby the construction of the overall meaning of an expression is achieved via the study of the expression's parts and the way they are projected and blended together, with the emphasis on the emergent structure and how it integrates the in-blend relations. The unity of meaning in the emergent structure of the blend, which is ensured by composition, completion and elaboration, can further be safeguarded by the following:

> *Modification*: during the construction of an integration network, any space within it can be further modified. For instance, there is a possibility of reverse mappings from the blend, in order to complete the integration network.
>
> *Entrenchment*: blends are frequently generated on the fly and in this sense they are novel, however, they might employ the already entrenched blends, or alternatively, they might become entrenched themselves.
>
> *Event integration*: blends lead to event integration, whether merely to link two or more events together, or to superimpose and blend them, etc., to the extent that it is claimed that blends constitute a basic instrument for event integration.
>
> *Wide application*: integration networks are capable of serving different purposes, e.g. To transfer emotions or inferences, to create novel meaning or change in meaning, or to integrate action(s), to say the least (Fauconnier and Turner 2003b: 49-50).

On closer scrutiny, then, modification enables us to modify the contents of a conceptual integration network in order to complete blending and allow for any gaps to be filled in the topological relations between spaces, e.g. a reverse mapping from the blended structure to one of the inputs is allowed. Also, there is a possibility of entrenchment[3] with the CIT, where already established and fully conventionalised blends give rise to novel, more elaborate blends.

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3 As noted by Langacker (2000: 3-4; 2005: 143-146), certain linguistic units may become conventionalised in the course of time to such a degree that they may further serve as a basis

Finally, the conceptual integration process is characteristic of event integration, whether we simply think of linking two events, or juxtaposing them, right through to their blending and modification. Also, the conceptual integration is said to be the basic cognitive operation accomplishing many specific purposes, e.g. conveying emotions, making inferences or expressing meaning. Viewed in this light, CIT may be considered a basic cognitive process (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 304; 2008b on-line).

One more important remark has to be made with regard to CIT. Whether we think that blending is conscious or not, we have to realise that it is based on a cultural context which it incorporates with the intention of encouraging creativity and novel meaning composition.[4] The question that arises, however, concerns the manner with which such a contextual knowledge is employed by humans for conceptual blending; i.e. assuming that blending is ubiquitous, and unconscious at the same time, how can it incorporate local context in the way that is similar for all the users of a particular culture? The answer is given by Fauconnier and Turner as follows:

> Although it can be hard to come up with good projections, once the culture has them they are easily learned, precisely because cultures have invented systems of form, such as language, whose purpose is to prompt for various kinds of imaginative work like selective projection. Finding a blend for which the culture has no previous recipe can involve considerable amounts of unconscious cognitive exploration, but using the formal prompts provided by culture to reconstruct such a blend once it has been found is much easier. The imaginative Achilles puts his formal armour to good use. (Fauconnier and Turner 2003b: 73)

Thus, blending as a process does not occur on-line directly from the start. People and cultures develop cognitive integration patterns and these are further handed down and evolve. For this reason, the setting up of the blended space does not appear to be in contrast to the running of the blend (i.e. elaborating it) that is considered more creative and on-the-fly. On the other hand, once a certain blend has

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for some novel relations. Langacker calls such an extension of language units augmentation, where one linguistic unit is elaborated, or augmented, into another. Still, an already augmented unit is capable of further extension. In the same manner, blends may become entrenched and augmented even more, into bigger augmented wholes, as the entrenchment principle states.

4 Sinha (1999) advocates a similar perspective on language. Precisely, Sinha proposes the so-called 'dual grounding' view of language as well as cognition, the notion which links embodied grounding and functional grounding. Basically, Sinha favours the view on language that is based on individual-cognitive perspective and social-functional view of language which are inseparable.

gained its emergent structure, it might become conventionalised and accepted in the given culture as a pattern. Such an entrenched pattern will be used with considerable ease in order to aid a novel patterns formulation. This is how CIT accounts for the cultural element and context being used for the purposes of blending.

1.1.3. Optimality principles and CIT

Based on the above information pertaining to CIT, it would seem that in blending we link anything with everything else. This is, however, an illusion. In order to rule out some cases of the supposed blended spaces that blatantly violate the gist of "pure" conceptual integration, Fauconnier proposed a list of higher-order governing principles, called optimality principles, that ought to "supervise" every instance of blending. The optimality principles serve the prime purpose, for they structure and tightly constrain the blending processes, guarding the conceptual integration networks against disintegration, interference or displacement. These include:

> INTEGRATION: the blend must constitute a tightly integrated scene that can be manipulated as a unit;
>
> WEB: manipulating the blend as a unit must maintain the web of appropriate connections to the input spaces easily and without additional surveillance or computation;
>
> UNPACKING: the blend alone must enable the understander to unpack the blend to reconstruct the inputs, the cross-space mapping, the generic space, and the network of connections among all these spaces;
>
> TOPOLOGY: for many input spaces and any element in that space projected into the blend, it is optimal for the relations of the element in the blend to match the relations of its counterparts;
>
> BACKWARD PROJECTION: as the blend is run and develops emergent structure, avoid backward projection to an input that will disrupt the integration of the input itself;
>
> METONYMY PROJECTION: when as element is projected from an input to the blend and a second element from that input is projected because of its metonymic link to the first, shorten the metonymic distance to them in the blend (Fauconnier 1997: 185-186; Fauconnier & Turner 1999, 84-85; Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 334-335; Coulson & Oakley 2000 on-line; Grady & Oakley & Coulson on-line).

Let us take a closer look at the above-mentioned rules of blending. The first principle of integration is to ensure that the blended space functions as a closely connected, manipulatable and well-established unit, whereas the web principle is to supervise the smooth network of connections between the blend and the inputs. The unpacking principle is to guarantee that the content of the blend is easily "deconstructed back" to the inputs and the generic space, without it being a mental struggle on the part of a language user. Topology obviously secures the status of mappings, so that they are projected into the blended spaces in an appropriate way and remain as relations therein. Similarly, the metonymy projection rule

"supervises" the metonymic correspondences from mental spaces to the extent that it allows for the shortening of the metonymic distance between two elements from one and the same mental space if there is the relation of metonymy involved between them. And lastly, the rule of backward projection that forbids the fictive route backwards (to the inputs, i.e.) from the blend after it has been altered and acquired an emergent structure of its own, so that there is no problem of disintegration or deconstruction.

The optimality principles have been studied in detail by Coulson and Oakley (Coulson and Oakley on-line), who came to the conclusion that although at times the semantics of a studied example is not as orderly as one would like it to be, with regard to cross-space mappings, the 'unruly, ad hoc, conglomerations' that we assemble still remain in accordance with the optimality rules. And, although the mappings might violate the topology principle, it is usually for the sake of the tight integration within correspondences that such a violation might be allowed (see Coulson and Oakley on-line for more specific examples).

1.1.4 Diverse blending networks

As stated earlier in the chapter, the graphical representation of blending is called the cognitive integration network. CIT singles out different kinds of such a network within blending (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 343-351), the basic one being:

> (…) [the]one in which human cultural and biological history has provided an effective frame that applies to certain kinds of elements, as values, (…) the frame in one input is compatible with the elements in the other: There is no clash between the inputs, such as competing frames or incompatible counterpart elements. As a result, a simplex network does not look intuitively like a blend at all (Fauconnier & Turner 2003b: 120).

In a simplex network one input space is an abstract space with an organising frame, whereas the other input refers to a specific situation with no apparent organising frame. Thus, there is no discrepancy between the inputs at all (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 347-348; Turner on-line). One example of a simplex network is the sentence *Paul is the father of Sally*, where the first input space of a family relations projects onto the second input, i.e. the above statement's input, and its roles of father and daughter, making the two perfectly compatible spaces (Fauconnier and Turner 2003b: 120).

The second kind of cognitive integration networks is a mirror network, defined as follows:

> A mirror network is an integration network in which all spaces - inputs, generic, and blend - share an organizing frame (…) [where] an organizing frame for a mental space is a frame that specifies the nature of the relevant activity, events, and participants.' (…)

> The input spaces mirror each other in the sense that they have the same organizing frame. So does the generic space. (…) An organizing frame provides a topology for the space it organizes, that is, it provides a set of organizing relations among the elements in the space. When two spaces share the same organizing frame, they share the corresponding topology and so can easily be put into correspondence.' (Fauconnier & Turner 2003b: 123)

A mirror network is therefore a network in which the generic space provides an organising frame that is literally mirrored in both inputs, so establishing topology is relatively easy. That does not entail that the spaces cannot differ in any respect. There are possible divergences allowed at a more detailed level (Fauconnier 1997: 24-25). Essentially, there is incidental topology present, which means that both input spaces possess elements of a finer detail that are not included in the organising frame (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 341-342; Turner on-line).

A "Regatta scenario" may serve as a case in point here. The ship called Northern Light covered the distance between San Francisco and Boston in 1853 in 76 days and 8 hours; the same distance was covered by a different ship, called Great American II in 1993 but with greater speed, which prompted the following observation, well before Great American has finished its sailing: 'At this point, *Great American II* is 4.5 days ahead of *Northern Light*.' (Fauconnier and Turner 2003b: 63; 2006: 327-334). There are two input spaces here, the first one regarding Northern Light, the second being in relation to Great American II. However, they share one organising frame which specifies: the nature of activity performed, i.e. sailing from San Francisco to Boston; the events, i.e. the course of a boat sailing along the ocean, with different timings on the part of two ships involved; and finally the participants, i.e. Northern Light and Great American II. Although the time span and space are different, and the events taking place in different realities have to be compressed, they still share one organising frame and topology, in this way mirroring each other (Fauconnier and Turner 2003b: 122-126). I shall return to the notion of compression later on in this chapter.

Finally, we can distinguish the so-called shared topology networks in which the topology of the generic space is in any case shared by the following: a generic space, the input spaces and the blend. Thus, such four-space conceptual integration networks are always shared topology networks. On the other hand, the multiple blends do not conform to this rule, as they consist of more than four identical spaces and display incompatibility (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 343-347; Turner on-line). Among shared topology networks we can distinguish between single-scope networks and double-scope networks which form a gradient (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 346; Turner on-line). The former is described as follows:

> A single-scope network has two input spaces with different organizing frames, one of which is projected to organize the blend. Its defining property is that the organizing frame of the blend is an extension of the organizing frame of one of the inputs, but not the other (Fauconnier & Turner 2003b: 126).
>
> (…) Single-scope networks are the prototype of highly conventional source-target metaphors. The input that provides the organizing frame to the blend, the framing input, is often called the "source". The input that is the focus of understanding, the focus input, is often called the "target" (Fauconnier & Turner 2003b: 127).

In a nutshell, single-scope networks might be referred to as metaphoric, where the projection to the blended space is asymmetric. What this means is that one of the inputs, called the source input, provides an organising frame and frame correspondences. The target frame will also provide elements, yet such elements will belong to the specific level or incidental topology (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 344). So the source input's organising frame is projected to organise the blend exclusively, and not the other input's frame. Again, Fauconnier and Turner provide a good example of a single-scope network themselves. Specifically, the scene of two men boxing functions as input space 1, as projected onto the understanding of two top businessmen fighting in a business competition, being the input space 2 (Fauconnier and Turner 2003b: 126-131). There are topologies between the two inputs, such as each boxer is mapped onto each businessman, boxing is understood as fighting, dealing a blow is understood as attacking the position of the other businessman, etc. However, only one input space organises the projected transfer to the blend, specifically the boxing mental space with its organising frame.

As for the double-scope networks, Fauconnier and Turner define it as:

> A double-space network has inputs with different (and often clashing) organizing frames as well as an organizing frame for the blend that includes parts of each of those frames and has emergent structure of its own. In such networks, both organizing frames make central contributions to the blend, and their sharp differences offer the possibility of rich clashes. Far from blocking the construction of the network, such clashes offer challenges to the integration; indeed, the resulting blends can be highly creative (Fauconnier & Turner 2003b: 131).

Although a double-scope network has input spaces which are organised by completely different frames, some topology is established between them, and they are transferred as correspondences into the blended space (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 344-345; Turner on-line & 2007 for further discussion on double-scope blending). Double-scope networks shall prove vital for humour analysis in chapter 3, where the majority of examples will be shown to rely on varying inputs. However, for the time being, a good illustration of such a

cognitive network is a sentence such as *You are digging your own grave* which provides us with two incompatible input spaces, i.e. the input space of digging a grave, and the input space of failing to achieve one's goals. It is apparent that there will be clashes, if one chooses to superimpose the two spaces. It is also apparent that the blend will consist of the mixture of the two inputs, juxtaposed to form the blended emergent structure. For example, the elements such as failing to attain a goal may be understood as being dead and buried, or unfortunate steps which an individual takes that precede and cause the failing can equal to the digging of one's own grave (see Fauconnier and Turner 2006 for further discussion).

The above types of network adjustment provide a more thorough insight into the nature of cognitive integration, describing the level of its complexity which, on the other hand, will relate to the understanding of a blend in question. The more sophisticated the network type is, the more complex the comprehension processes are said to be.

To conclude, Fauconnier and Turner maintain that language usage is closely associated with cognitive integration. Language as such simply provides the basis for possible mappings and extensions in blending, hence: 'We may think of language as a system of prompts for integration.' (Fauconnier & Turner 2003b: 143).

1.1.5. An illustration of CIT

To show how cognitive integration works it is best to take a look at the example discussed by Grady, Oakley and Coulson (on-line), Marick (on-line) and Brandt & Brandt (also on-line), namely the sentence: *This surgeon is a butcher*. Its integration can be presented as follows

Figure 3. Conceptual integration network presenting surgeon as butcher (after Grady, Oakley & Coulson on-line)



The four-mental-space cognitive network includes: the generic space with most conventional roles that will be fulfilled by the inputs, the roles being: agent, undergoer, sharp instrument, work space, procedure (including goal and means); input space 1 which centres around the domain of surgery, with the following

elements: surgeon, patient, scalpel, operating room, surgery and healing; input space 2, the basis of which lie within the butchery domain, with the elements as follows: butcher, commodity (here animal), cleaver, abattoir, butchery and finally severing flesh. All the above-described roles are connected via a series of cross-space mappings: 1-agent is surgeon who becomes butcher, 2-undergoer is patient, who becomes a commodity or animal, 3-instrument is mapped onto a scalpel which becomes a cleaver, 4-work space is the operating room which becomes the abattoir, and 5-the means is surgery which becomes butchery. Such correspondences, projected from the source domain, i.e. input space 1, onto target domain, i.e. input space 2, are brought together, according to composition and completion principles, to develop the emergent structure of the blend, although not all the elements of each input space are taken into consideration. Thus, the blend only partially inherits the structure of the inputs. In the blend, then, the elaboration takes place, i.e. the blended structure is refined and novel meanings are added, so the identity of all the pairs is recognised, and a certain degree of incompatibility follows, particularly where surgery equates to butchery;

> (…) elaboration is the stimulated mental performance of the event in the blend, which we may continue indefinitely. For instance, we might proceed from the image of a butcher carving a patient to the even more grotesque image of a butcher packing the patient's tissue as cold cuts. Once the connections to long term knowledge about operations and butchery have been made, we are able to imagine scenarios which unfold along various possible trajectories. (Grady, Oakley & Coulson on-line)

Such unfolding of the blended space is characteristic of the language user who attempts to interpret the blend, and uses all the possible contextual, cultural and encyclopaedic knowledge available to them, as so to best use the information provided by the blend. Even ridiculous or impossible scenarios are allowed by CIT, none of these being rejected as wrong or inappropriate. In whatever manner the elaboration may proceed, the activities mentioned above are incongruous due to their nature; a surgeon being precise and meticulous, while a butcher fairly rough and brutal. Elaboration brings about the idea of on-line meaning, which is closely connected with blending. On-line-meaning, in simple terms, is the '(…) real-time process that creates new meanings through the juxtaposition of familiar material' (Grady, Oakley & Coulson on-line). The on-line meaning idea refers to the fact that it is performed on-the-fly, instantly and continuously in relation to the elaboration processes.

Consider how the optimality principles established by Fauconnier and Turner (see sections 1.1.4 & also 1.1.8 for more) constrain this particular blending instance. Firstly, the surgeon as butcher blend is well-integrated owing to the fact that the correspondences between the inputs themselves and respectively

between the blend and the input spaces are built in a tight manner and also follow the metonymic tightening rule. Secondly, it is possible to go back from the blend to the inputs before elaboration takes place. The topology is thus well-maintained. Consequently, we may classify the surgeon as butcher example as a well-integrated blending instance.

1.1.6. What is the objective of CIT?

It should be noted that blending is considered to be omnipresent. Not only is it used to explain linguistic phenomena, such as, for instance, counterfactuality (Fauconnier 1990), noun phrases and compounding (Coulson 2001), or grammar in general (Fauconnier and Turner 1996), discourse (Oakley 1998), performative speech & action, i.e. pragmatics (Sweetser 2000), morphology (Kremmer 2003: 67-97) or metaphor (Janowski 2007), but it is also regarded as a tool for the explication of literary texts or art (Brandt & Brandt on-line; Rohre 2005, 1686–1716; Sweetser 2006 online; Stockwell 2002: 96-103; Turner 1998: 57-84), politics (Harder 2005, 1636–1652), psychological issues (Sinha 2005, 1537–1554), psychiatry (Kiang 2005, 13-24), cartoons and verbal humour (Jabłońska 2003: 57-98, Jabłońska-Hood 2007a: 73-93 & 2007b: 305-317), irony (Wengorek-Dolecka 2005), courtroom discourse (Pascual 2002, 129-225), creativity (Pereira and Cardoso online), computational analyses (Veale & O'Donoghue, after Coulson & Oakley 2000; Nerhardt 2002 on-line or Ritchie on-line) or mathematical processes, e.g. the infinite number (Nunez 2005, 1717-1741). Blending has simply become a crucial means of study, which

> (…) goes beyond both a philological interest in the history of words and a formal interest in the patterns of grammar to a cognitive scientific interest in basic mental operations that underlie language and that are indispensable to human understanding. Conceptual blending is a basic mental operation. It plays a role in grammar, semantics, discourse, meaning, visual representation, mathematics, jokes, cartoons, and poetry. It is indispensable to the poetics of literature because it is fundamental to the poetics of mind. (Turner & Fauconnier 1997)

Note that cognitive integration was presented in the preceding quotation as a basic cognitive process which ought to be recognised as underlying human thought and creativity. Blending is not some far-fetched theory which has no use in respect of ordinary brain activities. And although complex in its form, it is ubiquitous, and hence subconsciously it must be well-known to every individual (most of human thinking is subconscious and cannot be accessed or retrieved!). For this reason, it is proposed that cognitive integration should be recognised as a universally acknowledged basic process which lies at the roots of human

thought and language (Fauconnier and Turner 2003a: 31-38). Also, it is apparent that CIT has become widespread and popular in many fields of research. It has aided the progress in diverging linguistic and non-linguistic experiments. However, despite its complex applications, it is understood to be a simple cognitive procedure applied not only to complex scientific issues, but first and foremost, to everyday processes of human understanding. Hence, CIT is to be considered a basic operation of a human mind, and ought to be studied as such.

1.1.7. The modifications and recent development of CIT

Throughout the last decade, CIT research has developed significantly, bringing about novel extensions to the theory. However, the primary interest has been laid on cognitive mappings, or correspondences. Firstly, the idea of projection, is referred to as 'the backbone of analogy, categorization, and grammar.' (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 304), i.e. projection can appear in simple analogical expressions, in meaning construction, in categorising as well as in grammatical constructions, for instance counterfactuals (Fauconnier 1997: 90-130; Fauconnier after Fauconnier and Sweetser 1996: 57-90). Projection is envisaged as a basic cognitive operation, alongside framing or categorization, which can appear at all levels of abstraction (Fauconnier and Turner, as above). Projection never results from any one single space, but rather from a network of spaces and the connections holding in between. Hence, it is built against multiple-space arrangements. Also, the meaning constructed on the basis of projections does not result from mere projections themselves, neither does it reside in the blended spaces, as specified below:

> During blending, conceptual work may be required at any site in the conceptual array. Spaces, domains, and frames can proliferate and be modified. Blending can be applied successfully during that proliferation. Achieving useful counterpart structure and useful integration may require activating different input mental spaces, changing the recruitment of structure to them, establishing different generic connections between them, projecting different structure from the inputs to the blend, recruiting different frames to the blend, projecting different structure from the blend back to the inputs, multiplying the blends, and so on. (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 331)

The above quotation leaves no doubt that in CIT meaning is created actively via backward and forward manipulation of the contents from the inputs and the additional spaces that are brought into the blended structure by means of background or context associations. In cognitive integration, then, meaning is an actively created process that is arrived at with some cognitive effort on the part of its conceptualiser. In addition, the fact that the meaning construction in blending is dynamic also refers to the discourse participants, i.e. conceptualisers,

in the manner in which they keep record of the mental spaces they use. The role of language here is twofold: we use the reference to time which is expressed linguistically by grammatical reference, and we utilise epistemic modality which signals epistemic distance linguistically (Evans & Green 2006: 400-444). However, blending goes far beyond that. Because mental spaces and conceptual integration processes are construed on-line[5], they bring about 'unique and temporary "packets" of conceptual structure, constructed specifically for purposes of ongoing discourse' (Evans & Green 2006: 369). I shall return to the concept of the on-line meaning, which is closely connected with the idea of ongoing discourse, further.

Secondly, another fundamental process which accompanies CIT is mental simulation which is of assistance with respect to the online elaborations of meaning in blended spaces, and justifies the operations which carry fictive or imaginary reference (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 305). A case in point may be what has become a classic in CIT, i.e. *the riddle of the Buddhist monk.* The riddle has the following format:

> The riddle of the Buddhist monk: A Buddhist monk begins at dawn one day walking up a mountain, reaches the top at sunset, meditates at the top for several days until one dawn when he begins to walk back to the foot of the mountain, which he reaches at sunset. Making no assumptions about his starting or stopping or about his pace during the trips, prove that there is a place on the path which he occupies at the same hour of the day on the two separate journeys. (Köestler 1964 after Fauconnier and Turner 1998: 6, or Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 306-315; Turner on-line, available at: markturner.org/blending.html;).

From the above description it follows that there is not one single moment in time when the monk occupies the same location on both upwards and downwards paths, and this is what requires clarification in the riddle. CIT makes it possible to solve the riddle, with the aid of mental simulation. To begin, it is necessary to imagine the fictive path of the monk going up and down simultaneously. Although the two journeys are not performed at the same time, one can mentally scan them onto each other, thus producing two paths which run one upon the other within the same time span and converge precisely in the middle of the mountain slope. Without such mental simulation, it would be fairly difficult to understand the processes of such a riddle, or any other, more complex fictive situation.

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5 Keil's study into causative patterns of knowledge in categorisation prove that individuals usually possess shallow knowledge as to the causation of entities and processes, however, we seem to excel in online comprehension of causal relations and patterns in the environments that are information rich (Keil 2003: 690). This correlation between online causative excellence and CIT's online meaning creation might not be accidental, as Keil's study shows.

Thirdly, CIT shows a range of structurally uniform and dynamic characteristics applicable to data such as inferences or emotions, which are not easily described by other available models (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 305). To illustrate this point we shall refer to the expression *to dig one's own grave* (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 321-323), already described in part in section 1.1.5 in terms of a double scope network. It may appear that the expression functions as a set of simple projections between the following domains: the domain of graves and the domain of falling into trouble; where death and burial are equated with failing to perform well and encountering problems, etc. There are basically two inferences possible to be drawn from the expression: 1 – a person is doing something which will result in negative consequences, 2 – there is no intention on the part of a grave-digger to dig his own grave. Nevertheless, there is more to the expression than meets the eye. Specifically, the causal structure of the expression is distorted. What it means is that grave-digging cannot in any logical way cause death, just as one cannot be aware of the fact that they unintentionally dig their own grave and head for death. Similarly, the frame structure of the expression is violated, i.e. it is not usual for the patient who is dying to dig their own grave – their role is rather passive. It is rather the role of an active agent who performs such an act of digging, after the patient's death. However, in this case the grave-digger is the active patient. In addition, the structure of the metaphor is also violated, i.e. the invariance hypothesis principle, stating that the image-schematic structure of the target matches the structure of the source, is not in operation here (for more on invariance hypothesis principle see sections 1.2.8 and 1.2.9). Basically, it is true that the intensity of the problems a person experiences, which is part of the target, deepens the intensity of the consequences in relation to such problems. However, the source does not imply that the depth of a grave increases the chances of dying. All the above mentioned mismatches can easily be resolved by means of blending. The blended space, which is initially based on the source and target inputs, has the projections and analogies from the inputs transported into the blend, where they are further elaborated on. Such an elaboration process manipulates the contents in all possible ways, however unreal the online meaning extensions of the blended space might be. In this way, the information from the inputs creates a perfectly suitable construction of meaning in the blend (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 321-323).

Let us now turn to the more advanced features of CIT that have become apparent following recent studies. One such characteristic is the fact that input spaces are frequently blends in their own right with complex blending further in the background. To go even further, Fauconnier and Turner (2006: 330) suggest that a good blend can become the basis for a superior one, previously mentioned

with reference to entrenchment and Langacker's augmented structures in section 1.1.3. The next advanced characteristic of blending is the fact that blends are creative in their nature. What this means is that the mappings projected into the blends must not be accidental, but rather they must satisfy a number of constraints in order to be recruited for blending. Apart from the optimality principles, discussed above in section 1.1.4, there are also more sophisticated constraints to be obeyed. The first to be mentioned is the opportunistic recruitment of elements within the blends (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 334-335). Namely, the manner in which we process the information in the blends is opportunistic, there is no way of explaining why looking at *the Buddhist monk riddle* (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 306-310) we choose to link the two journeys up and down the mountain, and not any other, viable alternative projection. The selection of projection is a matter of prioritising. However, once such a projection is prioritised, it adds to the meaning of the blend and completes the blend's emergent structure in a compatible way.

Entrenchment, referred to in section 1.1.3, constitutes the next advanced feature of CIT, which has not previously been discussed in any detail by the proponents of the blending theory. As it stands, the blends constitute two distinct kinds: they are either entrenched or novel. The entrenched structure is provided by the phrase: *digging one's own grave*, while the novel one-off construction to be blended is the linking of two paths of a Buddhist monk in the above-mentioned riddle. The latter example exhibits one more crucial property of CIT, namely, fusion. It is in the Buddhist monk example that we fuse the daytimes and positions of the monk on two divergent occasions into one happening. Fusion is not obligatory, however, and only certain elements within projections are fused. For instance, although we fuse the journeys of the monk, we do not fuse the two personifications of the monk.

The most characteristic feature of a blend is that of incorporating elements which do not originate from inputs, and are based on some metonymic associations that do not function as counterparts between mental spaces. Such metonymic relations might be connected to one of the following categories: Change, Identity, Time, Space, Cause-effect, Part-whole, Representation, Role-Value, Analogy, Disanalogy, Property, Similarity, Category, Intentionality, and Uniqueness. Any of these above mentioned relations might be compressed for an easier search of meaning in the blends, such compression being a routine procedure within CIT (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 336-339). For instance, in the metaphorical statement: *He was red-hot with anger; I could see smoke coming out of his ears*, not only do we link the emotion – anger – with heat in the metaphorical mapping between the target and the source respectively, but we also arrive at the metonymic link bringing about the bodily heat as a physiological element of

the blend. This association does not originate in either of the above-mentioned metaphorical domains, but it becomes apparent due to the metonymic link of Change and Identity (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 337). Hence, the additional metonymic relations are central to the blending processes, and I shall return to them further, as I explain compression.

Lastly, it ought to be stressed that as cognitive integration relies heavily on the human patterns of knowledge and thinking, blending is characterised with regard to the subjective bias of a conceptualiser. What this means is simply that despite the fact that the emergent structure of the blend is achieved predominantly in an automatic manner, the blends might attain their structure from defaults, prototypes, category information, conventional scenarios, and routine knowledge (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 339-340). Hence, the subjective bias in the blends serves an overarching goal of CIT, i.e. *the rule of achieving human scale* (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 339-341, Fauconnier 2008 on-line).

Similarly, the more advanced the conceptual integration, the more advanced principles will govern its processes, always relying in the first place on the optimality principles, and then progressing to the more general principles just discussed above, which can be generalised into the following:

> Intensifying vital relations
> *Compress what is diffuse by scaling a single vital conceptual relation or transforming vital conceptual relations into others. This is intensification of vital relations.*
> Maximizing vital relations
> *Create human scale structure in the blend by maximizing vital relations.* (…)
> Relevance
> *All things being equal, if an element appears in the blend, there will be pressure to find significance for this element. Significance will include relevant links to other spaces and relevant functions in running the blend.* (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 340-341, 348-349; Fauconnier 2008 on-line; Turner on-line)

In other words, the most advanced principles of CIT will involve compression, relevance and creating human perspective within the blended space.

It is essential to highlight the fact that the principles governing conceptual integration might compete with one another for the purpose of restraining the blending processes. Hence the necessity to clarify the constraints and their functions, so that the blended spaces can elaborate efficiently. To this end, the proponents of CIT enumerate a set of general principles that are to uphold the blending process:

> Non-disintegration
> *Neutralize projections and topological relations that would disintegrate the blend.*
> Non-displacement
> *Do not disconnect valuable web connections to inputs.*

Non-interference
Avoid projections from input spaces to the blend that defeat each other in the blend.
Non-ambiguity
Do not create ambiguity in the blend that interferes with the computation.
Backwards projection
As the blend is run and develops emergent structure, avoid backward projection to an input that will disrupt the integration of the input itself. (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 355-359; Fauconnier 2008 on-line)

Overall, all these principles, that are motivated by optimality pressures, have been put forward in order to ensure that the blend does not disintegrate. Paradoxically, the optimality rules can at times interfere with each other. This may endanger the blended structure, and for this reason additional more fine-grained principles, as the ones mentioned above, will clarify any potential inconsistencies.

There is yet another side to CIT, which has been widely discussed in recent years, namely compression. Compression is thought of as a result of the efficiency, as well as creativity, of the conceptual integration processes (Fauconnier and Turner 2003b: 92). Compression is the action by which we fuse, or 'scale down', the 'outer-space' links between input spaces into the internal correspondences of the blended space, i.e. the 'inner-space' relations (Fauconnier and Turner 2003b: 92-93). To be more specific, we could compare the act of compression to the act of tightening the topological relationships within the blend. Over is the diagram of compression:

Figure 4. Compression as presented by Fauconnier (Fauconnier & Turner 2003b: 94; Fauconnier 2008 on-line)



Equally, compression is said to build upon the so-called vital relations, i.e. the repeated patterns of conceptual relations (Fauconnier and Turner 2003b: 92-102, Turner on-line), which has already been signalled above. Below is the list of such vital relations, with their explanation, that are most characteristic of blending:

- *change* in many different forms, most generally described as a link between one element and another, with some alteration. It can be as simple as a connection between an older person in reality and the same person in the photo taken a few years earlier, as a youngster, where it is obvious that the change of the physique has taken place, for instance.
- *identity* understood as the sameness, as in the example above. Identity and change frequently exist alongside each other, complimenting the projected relations in blending.
- *time*, the notion of which can be manipulated linking and juxtaposing ancient times with the contemporary ones as a case in point.
- *space*, the notion of which can also be manipulated, e.g. compressing reality with fiction or imagination, etc.
- *cause-effect* relation, not necessarily treated as a simple action of one thing causing another, but elaborating this idea and finding cause-effect relations between diverse input spaces in connection with other vital relations of time, space or change.
- *part-whole* – this simple relation is to be perceived to the extent that the part and the whole are compressed, so any manipulation of the part immediately brings about the manipulation of the whole
- *representation,* where one input space is represented by another, e.g. a sketch of a woman representing the woman in question.
- *role* regarded as a function or profession a person has.
- *analogy* depending on the role and particular values being compressed. A case in point may be the set of mappings between two inputs that share the same role and value systems, but describe different participants, i.e. linking two distinct popes from two input spaces, for instance, John Paul II and his equivalent Pope Paul VI by the statement 'He was Italian for centuries but in 1978 he was Polish for the first time.' (Fauconnier and Turner 2003b: p. 98)
- *disanalogy* based on analogy. According to psychological experiments people tend to perceive differences between two things that are fairly similar in a much easier manner than between two things that are very different.

- *property* understood as one item having a certain characteristic property, e.g. a warm coat has the property of warmth; it is not warm itself.
- *similarity* understood as a notion of shared property.
- *category* understood as the label for particular things or entities, e.g. when describing ships, a clipper or a sailing boat would be the categories involved.
- *intentionality* understood with regard to emotions and mental dispositions or attitudes. It is to do with what happens intentionally, or purposefully, and what happens non-intentionally, i.e. what is accidental
- *uniqueness* in the sense of having the property of being distinctive, exceptional and exclusive,
- (Fauconnier and Turner 2000 on-line & 2003b: 92-102).

Having explained the basic idea of compression, we shall now describe how this process works in practice. Let us consider the following example: *Your tax bill gets bigger every year* (Fauconnier 2008 on-line). In order to be able to account for this statement, we have to compress the following elements: change, identity and time. The first type is explained as follows: the tax bill is perceived as a series of tax bills throughout the years. It is not one and the same tax bill statement that changes yearly, but each year the tax bill that a person receives is bigger and bigger, and hence it is altered. For this reason, it is possible to talk about the compression of change. Another factor is identity. If we focus on the tax bills that are collected by a person, they must be understood with regard to the notion of similarity in the sense that they describe roughly similar financial activities of a tax payer, so they bear the same identity. And finally, the compression of time to the extent that each year is fused with another in the perception of the tax bill in question. Additionally, each year is juxtaposed with another to the extent that the tax bill is treated as higher and higher. Simultaneously, the phenomenon of compression is accompanied by decompression, for to arrive at the meaning of the above tax bill, apart from the compressions, we need to be able to decompress the stated relations and view each tax bill in each year separately (Fauconnier 2008 on-line).

Such an interrelation between compression and decompression has been generally overlooked by early research into the CIT, although it is a vital process (Fauconnier and Turner 2006, 336-337; Fauconnier 2008 on-line). The compression/decompression notion and its particular subtypes can be summarised in the following way:

Figure 5. Compression and decompression (Fauconnier 2008 on-line)



The notion of compression is considered important for the purpose of metaphor and metonymy, as it can lead to the rise of these two phenomena, which shall be scrutinised further in this chapter, in section 1.2 together with its subsections, and section 1.3. Compression and decompression are claimed to facilitate blending processes since both account for particular goals of the human cognitive process, the first and foremost being the principle of achieving human scale (Fauconnier and Turner 2000 on-line). Some other sub-goals of CIT, that are allowed due to compression/decompression, are as follows:

> compress what is diffuse, obtain goal insight, strengthen vital relations [these have been discussed above], come up with a story and lastly go from many to one (Fauconnier 2008 on-line).

In addition to what has been said above, it is also suggested by Fauconnier and Turner that blending, although not a compositional algorithmic operation, may possibly be applied to artificial intelligence and its meaning construction, which would put CIT among many theories that foster computational modelling (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 306). However, this idea has not been fully explored as yet, but still, it is worth consideration as a potential direction for CIT development. For this reason, I shall take it into account in chapter 3 and the conclusion.

1.1.8. Problems with CIT

Conceptual integration has gained popularity in numerous fields of study and is therefore regarded as one of most influential theories in contemporary linguistics. Nevertheless, there are a number of its critics who pinpoint potential faults within the system. Firstly, Gibbs (Gibbs 2000: 347-358, Coulson & Oakley 2000) presents his criticism based on the fact that CIT, for his part, is not a single theory but merely a general framework of rules and for that reason cannot be affirmed or negated at all. What follows from this assumption is the fact that the principles guiding blending should be verified and also made more specific so that they are precise enough to encompass falsifiable statements concerning CIT. This argument, however, is opposed by the very fact that in recent years the proponents have developed CIT from what might have been called a general abstract theory, based on the notion of mental spaces, through to a detailed, well-constraint theory (see sections 1.1.5 through to 1.1.8) which is so compact, precise and well-illustrated that it has been proposed as a basic cognitive operation underlying language and human cognitive processes (Fauconnier and Turner 2008a & b: on-line).

The versatility of blending, i.e. the fact that CIT has been used for the explanation of numerous phenomena which are different in nature, has also been questioned. According to Gibbs, the same small number of rules cannot uphold the infinite number of complex processes, and the rules cannot be exactly the same for an infinite number of such complex processes (Gibbs after Coulson and Oakley on-line; Tendhal and Gibbs 2007 on-line: 1845; Bache on-line on disintegration as part of CIT that deals with ubiquity). Similarly, Tendhal and Gibbs argue that the idea of the input space is indeterminate as we do not really know what exactly constitutes those spaces, whether they are metaphorically or metonymically oriented, or image-schematic, for example. Also, the constraints on CIT are numerous yet lack substantiation, as one critic points out: blending has produced 'a kind of snapshot of the nature of a dynamic process, but is not the process of change itself' (McNeil, 2005: 74; after Tendhal and Gibbs on-line 2007: 1845). This does not necessarily hold true, if we again follow the logic of the CIT's advocates:

> Just as the marvelous systematic products of chemistry – acids and bases, colors from titration, metabolism, nuclear decay – are not foretold in the principle that atoms combine to make molecules, so the marvelous systematic products of blending are not foretold in the principle that mental spaces blend to make new spaces with emergent meaning. There is an entire system of interacting principles behind the possibilities for conceptual blending and we must grapple with the entire system any one of its products (Fauconnier and Turner 2003b: xii - xiii).

Judging from the illustrations cited by all supporters of CIT and their varying nature, we might reject the above-mentioned claim on the part of Gibbs that conceptual integration does not include diversity and complexity of subject matter. Exactly the same conclusion is provided by Brandt (on-line) who states that a less inhibited CIT would certainly be of more use in the field of empirical analysis of artworks, for example, and who is against anti-semantic feedback wrongly influencing cognitive grammar. When it comes to Brandt (on-line), however, he goes slightly further with his criticism. Namely, he accuses CIT of suffering from theoretical or methodological issues which concern the notion of a mental space. According to Brandt (on-line), Fauconnier devised the term in question as a part of his construction of meaning process which was buried within the context of formal logic and early cognitive approaches to language. Nevertheless, as the idea of mental space was incorporated by blending and cognitive integration theory, the perspective on the whole construct altered. Whereas the construct was originally a part of a logical set-theoretical model of meaning viewed as a reconstruction of the logic, in cognitive linguistics, where the CIT seems to locate its origin, a mental space must not be seen to function as a vericonditional or representational composite. On the contrary, the cognitive semantics deals with meaning in the embodied mind of a human being, hence it must tackle meaning as a part of dynamic meaning production and comprehension with the cognizer present actively at such processes (Brandt on-line p. 1578-1579). This cannot be said of mental spaces, in Brandt's opinion, as they only ever serve to explain decontextualised instances, rather than real ones. Thus, CIT needs reformulation, in that it must involve real sociocultural context into its analyses, as well as the redefinition of the notion of mental space. All in all, however, Brandt (on-line) is in favour as CIT's further development, and he gives his reasons for it being:

> MS [mental space] semantics and its basic networks may be an early paleolithic, proto-symbolic and proto-linguistic, cognitive creation of the human mind, which is still with us; anyway it certainly remains as active and creative as ever. The particularly rich meaning unfoldings that can be found in our technical and artistic practices, in artefacts and works of art, testify to its transhistorical presence and perhaps also to the importance of tools and art to the development of the blending brain. (Brandt on-line)

Specifically, Brandt offers help with reformulation of CIT himself. According to Brandt and Brandt (on-line), the term mental space should be enriched with an adjective semiotic in the beginning. Basically, it is recommended that blending should acquire a more abstract level of processing information, in particular the semiotic nature, where an input mental space becomes a sign for another, hence enabling us to perform all kinds of virtual and imaginary meaning integrations.

Further, such semiotic blends ought to be context-oriented and hence more subjective, thus achieving a phenomenological level of thinking and communicating. This would be easily comparable with other cognizers' thought processes, in contrast with blending which is context-independent in theory, and too closely associated with semantic abstract theoretical paradigm which cannot be accessed or experienced by our embodied minds, and thus cannot be verified for critical feedback. In this manner, blending deals with meaning which merely signifies meaning, and does not represent it. Only the semiotic version of CIT is recommended, where blends are related to real instances of communication, and where signifier actually signifies something:

> (…) the very concept of 'meaning' only makes sense in so far as there is a 'signifier' that *means* something. To speak of *meaning* is to speak of the meaning *of something*. The meaning is the 'signified' part of a sign structure. Meaning is a semiotic notion. (Brandt and Brandt on-line)

Taking this critique into account, I propose, after Brandt and Brandt (on-line), to treat blends as signs, with their inputs operating as the signifier and the signified respectively, bringing CIT closer towards semiotics. I shall incorporate this semiotic slant in my further analyses of humour via CIT in chapter 3 (see further in the paper).

In close similarity to Brandt and Brandt runs a view expressed by Li, Zook, Davis and Riedl who deal with computational approach to language and specifically to creativity. The authors (on-line) agree with both the research and reformulated proposals on the part of Brandt and Brandt and provide their own critique of CIT, too. As for their feedback, they find optimality principles crucial in blending processes, however, they notice that these can only be treated as quality measures that apply after the blended space has already been constructed, hence their remark that Fauconnier and Turner lack any details connected with the way information is selected from the inputs. When such a proposition as CIT, at its present state, is applied to computational creativity, it must result in the options overload, as there are zillions of possibilities for a machine to choose mappings from two varying inputs into correspondences of some kind, especially when we take into account large inputs. Not to mention the relations that are valid and that have to be projected to the blend, which is another infeasible option. Secondly, the authors express critical views on elaboration of the blended space, which as a process is not restricted in any way, too. As seen from the computational perspective, elaboration of the blended contents cannot possibly be endless. Additionally, it is pointed out that CIT is capable of analysing both metaphors and also novel concepts, which clearly vary in the relational manner,

according to the authors. Namely, within metaphorical blending, we experience the underscoring of certain aspects of an input space, or otherwise we attach novel properties to it (just like it is with the surgeon who is supposed to be viewed as a butcher, and he thus acquires the characteristic of sloppiness of the latter, for instance). Yet, in the creation of novel concepts by means of CIT, we do not wish to define or refine the inputs meaning in any manner whatsoever, but we rather create some new blended construct, with projections going only one way to the blended space, but not the other way round (so we cannot perform backward projections, as CIT would specify for us to do!). All this critical evaluation is reinforced by the need to introduce context and goal-orientation into the blended space. Following Brandt and Brandt on this, the authors finally conclude that CIT has a great potential but only if it utilises the notions of both context and goals in any blend's construction, which limits the search for inputs and the elements within these to be projected, aside of the improvement in the extension of the blended contents (for a discussion with exemplary instances within the field of computational linguistics and AI see the whole article in press). Again, I shall try to incorporate the above criticism into my humour analyses in chapter 3.

On the note of more feedback in relation to CIT, Gibbs also states that 'blending theory proceeds by way of post hoc analysis of examples, a procedure prone to fallacious imputing of cause.' (Gibbs, after Coulson & Oakley 2000: 182). Essentially, what Gibbs says is that CIT states its rules first, and only later does it proceed to analyse its instances. From a scientific point of view, this is erroneous. The very argument, however, is discussed by Coulson and Oakley (2000) who agree that blending must go beyond post hoc analysis and refine itself. On the other hand, they also stipulate that it will actually be the post hoc analysis of texts that will aid the restructuring of the on-line meaning in CIT (Coulson and Oakley 2000: 193-194).

Again, CIT is also criticised for the fact that blending appears to be ad hoc. This means that it '(…) employs temporary, improvisational procedures for dealing with specific instances.' (Coulson & Grady 2000 on-line – this criticism runs in a similar vein to the feedback from AI). But as Coulson and Grady themselves state,

> (…) this criticism confuses the nature of the theory with the nature of the kinds of data covered by the theory. Blending theory (like most theories of meaning) is really an interpretive model and its strengths can be assessed by how well it treats disparate cases in a principled way. What is variable is the contexts and situations in which blending is thought to occur. In this respect, ad hocness is good, because a principled interpretive model (…) that focuses on variability renders important insights, especially when trying to scale the micro-structures of meaning to their macro-structures of the real time on-line situation. (Coulson & Oakley 2000: on-line)

What becomes clear from the above passage is that the criticised ad hocness of CIT makes it easier for the theory to develop. How it works is that the more variable illustrations are employed to be analysed in terms of blending, the more diverse data is covered and the more objective the conclusions will be reached. In this way, CIT also attains the level of an all-encompassing theory, which again might well be seen as a drawback.

The empirical, interdisciplinary criticism may also be poured all over CIT, i.e. the latest approach to language studies, learning, processing information as well as evolution, which advocates multi-modal tendencies. For example, Vigliocco, Perniss and Vinson (2014) argue that the basic assumptions of the contemporary linguistics need to be challenged, i.e. firstly we ought not to treat language as a completely arbitrary system, and secondly, we ought to alter our linguistic investigations so that they do not only focus exclusively on linguistic text or speech. In particular, the authors quote numerous experiments confirming that the two above mentioned premises have been supported by real-life experiments. For instance, the arbitrary uses of language in the form of onomatopoeia are frequently dismissed by scholars as being of limited value only. Nonetheless, the authors quote a great number of cases[6], where iconic relations between meaning and form constitute a norm, e.g. Japanese, Chinese, or South American languages, to name just a few. Also, research shows, perhaps rather surprisingly, that there are systematic relations between the properties of both vowels and consonants, and the broadly understood human experiences. Further, prosody of some languages also proves that there exist suprasegmental varieties of the acoustic signal which are highly iconic, and certainly not arbitrary. Additionally, the authors quote research which points to the fact that the non-verbal communication, such as gestures, facial expressions or prosody, play a crucial role in language acquisition[7]. Hence the necessity to reintroduce a widely-understood notion of context into language studies. All in all, Vigliocco, Perniss and Vinson (2014) are led

6 Vigliocco, Perniss & Vinson (2014) also exemplify cases of languages where iconicity, as opposed to arbitrariness, shows in a substantial manner. For instance, research on spoken language (e.g. in Maurer, Pathman and Mondloch 2006), research on discourse processing (in e.g. in Kovic, Plunkett and Westermann 2010), or sign languages (e.g. in Thompson, Vinson and Vigliocco 2009). For more examples and discussion, see the complete article.

7 Vigliocco, Perniss & Vinson (2014) quote a vast amount of research into extra-linguistic properties of language and their crucial role in language learning and development. To give just a few examples, check out the following experiments: Barsalou, Simmons, Barbery & Wilson 2003 on mental knowledge as rooted in modality specific systems; Rowe & Goldin-Meadonw 2009 on gestures in children's language acquisition; or finally Wu and Coulson 2005 on iconic

to conclusion that language should be studied as a multi-modal phenomenon, thus allowing the other channels, which have been of secondary importance so far, i.e. context in the form of gestures, facial mimics or simply prosody, to be incorporate into the linguistic research[8]. Secondly, the authors propose to alter the perception of language as a completely and utterly arbitrary system, into a more gentle, reformulated version of that hardcore view, thus making space for research into iconicity within language elements[9].

What is closely associated with the above-mentioned need to introduce multi-modal language studies, and what might also serve as a case in point here, is the scientific analysis to do with the understanding of energy concepts. Dreyfun, Gupta and Redish (on-line 2014) use CIT to analyse the verbal scientific utterances of learners, as combined with the other embodied modalities, i.e. speech and gestures, to produce a model of cognition of energy concepts in terms of metaphors that are explicated by means of blending. This experiment proves that the multi-modal approach to CIT, which is combined with extra-linguistic elements, does work as an explanatory tool in an expert field of science, for better understanding of scientific concepts such as energy. Thus, it can be profitable to make sense of linguistic studies and research with recourse to such a novel, multi-modal approach. It is exactly for this reason that these proposals will also be incorporated for in my further analyses of the comic (see chapter 3 and 4).

Another interesting fact is that one of the proponents of CIT himself, i.e. Mark Turner has recently turned to multi-modality in blending. Turner (2014

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gestures. In order to find out about more examples of empirical experiments in this field, see the whole article.

8 McNeill (2005) provides a rather fascinating perspective on extra-linguistic information in relation to language, he is particularly interested in gestures and he evolves the so-called 'thought-language-hand link' hypothesis which believes language to have been largely dependent on gestures and it is experimentally proven, as well:

> Without gestures (…) language could not have evolved; some of the brain circuits required for language could not have evolved in the way they apparently have. The integration of gesture with language we observe in ourselves today is an essential part of the machinery that evolved. Gesture is not behavioural fossil but an indispensable part of our current ongoing system of language.
>
> This view runs parallel with what a modern, multi-modal and interdisciplinary approach to language presupposes, too.

9 Vigliocco, Perniss & Vinson (2014) do not necessarily claim that languages are utterly non-arbitrary, but they are of the opinion that it would be good to acknowledge the fact that empirically, non-arbitrariness does exist and play a crucial role in language learning, development as well as evolution.

& 2015) discusses certain challenges to CIT that have cropped up over the years trying to reconcile these with the theory itself. Firstly, Turner addresses the accusation that CIT is merely a sum of already existing epiphenomenal processes. To be specific, he clarifies that certain labels in language studies, such as metaphor or counterfactuals, function only as labels and even if blending covers the same phenomena, it does have the right to produce its own model, just in the manner as all the other theories do. Further, Turner proceeds to state that it is appropriate to find distinctions in certain process of thought, which are not to be regarded as true categories of human thinking processes. To study varied processes and find our generalisations about them is the CIT's task in the long run.

Another challenge which Turner (2015) addresses concerns the old schema that blending is based on, i.e. the link between something old and familiar to produce something novel. Why bother with CIT then, if we already know the process? - this is the question that arises frequently as a critique to CIT. Turner answers back with his comment that both Fauconnier and him have studied manifold predecessors in philosophy who did think of combining ideas together, e.g. Aristotle, so the schema itself is truly old-school. However, he rightly notices that no one before have spoken overtly of mixing ideas together as constituting a basic process of cognition, which is insightful and proposes new systematic principles applicable to intricate mechanisms of mental workload.

The third strong opposition in relation to CIT has been formulated in the doubts regarding computational powers of blending; for if CIT does really apply to our human thought, it ought to be able to be represented as a computation algorithm. To such opponents Turner retorts that computation creativity has had a lot in common with CIT, quoting numerous blending-based research in this field (see the article for details). Further, Turner asserts that in his opinion, cognition is not algorithmic, consequently there has been no successful application of CIT in computer-oriented linguistic research. In addition to that, Turner also answer those who would willingly see CIT as confirmed by fMRI in relation to brain and its whereabouts in the human mind. He compared CIT here to a prediction mechanism that draws output from input, but that is a higher-organisation principle rather than a very basic, or even primitive cognitive equation. This fact is to explain the difficulty in designing empirical experimentation which could prove something neural about blending[10]. However, Turner does mention attempts

10 So as to support Turner's argumentation line here, we can quote from the computational experiments that prove exactly the fact that natural language-parsing, i.e. trying to find relationships between words and compute their meaning, is not at all deterministic, when

at such research (e.g. McCubbins and Turner 2013). Moreover, as Fauconnier puts it: "Neuroscience has made awesome progress in recent years, but does not provide direct observation of conceptual operations like mental space mapping" (after Coulson 2011: 413).

There is more feedback to deal with, as well. Some more sceptics of CIT remark that people are not aware of the fact that they perform any blending, and if so we cannot possibly realise when mental spaces of larger networks are activated. Turner dismisses such claims, as he states that human awareness in immaterial. Rightly so, we predominantly do not know what and when our minds do, though it is rather apparent that the human brain performs in a spectacular manner. As for the activation of blending on the basis of inputs, the issue here is of the same quality as any methodological research on human conceptualisation experiences. All such theoretical paradigms must be inferential and indirect to a great extent, there simply is no other way of detecting the categorisation in the human mind, for Turner's part (2015). It is all about hypothesizing and reformulating the original theoretical premises over and over again, which is in accordance with any scientific attempt to discuss meaning.

Finally, Turner (2015) does acknowledge the fact that CIT is a totally incomplete framework that needs evolving, and this is exactly what is happening to it, which, as Turner admitted himself, the architects of blending are waiting for, to reformulate and make progress. As for the need to elaborate on the context, or the ground in the blending, Turner quotes that for him this notion is similar to the concept of the so-called joint attention (see Tomasello 1995 for more). Joint attention appears to relate to the fact that in any human context all the participant will be attending to a specific scene, and they will do it knowingly. Turner hurries to explain that in the blend there will also be roles for the speaker, or viewer, or constructs such as time and place, though these do not have to be determined explicitly. For his part, the idea of ground is a matter of viewpoint, which originates from embodiment, and so participants in any communicative scene will be embodied via joint attention. They will project selectively from the viewpoint in inputs to the blend, where there joint attention viewpoint will finally be accessed. In this manner, he resolves the need to address the term ground directly in CIT.

What is more, Turner also proposes that CIT is essential for language and multi-modal communication of people, simultaneously acknowledging the need

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compared with the computer language parsing, which will necessarily be highly deterministic, as it is pre-conditioned to work in this manner. (Blakemore 1992)

for the integrated approach to language study. He finishes his observations by stating that mapping between the form and sense only give us clues as to our cognition and thinking processes that ensue: "Communicative forms do not mean; instead they prompt human beings to construct meaning." (Turner 2014 appendix & 2015)

There has also been some precise update on CIT by Turner, who discusses certain mental processes of the brain in relation to CIT, creativity and human ingenuity. Turner proposes that our creativity and bright new ideas originate in the fact that we possess a human ability to blend ideas in order to make new ones, which he refers to as the human spark (Turner 2014: 8). It occurs most probably unconsciously, so it is difficult to discuss it, however, Turner makes an attempt at it and comes up with interesting ideas, himself. Turner (on-line 2014a) puts forward the idea of the so-called parabolic understanding. Parable, as Turner understands it, is the ability to blend, which can be regarded as our basic mental tool to process information and thinking. What he means by this is that people are capable of blending things in forms of stories to arrive at novel meaningful stories. Specifically, Turner refers to the notion of compression to a story, which can be applicable on both large and small scale, i.e. to the comprehension of time, politics or history, for instance, and also of our lives and simple processes. For example, Turner thinks that in order to comprehend other more complex data, we take one story and apply it further, in the parabolic manner. This underlies human creativity and forms the basis for human thinking processes. As a criticism to parabolic human ingenuity, in a radio interview for the BBC, Turner (on-line 2014a) is asked about negative capability, i.e. the situation where we resist certainty and cannot perceive any story/stories to be blended, so the situation where that abovementioned notion does not apply. Turner's (on-line) reply is based around the idea that such a scenario does not relate to human thought, as we indeed think in terms of stories and blend these ones at hand in order to proceed to more complicated concepts. Humans do not have much choice in the matter, according to Turner, as we are prone genetically to order in our lives, so the only solution for us is not to be too carried away by the notion of a story. Turner (on-line 2014a&b) also speaks of blending that makes it possible for people to self-reflect and to think about other people, as well as art and film, or simply about ideas such as space, time, causation or agency, which are far too big to understand holistically, so we need compression and blending to talk and think about these. Turner makes an attempt at the hypothesis that our minds are blending-oriented and that we think in such an advanced CIT manner, which is the result of the evolution that no other species has attained, and the reason for having our human culture (online 2014a&b). Thus, Turner puts blending on the pedestal of all human creativity and

blames it for all novel ideas, which does seem to be captivating for a reader, as well as vital from the point of view of any humour research. As humour certainly is ingenuous, for this very reason, if not more, all the above mentioned innovations into CIT will be incorporated further into my humour studies.

Summing up, it can be observed that there are weaknesses within CIT, concerning its omnipresence and its too general paradigm. Also, the context-independence, non-phenomenological nature of CIT, as well as its methodological problems and the need for the real cognizer to be included into the framework, constitute just a few more drawbacks that must be addressed. Another disadvantage could be the vast range of examples which conform to blending, which leads to the commonplace statement that if something is good for all situations, it will usually turn out to be of little benefit at all. However, the fact that CIT does explain so many phenomena can be regarded as a positive feature of the theory. Taking the faults of the theory into account, it ought to be stated that despite a certain degree of impreciseness, which has been recently reduced by its proponents (see above the sections 1.1.4. through to 1.1.7.), CIT does presently function as a fairly widespread tool of language investigation, and it is successful at explaining how mental spaces account for the cognitive processes of the human mind. In this light, CIT ought to be tested even further, in order to clarify and verify the blending processes. Only after more thorough research can one put forward a justifiable opinion on the theory. Taking the above into consideration, I shall use cognitive integration to discuss humour. As further justification, I shall quote Grady:

> As both conceptual analysis and cognitive science research continue to progress, along with technology that allows us to narrow the gap between the two, we will need more specific, hypotheses about the ways in which mental experience arises from fundamental processes within the brain. Conceptual blending has already proven to be a rich field for exploring this relationship (…) and I hope that [similar] hypotheses (…) will help further this ongoing enterprise. (Grady 2002: 343).

This study will hopefully become one such hypothesis which will further test CIT with regard to humour and the mind, and thus facilitate progress.

In conclusion, the nature of mental spaces and conceptual integration have been explained in detail, in this chapter. This will become of particular importance in chapter 3, where the proper analysis of humour shall be conducted. And it is exactly for this reason that conceptual integration, ever so slightly adjusted to the needs of the empirical research up-to-date, shall be proposed in chapter 2 – as an example of a theory to be used when analysing humour. It shall be proposed as a theory capable of explaining how humour is created, and how the comic is

achieved, in a more comprehensive as well as more holistic manner, when boosted by certain degree of pragmatic perspective, compared with other, already existing theories.

1.2. Blending and the theories of metaphor

In this section, I shall present the phenomena involved in the process of blending, namely metaphor and metonymy. Initially, the state of metaphor research shall be presented (section 1.2), starting from the more traditional views (sections 1.2.1 – 1.2.4) via the Lakoff and Johnson's cognitive metaphor theory (section 1.2.5), through to the most contemporary theories pertaining to metaphor (section 1.2.5.5) and issues connected with it. In this way, I shall explain what metaphor is. What follows is the juxtaposition of blending and metaphor (section 1.2.5.6), which demonstrates the fact that although blending might be used with reference to metaphor in the selection of the topology between mental spaces, this relation is neither very common nor predominant. Finally, the nature of metonymy will be discussed in relation to CIT processes (section 1.3). Again, I shall present the most crucial research in this field together with the proposition that metonymy should be treated as a process primary to blending in its choice of mental spaces and relations between them. Ultimately, it will be demonstrated, as it is the case with metaphor, that metonymy might occasionally be used for the purpose of mental spaces integration, nevertheless it is not the phenomenon that can actually be regarded as more fundamental than CIT (section 1.3).

1.2.1. The state of metaphor research

There has been substantial research conducted on metaphor. However, the more the subject is studied, the more it needs to be studied, it would seem. Let us start with Aristotle, who defined the relation of metaphor in the following manner: 'Metaphor is the application of an alien name by transference either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or by analogy, that is, proportion.' (Aristotle on-line; Gibbs 1994: 210-211). The description reveals that a metaphor, in its classical form, is to be perceived as a mere comparison between two names, i.e. objects or things, by means of substitution or analogy. In this way, metaphor substitutes one entity for another, and so this interpretation of metaphor is referred to as a substitution or comparison view. As for its purpose, metaphor is to be used as a purely ornamental device, namely a trope (Gibbs 1994: 210). According to Aristotle, metaphor cannot be included

in literal language because of its ambiguity and obscurity (after Ortony 1998: 3). Essentially, then, metaphor is a process of transference among things, where one entity is substituted for another, the substitution being based on comparable features. What this view presupposes, however, is that metaphor can be paraphrased by means of literal language, paradoxically as it might sound, even though it performs a figurative function (Alm-Arvius on-line). Clearly then, in traditional terms, metaphor is regarded as a matter of language, not of thought as such. Precisely, metaphor is to be comprehended as an instance of a highly ornamental figure of speech, employing figurative language to express the relationship of substitution. Nonetheless, such a comparison view of metaphor is problematic to the extent that one might question the need for any metaphorical statement at all on the part of a speaker, assuming that the speaker using a metaphor could have something completely different in mind, in relation to the uttered metaphor, especially if the metaphorical statement can be paraphrased by a literal one (Black 1998: 22; Ortony 1998: 7). The obvious solution would be simply to state the literal version. Further, in traditional view, metaphor is a violation of language rules, as far as semantics is concerned (Cohen 1998: 58-70). For example, in the sentence: *John is a real tiger*, there is a mandatory operation of transferring some properties of an animal onto a man, to view John as a tiger, which semantically is incorrect. Consequently, metaphor is restricted to a purely ornamental phenomenon, being a tool for literature, poetry or rhetoric, and nothing more (Cruse 2004: 198). Such a view of metaphor was also accepted by Jakobson who incorporated a componential model of semantic elements into his metaphor theory (Steen 2005 on-line). His account of the term becomes the discussion of word meaning, as conducted on the basis of metaphor, in respect of semantic primitive features. It turns out that metaphorical expressions are not easily defined by means of semantic features, and more importantly, not every metaphor with its meaning can be explicated and predicted from its lexical and semantic content. Jakobson's study is compatible with the traditional approach which viewed metaphor as illogical, anomalous and linguistically un-analysable (Steen 2005 on-line). These semantic analyses of metaphor are rejected, however, as invalid, which initiates a movement towards a pragmatic interpretation of metaphor, with a language user at its centre. (Culler 1975 after Steen on-line, Lodge 1977 after Scott & Katz 1996: 174, Davidson 1987 & Davidson's pragmatic theory of metaphors after Ortony 1998: 116; Eco 1984: 112-114).

Richards is reputed to have moved the research into metaphor forwards, by distinguishing between three aspects of it, i.e. *vehicle* which can be explained as the metaphorical expression, *tenor* which is classified as the meaning of the

vehicle, and finally *ground* which is comprehended as the basis for the metaphorical interpretation (Cruse 2004: 198; Gibbs 1994: 211). The expression *the foot of the mountain* can serve as an example, with "foot" being the vehicle, the idea of a lower part of something, here the "mountain", being the tenor, and the spacial interrelation between the position of foot in the body relative to the position of foot of mountain relative to the mountain serving as ground (as above).

1.2.2. The pragmatic account of metaphor

In response to the traditional view, Morgan (1998: 124-134) has suggested that metaphor ought to be perceived from a more pragmatic perspective, understood in terms of an alternated meaning (Searle 1998: 102-108; or metaphor as a 'coherence maintaining device' in Kimmel 2010 on-line). However, there are two issues concerning this viewpoint. On the one hand, in pragmatics it is possible to interpret a metaphorical meaning as the one attached to the sentence it stems from by the compositional rules of language, and this interpretation is then incoherent with the notion of metaphor itself (Morgan 1998: 125). On the other hand, it is possible to render meaning in Searle's terms, i.e. meaning comprehended as what the speaker bears in mind when he utters a metaphorical statement, which precisely equals the utterance meaning. Yet this utterance meaning can obviously never change on interpretation. Hence the conclusion that in no sense is any meaning ever altered in metaphor. However, Morgan still maintains that there are two meanings for metaphor, but insofar as the first meaning is offered for the second one to be derived from, rather than changed. Alternatively, the mechanisms behind the supposed metaphorical change pose some problems, too. Specifically, the traditional view assumes that a change in meaning is possible thanks to the the division between the literal and figurative language. To put it simply, the meaning change is achieved via going from the literal sense to the figurative use of a metaphorical statement. This traditional fallacy no longer holds, so there is a need for some resolution to this issue. Searle claims that the change of meaning is produced as a language user takes steps to arrive at the utterance meaning and inferences from the context available (Searle 1998: 102-108, Bartsch 2003, Blakemore 1992: 164; Giora 1997, 1999a & b[11]), which Morgan dismisses due to the fact that both

11 Giora represents a rather interesting viewpoint on pragmatic metaphor which is referred to as salience hypothesis. Namely, in metaphors which require less salient meaning, e.g. novel metaphors, the arrival at the intended meaning is sequential and it is the most salient meaning that is processed first. Only then does a conceptualiser arrive at the intended meaning (Giora 1997, 1999a & b).

inferencing and context based-assumptions are also used for unravelling purely literal meanings, for example in the case of ambiguity (Morgan 1998: 126-127). But clearly metaphor is not just duality in meaning. Whereas ambiguity concerns two different senses that happen to be present in one and the same utterance, but might still be paraphrased into two separate sentences, the metaphor pertains to the derivation of one meaning from another, with the original sense being rendered as 'a complete understanding, an enriched sort of meaning with all the pragmatic gaps filled in.' (Morgan 1998: 127). Therefore, to explain metaphor one needs to view it as a pragmatic phenomenon, rather than a semantic one. 'We shouldn't think of metaphor as a kind of meaning, because it suggests metaphor is a property of sentences. Metaphor is rather a matter of what one does saying the sentence.'[12] (Morgan 1998: 127). More importantly, Morgan proposes to treat metaphor as a natural function of the mind, whose purpose needs to be further studied, as the conclusions that metaphor resembles indirect speech (Searle 1998: 108-111) or is an example of language convenience (Searle 1998: 83-84 & 111) are not sufficient.

It is also worth exploring the idea of metaphor as an emotional linguistic tool (for more see Osgood online). This is precisely what Black achieves (Black 1998: 19-41) by dealing with the emphatic as well as resonant examples of metaphor. The former is a kind of metaphor whose words must not be varied or substituted at all, which is connected with the collaboration on the part of both the speaker and the hearer in the comprehension of implications. The resonant metaphor arises when there is a high number of implications stemming from a metaphorical utterance (Black 1998: 26). However, Black's distinction is just the tip of the iceberg, hence there is still more research needed in this area, especially in relation to its pragmatic nature, in order to value the degree to which metaphors can be emotion-based. Moreover, Black seriously rejected both the substitution and the comparison view of metaphor (the latter was in Black's opinion just a subtype of the former), and he advocated the pragmatic transfer of 'associative implications' from one entity, referred to as the 'secondary subject', onto another, called 'the primary subject'. (Cruse 2004: 199-200). Such a transfer is performed between entities that exist in the minds of the speaker and the hearer, but not

12 This view can be compared to what Gibbs (1999: 42) maintains, i.e. the fact that meaning is intentional in a communicative sense, and by analogy, metaphorical meaning might be treated as intentional in a discourse, rather than simply a semantic element: 'People use words to convey to each other first and foremost their communicative intentions, not the semantic meanings of words as the unconscious causes that might underlie such intentions.' (Gibbs 1999: 42). In a similar vein, Kittay (1989: 140) presents metaphor as a second order interpretation process, where the first order interpretation is at fault with the context.

necessarily in exactly the same manner, i.e. there might be differences between the implications drawn by the speaker and the hearer. Additionally, Black sees the 'implicative complex' of the secondary subject as an 'analogue model' of the implicative complex intended to be inferred for the primary subject, which appears to bear a resemblance to Lakoff and Johnson's conceptual theory of metaphor and metonymy and their idea of mapping the structure of the source onto the structure of the target (Cruse 2004: 200).

1.2.3. The interaction theory of metaphor

Black is a representative of the interaction theory of metaphor. In his opinion, metaphor possesses two varying subjects, namely the primary subject which is also the focus (i.e. words used in a non literal manner) and the secondary subject which constitutes a literal frame (i.e. everything that surrounds the focus). The latter is considered a system. When a metaphor is uttered, both the speaker and the hearer form a set of implications between the focus and the frame, which are projected and organised in the implication complex. Hence, the interaction between the two subjects results in metaphor (Black 1998: 27).

Searle (1998) is another proponent of the interaction view of metaphor who claims that a common error in metaphor understanding is to assume that metaphor alters meaning. Searle's idea behind metaphor is that it initiates a semantic change, but in the sense that the metaphorical phrase is used to mean something completely different from what it previously meant, and not that such an expression ceases to mean what is does in literal terms. The issue here is the fact that people confuse the sentence meaning with the speaker's meaning. However, Searle maintains that in metaphor it is crucial to discover how the two kinds of meaning differ, and simultaneously, how they are interrelated. Therefore, Searle's investigation of metaphors centres around the operations that are involved on the part of the speaker and hearer proceeding from the sentence meaning to the utterance meaning. Certainly, metaphor must not be equalled with similarity; though similarity is vital in producing and comprehending metaphors as such. Further, similarity does not have too much in common with metaphor's meaning, as it differs from metaphor on the basis of truth conditions, i.e. similarity holds the truth, but metaphor does not. In addition to this, Searle rejects the interaction view of metaphor to the extent that metaphorical meaning is an interaction between an expression used metaphorically and other expressions used literally, i.e. every single metaphorical phrase will have to be used in a sentence which contains literal uses of that very phrase, too, which appears to be contradictory in itself.

Searle's account of metaphor is couched in terms of mathematical equations. It is held that metaphor can be represented in the following manner: S (sentence)

is P (utterance), where S is R (sense) (Searle 1998: 102). The formula has a great deal in common with truth conditions. Due to this fact, the information provided generates a straightforward question, i.e. how it is possible to state S is P, and mean S is R where P does not at all equal R. Hence, Searle immediately notices that the metaphorical system is limited, for not every similarity we perceive between two objects or entities will result in metaphor. Following this reasoning, Searle claims that in order to analyse metaphors we need to produce some principles, according to which the analysis could be valid and true (Searle 1998: 102-108). Additionally, as individual users of language do use metaphors and understand such metaphorical statements, metaphors must be held to be communicable from one speaker to a hearer on the basis of some shared system of rules. Hence it follows that metaphors are "systematic". Searle provides a small number of metaphor principles that are to guide metaphor comprehension. The first principle is as follows: when a metaphorical expression is deviant, taken in literal terms, a language user must search for an utterance meaning that is distinguishable from the sentence meaning. The principle clearly presupposes the existence of the sentence meaning and utterance meaning, with the latter being the essence of metaphor. Also, utterance meaning is perfectly sensible from the point of view that metaphors are creative, as they produce statements varying from reality. The other principles can be summarised under the following captions:

- Principle 1: things that are P are by definition R, i.e. R constitutes some salient characteristics of P, e.g. *Sam is a giant* implies that Sam is big, as giants are by definition big
- Principle 2: things that are P are contingently R, i.e. the feature R is a salient characteristics of P, e.g. *Sam is a pig* means that Sam is dirty, gluttonous etc., as these are salient properties of pigs
- Principle 3: things that are P are held to be R, though it may not be known that R is falsely attributed to P, e.g. *Richard is a gorilla* means that Richard is violent or aggressive, though in reality gorillas are sensitive and withdrawn animals
- Principle 4 & 5: things that are P are not at all R, however, culturally we are inclined to notice some association between these two, e.g. *Mary is sweet* stands for the fact that Mary is a gentle and polite person; but the condition of being P is equal to the condition of being R, e.g. it is viable to refer to a person who has been promoted in the following manner: You have become an aristocrat meaning that promotion, in terms of status or prestige, is comparable with aristocracy
- Principle 6: things that are P may be synonymous with R with regard to meaning, however, P is frequently restricted in application, e.g. addled is

considered to be the property of eggs, but we may utter the statements such as *His brain is addled*
- Principle 7 regards relational metaphors, for instance the ones in syntactical forms to do with verbs, such as Sam devours books, where we do not draw the conclusion that S is P = S is R, and hence P is R, but we rather seek relational comparison of the following kind: we proceed from 'S P-relation S' to 'S R-relation S' where the actions of eating and reading are certainly different, yet we are to find similarities between P and R in certain aspects
- Principle 8: it may be necessary to classify metonymy or synecdoche as special cases of metaphor (Searle 1998: 104-108).

The pragmatic analysis of interactive metaphor as proposed by Searle or Grice has been criticised by Lakoff (Lakoff 2006: 235), who rejects the claim that metaphorical language is just a matter of literal language being construed according to some pragmatic rules, precisely because such an approach eliminates any figurative meaning completely.

A representative of the interaction theory of metaphor is Haas (Haas on-line), who regards meaning of a word as a semantic field of normality which encompasses all the possible contexts for its interpretation, with the most probable contexts accumulating around the core of this semantic field, and the less ordinary contexts verging on its periphery.[13] In a situation where two words interact, the two semantic fields are brought together thus creating a new meaning, whose core is formed by the interrelation of the most ordinary contexts of the original semantic fields (Haas on-line; Cruse 2004: p. 199). Following this interpretation, a metaphor is such a novel semantic field, linking the „older" semantic fields stemming from the lexical items that equate to the metaphor. Although Haas never claimed any relation between his theory and the traditional theories of meaning, his account of metaphor may be compared to the traditional discrete analyses of meaning, where the incompatible sense and contexts are deleted from the new semantic fields, and only the more congruous contexts comprise the meaning intended (Cruse 2004: p. 199).

13 This understanding of meaning is based on the idea of radial category which is a conceptual category arranged around a central prototype, the organisation being with reference to the closeness in meaning to prototype. Thus, those members that are close in meaning to prototype are around it, while the less relevant members are on the verge of this radial category (Evans and Green 2006: 331). A case in point might be the word school with its varying senses (Dirven and Verspoor 1998: 32-36).

1.2.4. The conduit metaphor

A different view of metaphor is advocated by Reddy (1998: 166-171, Taylor 2003: 133) who claims that there are instances of statements which allow for both metaphorical and literal meaning at the same time, hence the assumption that metaphors are semantically deviant is not valid. Reddy discusses the CONDUIT metaphor which is defined by the following principles: LANGUAGE IS A CONTAINER, and EXPRESSIONS ARE PARCELS THAT CARRY MEANING, SPEAKER IS THE SENDER OF PARCELS, HEARER IS THE RECEIPTIENT OF PARCELS, and finally HEARER UNPACKS THE MEANING (Reddy 1998: 166-171, Taylor 2002: 490, 2003: 135). The above interpretation of language as a communication system poses a number of questions. One of the most significant issues is what Reddy himself called a "semantic pathology". What this means is that in language we use words such as poem or expression as both parcels and meaning that is contained in parcels, hence the metaphors in language are imprecise and ambiguous, and what follows from it is that our communication system is imperfect. The conclusion Reddy reaches is as follows:

> (…) the conduit metaphor is leading us down a technological and social blind alley. That blind alley is mass communication systems coupled with mass neglect of the internal, human systems responsible for nine-tenths of the work in communicating. We think we are „capturing ideas in words," and funnelling them out to the greatest public in history of the world. But if there are no ideas „within" this endless flood of words, then all we are doing is replaying the myth of Babel – centring it, this time, around a broadcasting tower. (Reddy 1998: 188)

Interestingly, despite the fact that CONDUIT metaphor has been recently rejected, Martin (Martin on-line) is of an opinion that language is actually likely to be thought of as a CONTAINER, making it possible for language users to transmit the meanings that are contained within language. The metaphor COMMUNI CATION IS SENDING IDEAS is treated as a metaphorical mapping of the idealised CONDUIT model, whose motivation is achieved via the following metonymies: the first one mapping the PHYSICAL TRANSMISSION OF SYGNALS onto the COMMUNICATION domain, whereas the second involving the mapping of MEANING onto its LINGUISTIC EXPRESSION, which is referred to as semantic pathology by Reddy, as already discussed earlier (see Martin on-line for more). The latter metonymy can be simplified by basically stating that a word, such as text or book, makes reference to both the linguistic expression and its meaning simultaneously. Also, Martin claims that CONDUIT metaphor is compatible with the ambiguous meaning of intentionality, which can be attained with the use of the verb *mean* or *intend*. Specifically, the metonymy here assumes that intentions

are on the part of a subject, while the meaning is a property of an object (for more details see Martin on-line). From the above it follows that the situation in which metonymy is coherent with metaphor is not sufficient to state that metonymy motivates metaphor in a conceptual manner, as particularly in the CONDUIT metaphor there is a mixture of both various metaphors and metonymies;

> (…) for example, a metaphorical expression may allude to the transmission of ideas without making reference to language as a container (Vanparys 1995:24) or vice-versa. The reason for this is that what has been called CONDUIT metaphor is not a simple metaphorical mapping; instead, it is a complex idealized model in which there is an interplay of different metonymies and metaphors that are coherent with one another, and which may get reflected separately in language (Martin on-line)

Nonetheless, metonymy may "reinforce" metaphor in the same way as in the CONDUIT model of communication, whereby metonymy facilitates metaphor, i.e. the experiential basis of the correlation between communicating and sending signals physically accounts for meaning being interpreted with regard to signals (Martin on-line). Finally, metonymy may form a part of an idealised model, such as ICM, in which metaphors also participate on equal status terms, this being coherent with Barcelona's approach (Martin on-line).

1.2.5. Lakoff and Johnson on metaphor and metonymy

For years, the classical view "loomed over" metaphor and metonymy studies with its stereotypes and fallacies, pushing the process of metaphorisation into the peripheries of linguistic interest. However, the situation has been altered by research into metaphor, conducted by Lakoff and Johnson, who have developed a theory called Conceptual Metaphor Theory, or CMT for short (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Evans and Green 2006: 296-304). CMT assumes that both metaphor and metonymy are not rhetoric figures, but rather that they form the basis of our cognitive processes (Panther & Radden 1999: 1-2). Precisely, thought is fundamentally metaphorical in nature. CMT shall, therefore, be discussed in order to demonstrate both its strengths and weaknesses[14], and simultaneously throw more light on metaphor and metonymy. However, as it regards both metaphor and metonymy I shall refer to the theory by means of Conceptual Metaphor and Metonymy Theory, or CMMT for short.

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14 Valenzuela & Soriano produce a report on the state of research in metaphor and they conclude that all the cognitive linguistics perspective on it ought to take into account a more empirical evidence, i.e. in order to be fully accountable cognitive linguistics must be aware of experiments conducted in other cognitive sciences and incorporate it as well.

1.2.5.1. The essence of metaphor

Before discussing the specifics of metaphor, the underlying principles of cognition, as proposed by Lakoff and Johnson, ought to be stated in order to provide context for the phenomenon in question. Namely:

- the fact that conceptualisation is grounded through embodiment (i.e. language users conceptualise on the basis of cognitive and sensual, bodily experiences[15]); following Casasanto we could say that "(…) the contents of the mind depends on the structure of the body (…)", which is also known as the body -specificity hypothesis[16] (Casasanto 2011)
- and the fact that semantics mirrors conceptualisation (i.e. the understanding of meaning is centred around such an experiential categorisation)

We are, then, likely to accept that both metaphor and metonymy, as linguistic notions, are 'a matter of thought and action, and only derivatively a matter of language' (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 153; Gibbs 1994: 207). Actually, it is possible to regard the whole human conceptual system as structured metaphorically,

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15 Embodiment is described by Johnson himself in the following manner: 'The fact of our physical embodiment gives a very definite character to our perceptual experience. Our world radiates from our bodies as perceptual centres from which we see, hear, touch, taste, and smell our world.' (Johnson 1987: 124) A similar view is expressed by Gärdenfors (online) when he says that word meanings are based on our perception:

Since the cognitive structures in our heads are connected to our perceptual mechanisms, directly or indirectly, it follows that *meanings are*, at least partly, *perceptually grounded*. This, again, is in contrast to traditional realistic versions of semantics which claim that since meaning is a mapping between the language and the external world (or several worlds), meaning has nothing to do with perception.

We can talk about what we see and hear. Conversely, we can create pictures, mental or real, of what we read or listen to. This means that we can translate between the visual form of representation and the linguistic code. A central hypothesis of cognitive semantics is that the way we store perceptions in our memories has the *same form* as the meanings of words.

16 Casasanto (2011) describes an interesting perspective in his article relating abstract thought to motor experience. He presents a study on embodiment, where he treats body as a constant part of the context in which the mind is being exercised. Further, Casasanto also notices that affective valence (i.e. positivity or negativity) as well as our motivation in physical and social interaction are grounded in body-oriented motor experiences. Similarly, it as been discovered that neurally emotions share central affective qualities, and that "(...) the brain easily emulates how it feels to experience events in the real world." (Casasanto et al. 2013). These findings are particularly remarkable when embodiment is taken into account.

on the basis of experience and image schemas[17], which in themselves are basic knowledge structures and relate back to our primary experiences. Additionally, metaphorical language seems to refer predominantly to its underlying metaphor system, i.e. a system of thought, hence I shall be dealing with conceptual metaphor, after Lakoff and Johnson (1980). Consequently, when we wish to describe how the conceptual metaphor functions, we must establish our comprehension of it by reference to the following term: i.e. a mapping. A mapping[18] should be thought of as a kind of correspondence, or association, between two domains which vary from one another considerably. As a matter of fact, in any mapping, there is always a source and a target domain. For instance, in the phrase *your eyes are like stars*, eyes will function as a part of a source domain (i.e. the domain of body), whereas stars will become an element of a target domain (i.e. the domain of astronomy, e.g., the relation between the two forming a mapping. Further, what also makes metaphor conceptual is the idea that the motivation for metaphorical thinking is present at the level of conceptual domains, so we speak and think in metaphorical terms. Metaphor is characterised by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) in a fairly specific manner. Namely, with any metaphor, there is always a conventional link established between two identifiable domains, the first one being a more concrete frame which a language user is familiar with through experience (the source domains), the second one being more abstract (the target domain), and therefore more difficult to comprehend. In this fashion, a language user proceeds from the source, and maps it (or finds similarities in the structures of two domains) onto the target domain in order to understand its more general nature. The consistency of mappings between source and target lies at the heart of the Invariance Principle, precisely. This point will be returned to later in this section.

Having defined the grounds for the conceptual metaphor, it is now possible to move to its characterisation. And thus, the conceptual metaphor is regarded as unidirectional, which means that the mappings always move from a source to a target, and never in the other direction. Elaborating on CMMT, Lakoff and Johnson produced the following list of metaphor types:

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17 Image schemas have been introduced by Lakoff to denote locative relations, e.g. prepositions such as up – down or front – back, etc. They are based on bodily experiences to a great extent. (Ungerer and Schmid 1996: 108; Taylor 2002: 134-137)

18 Lakoff and Johnson use the same name for correspondences between the domains as is used in the CIT for topological relations between input mental spaces. In addition, it ought to be noted that these two can be used interchangeably, since they refer to exactly the same processes.

1. orientational metaphors which function as an organisational tool for the whole linguistic system of concepts, with regard to one another, e.g. if happy is up, then sad must be down (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 14-15)
2. ontological (physical) metaphors which allow people to perceive things as physical objects, even if such entities are not of a physical nature intrinsically; there are three subtypes of ontological metaphor: A - entity metaphor, e.g. INFLATION IS AN ENTITY, B - container metaphors, e.g. HE IS IN LOVE, C - personifications, e.g. FACTS ARE PERSONS/PEOPLE (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 25-28)
3. structural metaphors help to structure more abstract concepts in terms of more concrete objects, e.g. TIME IS MONEY. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 7-8, 14)

All such metaphors interact, thus producing fairly complicated metaphor systems, e.g. the event structure metaphor, so as to depict a certain activity or a set of actions (Evans & Green 2006: 299). Additionally, metaphorical mappings carry entailments, or inferences, which essentially refers to the fact that metaphors bring with them some additional, detailed knowledge that is not necessarily overt from the source, but is obligatory for the proper comprehension of metaphor as a whole.

CMMT is closely associated with the so-called hiding and highlighting principle, which specifies the following:

> (…) when a target is structured in terms of a particular source, this highlights certain aspects of the target while simultaneously hiding other aspects. For example, invoking the metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR highlights the adversarial nature of argument but hides the fact that argument often involves an ordered and organised development of a particular topic (…). In contrast, the metaphor AN ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY highlights the progressive and organisational aspects of arguments while hiding the confrontational aspects. In this way, metaphors can **perspectivise** a concept or conceptual domain. (Evans & Green 2006: 303-304)

To put it simply, metaphors highlight certain image-schematic aspects of source-target domains which are relevant for the metaphorical correspondences, while simultaneously concealing the unnecessary, irrelevant or redundant aspects of the domains in question.

1.2.5.2. The Invariance Principle (IP) as a restriction on metaphor

Studying metaphors in detail, Lakoff and Johnson proposed certain restrictions on metaphorical processes. To understand why these limitations have been formulated, I shall briefly consider the example of the concept DEATH and its personifications. This concept may acquire some human-like features, for instance

volition. Simultaneously, however, death cannot be related to all potential human qualities, i.e. death does not fill the bathtub or sit on the sofa (Evans & Green 2006: 301-303). The observations such as these resulted in the creation of the Invariance Principle (later referred to as IP), also known as the Invariance Hypothesis (Lakoff 1990: 54-57 & 64-65; Rudzka-Ostyn 1994: 408). Before I move to the discussion of the IP, I shall briefly focus on the notion of the image-schema which is vital to the understanding of the Invariance Hypothesis. The image schema is a locative relation which describes the position or movement of a person or a thing (Ungerer and Schmid 1996: 108, 160-167; Taylor 2003: 134-136). To put it in other words:

> (…) our knowledge is not static, propositional and sentential, but is grounded in and structured by various patterns of our perceptual interactions, bodily actions, and manipulations of objects (…). These patterns are experiential gestalts, called *image schemas*, that emerge throughout sensimotor activity as we manipulate objects, orient ourselves spatially and temporally, and direct our perceptual focus for various purposes (…). (Gibbs and Colston 2006b: 239)

Image schemas are therefore embodied analogue relations of movement and stationary relationships in time and space. The most prominent of such image-schematic relations include: '(…) the schematic structures of CONTAINER, BALANCE, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL, PATH, CYCLE, ATTRACTION, CENTRE/PERIPHERY, and LINK.' (Gibbs and Colston 2006b: 239) All image schemas are crucial for cognitive functioning, and the extensive research into this field has indicated that image schemas are underlying our understanding and perception of grammatical constructions, prepositions or cognitive relations, to enumerate just a few (Gibbs and Colston 2006b: 239). The image schemas, thus, motivate our reasoning, thinking or creative processes.

Image schemas are not single entities, but they rather group together in order to form natural relations of image schema transformations, among the most important ones are:

a) *Path-focus to end-point focus*: Follow, in imagination the path of a moving object, and then focus on the point where it comes to rest, or where it will come to rest.
b) *Multiplex to mass*: Imagine a group of several objects. Move away (in your mind) from the group until the cluster of individuals start to become a single homogeneous mass. Now move back down to the point where the mass turns once again into a cluster.
c) *Following a trajectory*: As we perceive a continuously moving object, we can mentally trace the path it has traversed or the trajectory it is about to traverse.

d) *Superimposition*: Imagine a large sphere and a small cube. Increase the size of the cube until the sphere can fit inside it. Now reduce the size of the cube and put it within the sphere. (Lakoff 1987: 443)

Basically, these image schema transformations operate in a simple way: path-focus to end-focus imply the necessity to follow a fictive route of a moving object from start to finish, with the main interest on the object's destination. The multiplex to mass principle involves the zooming in and zooming out of a mass of objects. This results in a respective unity of the mass, and then its deconstruction back into the multiplicity. The next rule involves the overall perception of a trajectory of a moving object as a whole, and finally, the last transformation presupposes the superimposition of a sphere and a cube onto each other, with the help of activities such as increasing and decreasing of the size of the two objects in question. The above principles enhance our embodied understanding of the surrounding world and simultaneously they reflect some aspects of our visual, auditory and kinaesthetic experiences. A case in point of image schema transformations and how they operate may be the handling of a group of animals, where some might leave the herd and their observer needs to follow their path and focus on their trajectory to their new location. Additionally, one might have to use multiplex to mass and superimposition to visualise how to bring the stray animals back into the herd in order to restore the order and keep them together (Gibbs and Colston 2006b: 242).

Having explained the rationale for the Invariance Principle, I shall now focus on its nature. To begin with, the IP is defined in the following manner:

> Metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the image schema structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain. (Lakoff 1993: 215; Evans & Green 2006: 302; Rudzka-Ostyn 1994: 408)

In the light of the above, the Invariance Principle restricts metaphor to the extent that the correspondences between source and target domains must be preserved, and cannot in anyway be changed or expanded. Lakoff described the data that should be expected to be covered by the Invariance Hypothesis, i.e. time, states, events, actions, purposes, means, causes, modalities, linear scales and finally categories in terms of image schemas (Janowski 2007: 56; Lakoff and Turner 1989: 82-83; Lakoff 1993: 215-217, Lakoff 1990: 39; Langacker 2000: 41). The image schemas have been shown to be apparent from a very early age, including babies and toddlers, hence their fundamental nature is appropriate for the process of metaphorisation in language (Lakoff 1990: 73). As a consequence, for any abstract concept, the target domain is, in its entirety, transferred onto an abstract domain with the use of metaphor. Needless to say,

> (…) there is no structure in the target that could override, replace or otherwise alter the structure of the source domain. Consequently, there can be no reciprocal similarity between the parts of the source and the parts of the target structure involved in the mapping. Moreover, it is not possible to reconstruct the part of the target domain onto which a portion of the source domain was mapped. (Janowski 2007: 56)

Hence we are faced with the problem of indeterminate and unstructured abstract concepts, for instance IDEA or LOVE, whose comprehension is to be based entirely on the fairly structured source domains.

As already mentioned, the Invariance Hypothesis assumes, that the schema of a concrete source is projected onto the schema of an abstract target in a topological manner. Nevertheless, there are cases in which source entailments simply cannot be mapped onto target structure. To deal with this fact, Lakoff basically proposed to treat such an impossible mapping as an exception, and hence he has begun to refer to it as 'target domain override' (Lakoff 1993: 216).

The IP has been reviewed by Barcelona (2003: 45-46) who claims that each metaphor is motivated by metonymy. According Barcelona who draws on to Rudzka-Ostyn, it has been possible to regard the Invariance Hypothesis as a metonymy-related constraint on metaphor. Specifically, the IP can be interpreted to the following extent:

> (…) a prerequisite for a metaphorical mapping is the internal metonymic mapping in the target domain, whereby (a part of) the abstract image-schematic structure of the target is projected onto the whole of the target; that is, the target is understood as (part of) its image-schematic structure. It also means that (part of) the image-schematic structure of the source has to be metonymically mapped onto the whole of the source domain to check its degree of structural similarity to the target domain. (Barcelona 2003: 45-46)

What this means is that the target domain motivates the source domain by means of metonymy, the structure between the two being of image-schematic nature. Such a bond between the target and the source, with the former one playing a more dominant role in securing topological mappings between the two is a direct reflection of the IP. Also, as for a metonymically-based element of the target which motivates the metaphorical mapping, Barcelona agrees that 'target domain overrides' becomes a necessary consequence (Barcelona 2003: 46). A good illustration of this fact is provided by synaesthetic expressions such as *a loud colour* or *sweet music*, as discussed by Barcelona (2003: 35-49).

Rudzka-Ostyn (1994: 443) claims, with regard to IP, that it is actually a fact that both metaphorisation and abstraction are interdependent and must not be thought of as separate, the issue of which, therefore, is not irrelevant in this respect.

The Invariance Hypothesis has also been discussed by Fauconnier and Turner with regard to their CIT, since many instances of blending are fundamentally

metaphorical in nature. In their network model, Fauconnier and Turner postulate that the image-schematic topology is crucial not only for metaphorical projections, but for any conceptual projections (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: p. 359-362). Further, the generic space, both inputs and the blend all conform to the image-schematic structure to the extent that it is required for the topological transfer of the inputs' content to be image-schematic in nature. However, the inputs, and by default the generic space, are not image-schematic, but it is rather from the blended space that we infer the image-schematic relations of the inputs. For instance, in CIT we frequently encounter the time and place elements which always have exactly the same reference in both the inputs.

On the other hand, the Invariance Hypothesis holds that in metaphor all the correspondences have to be either supplied by the target and its image-schematic structure or by the source which projects its schematic structure to the target, which does not seem compatible with CIT. Specifically, the blended space establishes the emergent structure of its own which is not related to any of the inputs as such. Such an emergent structure will be image-schematic in nature, but not because of the input spaces, but rather the associations that are brought about. Further, the emergent structure is developed in the blend in order to be projected in the form of inferences backwards onto the target, the inferences being compatible with the target.

Another perspective on the Invariance Hypothesis is the fact that the two-domain model of metaphor with the Invariance Principle does not fit well into the manner in which metaphorical mappings operate. For Fauconnier and Turner, only CIT, with its multiple spaces and networks is capable of explaining the inferences behind metaphor. It is the blended space that constitutes the conventional structure of the target domain in metaphor (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 362). Viewed in this way, the Invariance Hypothesis becomes less problematic and is well incorporated within the theory of metaphor.

1.2.5.3. Mappings in metaphors

Let us now turn to the mappings that hold in a metaphor such as: 'Friendship, *n*. A ship big enough to carry two in fair weather, but only one in foul' (Bierce 2003: 42). This definition of friendship is based on the juxtaposition of a feeling with a palpable concept in the form of a ship. The metaphor, therefore, is based on the mapping between two domains: 1 - domain of positive feelings; with emotions like love, liking, and also friendship. 2 - the domain of sailing on a ship; such as sailors, their ship, the elements surrounding the vessel, for example good and bad weather. One can also perceive the metaphor referring to the word weather, which can either mean 1 - natural conditions, such as rain, sun, hail, wind, storm,

etc.; or 2 - the mood of a person, which can be treated in a respective manner to the nature: gloomy mood, sunny conditions, stormy moments of life, etc. If these varying frames of the initial metaphor of friendship are imposed onto each other, we have an image that is incomprehensible in literal terms, and requires figurative cognition to be well understood. More concretely, the following mappings and associations will occur, i.e. friendship is a ship – correspondence 1, friends are sailors – correspondence 2, good times understood as good weather - correspondence 3, and bad times comprehended as bad weather - correspondence 4, etc. And it is exactly via such similarities between varying domains that we arrive at the meaning of the elaborate concept of friendship, as well as the concept of a good, or a bad friend. Figure 3 shows the above-mentioned relations:

Figure 6. The mappings in the friendship metaphor



1.2.5.4. The current state of metaphor research

In recent years, the study of metaphor has been "at its crossroads", to use the expression of Barcelona (2003: 1-5), as so many new perspectives on metaphor interpretation have appeared, together with some complex and unresolved issues which still prevail in the research. One such problem concerns the definition of metaphor and of metonymy. The distinction between the two appears to be problematic at times. More specifically, for certain examples, it is not clear whether we deal with metaphor or metonymy, or both, Also, different researchers will hold different opinions on this matter. A case in point might be emotions and expressions describing them (Barcelona 2003: 8-10 and 17-56; Lakoff and Kövecses in Lakoff 1987: 340-415; Taylor 1995: 139). The distinction between metaphor and metonymy is based on the notion of a domain, with most cognitive linguists referring to domains as encyclopaedic in nature. What this assumes is the fact

that domains include the entrenched knowledge on the part of a speaker associated with a particular experience. If this were to be true, and we were to acknowledge that such an encyclopaedic knowledge varies from speaker to speaker, we would have to conclude that it is a fuzzy notion. Hence, the distinction between metaphor and metonymy based on this imprecise notion of domain poses some problems, too (Barcelona 2003: 8-10). One crucial issue also concerns the role that metaphor and metonymy play in any discourse interpretation, i.e. which mappings or sub-mappings are focused upon, which remain in the background, and how such mappings are elaborated on, etc. (Barcelona 2003: 8). As noted by Barcelona (2003: 8) a threat to metaphor and metonymy research is also a lack of any systematic topology of the two phenomena in question with their explanation, although a taxonomy of metonymy has been put forward by Kövecses and Radden (1999: 17-60). Another important issue arises from the fact that frequently both metaphor and metonymy interact (Geeraerts 2002 435-465), and the nature of such an interaction seems to be problematic. There can be two variations of interaction: either metonymy conceptually motivates metaphor or metaphor conceptually motivates metonymy. However, the latter presents a challenge for any theory of metaphor, as it can be interpreted to the extent that metaphor can be reduced to metonymy (Barcelona 2003: 17-56; more on this in Barcelona 2002). There are also voices that claim that metaphor and metonymy simply interact, and their respective interdependence is of a lesser importance and it is the interaction that ought to be stressed (Geeraerts 2002: 460).

Presented now are the most recent theories of metaphor. Consider first the claim that metaphor is motivated by metonymy. According to Barcelona (Barcelona 2003: 17-56) metonymy is not merely referential in nature, but it is 'a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same domain, or ICM.' (Kövecses and Radden 1999: 39, Barcelona 2003: 32). This broad definition can account for any metonymy in the sense that we do not refer to one entity by means of another, as previously viewed, but rather we think of metonymy as a conceptual complex of connotations ('the target') which is brought about by means of another such complex ('the vehicle'), the two being experientially linked within the same domain. It has thus been shown that metaphors are motivated by at least one metonymy in each case, and that metaphors and metonymies form a continuum, and should not to be viewed as independent of each other.

Radden (2003: 94-95) claims that metaphor and metonymy form a continuum, with clear cases of metaphor and metonymy at the extremes of this scale, and metonymy-based metaphors located at the middle. Precisely, the nature of the metonymy-based metaphors is as follows: 1- metonymy-based metaphors which

have conceptual domains with a common experiential basis, metonymy-based metaphors with conceptual domains associated by implicature, metonymy-based metaphors with conceptual domains displaying category structure, and finally, metonymy-based metaphors with conceptual domains connected via a cultural model (Kövecses 2003: 93-106). There are other proponents of the theory that metaphor is based on metonymy. Firstly, Goossens devised a name for an interrelation between metaphor and metonymy, i.e. *metaphtonymy*, where we have two types of relation: metaphor from metonymy and metonymy within metaphor / metaphor within metonymy (Goossens 2003: 349-378; Steen online). More importantly, Goossens also proposes a scalar relationship between metaphorical and metonymic examples (Goossens 2003: 367-369; Goossens in Cruse 2004: 210; see more on a critical view of meraphtonymy in Geeraerts 2002: 435-465).

According to Ruiz de Mendoza (2003: 109-130) there exists the continuum from metaphor to metonymy, with two kinds of metaphor. The first one structures a domain part, as it foregrounds some of its aspects, and the second one merely foregrounds some aspects of a domain without structuring it at all; the latter being associated closely with metonymy (see below section 1.3 on metonymy).

In a similar vein, Rudzka-Ostyn proposes a broad definition of metonymy which in any extension of language, including a metaphorical one, shall be of metonymic nature, i.e.

> If a metaphorical mapping requires the abstraction of a common schema for both source and target, this abstraction is surely a metonymic understanding of both (…). This metonymic understanding, by the way, was already implicit in Lakoff's earlier notion of the (experientially perceived) structural correlation between source and target (…), which is, according to him, what makes a metaphor possible. (Rudzka-Ostyn, after Barcelona 2000: 46)

Lakoff and Turner (after Haser 2005: 15) define metaphors with regard to metonymies on the basis of their structure, i.e. as for metaphors, the whole semantic structure of two or more entities is transferred onto their complete schematic structure, but as for metonymy, the crucial aspect is rather the fact that both the tenor and vehicle share a similarity within one domain. Equally, other cognitive linguists propose likewise definitions. Taylor defines metaphor as 'a process whereby one domain of experience is conceptualized in terms of another.' (Taylor 2003: 239), or in view of cognitive linguistics, as 'schematic for the metaphorical expressions which instantiate it.' (Taylor 2002: 493); and as for metonymy, the following accounts are given: '(…) the essence of metonymy resides in the possibility of establishing connections between entities which occur within a given conceptual frame.' (Taylor 2003: 125), or as a '(…) process by which an

expression which basically designates entity *e*, comes to be used of an entity closely associated with *e*, within a given domain (…)' (Taylor 2002: 590). Croft and Cruse make use of the terms *vehicle* and *target* to depict both metaphor and metonymy. These two terms are described as follows:

> Metaphor involves an interaction between two domains construed from two regions of purport, and the content of the vehicle domain is an ingredient of the construed target through processes of correspondence and blending. (…) In metonymy, the vehicle's function is merely to identify the target construal. (Croft and Cruise 2004: 193)

Also Gibbs defines metonymy, as opposed to metaphor, as a relation where one entity stand for another entity (Gibbs 1994: 320). Finally, Langacker presents his own attitude to metaphor and metonymy in the following manner: metaphor is one type of semantic extension directed from the source to the target (Langacker 2000: 39-40), whereas metonymy, also an extension, is for him a reference-point phenomenon (Langacker 1993: 30) that enables a conceptualiser to access the desired target. All the above-mentioned definitions differentiate between metaphor and metonymy on the basis of the fact that metonymies possess a referential function, while metaphors do not. However, Haser disagrees with such a state of affairs, maintaining that metaphors too are capable of referential shifts (Haser 2005: 17). Thus, an alternative theory of arriving at the distinction between metaphor and metonymy is proposed, i.e. in metonymy, the knowledge of target automatically implies the knowledge of the source. Contrary to this statement, in metaphor the knowledge of the target does not imply the knowledge of the source concept (Haser 2005: 51-52). In this way, Haser draws the distinction between the phenomena in question by disconnecting the meanings of source and target as such. Another observation made by Haser, in relation to CMMT, has to do with the fact that what Lakoff and Johnson give as instances of metaphors would not be regarded as figurative language by many non-cognitive scholars, e.g. Jackendoff and Aaron, or Murphy (Haser 2005: 52).

Murphy (2003: 48) refers to metaphor as follows: it includes 'using a set of concepts within another conceptual schema'. This definition is based on the study of antonymy, whereby Murphy concludes that lexical items, just like their meaning, can constitute conventionalised semantic relations which might be metaphorically extended. This view could be developed into a further claim that perhaps metaphor is not only the property of meaning, but also of linguistic expressions, such as words and phrases or sentences, which can also be metaphorically extended (Murphy 2003: 48). Murphy's view is criticised by Haser, because according to Haser we do not need to distinguish metaphorical concepts from metaphorical expressions, as it would, on the other hand, mean accepting

the fact that no meaning is literal. Haser also rejects the assumption that metaphors are a matter of thought rather than language, because she holds that neural connections do not create metaphors [or metonymies]. Also, and more importantly, Haser also states that there is no psychological research confirming that metaphors [or metonymies] are stored in our conceptual system. In addition, Haser notes that some further studies in metaphor and metonymy might actually exclude the possibility of mere distinction between the two, but rather it might come to light that these phenomena ought to be regarded as subtypes of a more general phenomenon, i.e. semantic extension (Haser 2005: 247). A case in point might be the study by Traugott and Dasher in semantic shifts within contexts, which provides a better perspective into metaphorical meaning than the one by Lakoff and Johnson, at least for Haser (Haser 2005: 248).

A link between metaphor and neural connections in the brain, rejected by Haser, has recently, however, been given a greater amount of attention, for instance in Lakoff 1993 & on-line, Lakoff and Johnson 1999, Fauconnier and Turner 2003a, Dodge and Lakoff 2006, or Howell 2000 on-line, to name just a few studies. In a similar vein, Bierwiaczonek (2005: 11-33) perceives metonymy – the phenomenon of conceptual coactivation grounded in neural coactivation[19], which will be presented later in this chapter (see section 1.3 below for details).

Feyaerts perceives the interrelation between metaphor and metonymy on a number of levels of conceptual taxonomies, but this feature is not present on all such levels. Normally, the more schematic ones typically do not show the interrelation. In this light, metaphor is perceived as a similarity-related mapping of logical structures between the source and the target (Feyaerts 2003: 67).

Kövecses analyses the scope of metaphor (2003: 80) which he defines as follows: 'The scope of metaphor is simply the full range of cases, that is, all the possible target domains, to which a given specific source concept (such as war, building, fire) applies'. What this means is that the scope of metaphor is the range of targets to which a certain source refers, e.g. a source concept of a building may be applicable to such target concepts as theory, relationship, career, company, economic system, social groups or life, which comprises its scope (Kövecses 2003: 80-81). On the basis of such an analysis of the scope of emotion metaphors it is possible to distinguish between simple or primitive metaphors, as well as complex or compound ones. The former type of mappings comprise the structure of the

19 Bierwiaczonek specifically defines metonymy as follows: 'Metonymy is the conceptual result (or manifestation) of a neural process whereby one active part of the neural network activates another (Bierwiaczonek 2005: 11).

latter type, to the extent that the simple metaphors might be referred to as simply mappings (Kövecses 2003: 91). More importantly, metaphorical source domains appear to have a varied scope: some of them have a wide scope, some have very limited scope, with numerous examples scaled in between the two extremes. Such observations are only the beginning of the necessary research to provide more generalisations on the nature of metaphorical mappings between the source and the target. Additionally, Kövecses (1986) advocates the fact that conceptual metaphor is an internally structured concept which is capable of creating reality, rather than just describing it. (see Kövecses 1989). Kövecses (2005) also advocates that there are universal metaphors, which are associated with the neural interconnection of metaphorical thinking, but this notion of universality will not be completely productive, as, according to Kövecses, metaphorisation may vary considerably both inter-culturally and also within one and the same culture. (Kövecses 2005: 34). In his more recent study, Kövecses (2014) discusses the relationship between the domains, both the source and the target, on the basis of the example THIS SURGEON IS A BUTCHER, which is a classic in CIT. Kövecses states that the two concepts in question, i.e. a surgeon and a butcher, form a metaphorical relation on the basis of the so-called meaning focus[20]. For his part, such a meaning focus is here concentrated around the contrast between the two conceptual domains evoked, in that surgeon's sloppiness is based on the backdrop of butcher's carelessness and attitude to portioning meat. Here we talk about the metonymy-based metaphor, where the concept stands for its property (butcher for sloppiness and carelessness). Further, in his analyses, Kövecses (2014) recognises the 4-stage meaning recognition process within metaphor, namely:

1. – we have two independent categories, such as SURGEON and BUTCHER
2. – some similarity between the two allows for metaphorical relationships to be created
3. – "incompetent" characteristics of a butcher's becomes most salient against the backdrop of surgery area
4. – such a feature (as in 3 above) is transported into the blended space (Kövecses 2014)

Based on this observation, Kövecses notices that in metaphor the meaning focus is entirely based on the source and its structure, which is similar to Ruiz de

20 Rather interestingly, Kövecses compares his view on the metaphor with the similar approach displayed by Ruiz Mendoza & Perez (2003, after Kövecses 2014), who talk about the "central correspondences" or "central explicatures" in metaphor, based on relevance theory. However, for Kövecses his meaning focus and their central correspondences are fairly synonymous.

Mendoza and his Extended Invariance Principle (Kövecses 2014). Specifically, it assumes that the image schematic structure of the source is not the only possibility, but that we can also have generic-level structure of the source category, and when it is used in CIT, the blended space can also have a generic-level structure after its source, and not only the image schematic one. Hence, Ruiz Mendoza presumes that blends will primarily apply the source category structure to its composition, and not both the source and the target. Following this view, Kövecses (2014) agrees that it is the source category that carries over its meaning focus onto the target, without conforming in any way to the target domain. Such a view is, according to Kövecses, well compatible with both CMMT as well as CIT, yet not with relevance theory. As Kövecses (2010& 2014) points out, relevance theory claims to interpret the classical sentence about surgeon who is a butcher purely from the inferential point of view, without seeking help in notions such as metaphor, metonymy or blending. Nevertheless, for Kövecses (2010&2014), RT does use the stand-for metonymic or metaphorical relation in the comprehension of the above, thus also making use of cognitive tools available to all language users. Interestingly, Kövecses (2010 &2014) sums up his research with the view that in reality, no one and only theory is better than all the others, and that is should be noted that all the available paradigms are intersecting and complementary, thus perhaps indirectly suggesting a multi-modal approach to metaphor research, and also possibly language and its study. Additionally, Kövecses (2010 & 2014) also criticises CIT for the theoretical point which states that in blending meaning will arise out of the static blend via some indefinite notion of incompatibility, whereas the focus ought to be rather on the fact that appropriate meaning always emerges from a blended space as a result of dynamic interactive situation. These developments of the theoretical kind shall be later on incorporated by my study of humour instances (see chapter 3).

In addition to that, Kövecses (2010: 27), after conducting experiments with both the source and the target, provides us with a list of potential source domains in metaphor, i.e. human body, animals, plants, buildings or machines, etc. As for potential targets, he further enumerates psychological and mental states or events, social groups, processes, personal experiences or events, etc. This finding is of great interest for those who wish to elaborate metaphor studies and unite them, too.

According to Lakoff, cognitive linguistics embraces the so-called generalization commitment. The generalisation commitment must incorporate all experimental hypotheses, which is referred to as the cognitive commitment (Lakoff 2006: 234). Lakoff also shows how the notion of literariness is misunderstood by many, as compared with the figurative language. Here is the list of such false implications with regard to the literal meaning:

> All everyday conventional language is literal, and none is metaphorical.
> All subject matter can be comprehended literally, without metaphor.
> Only literal language can be contingently true or false.
> All definitions given in the lexicon are literal, not metaphorical.
> The concepts used in the grammar of a language are all literal; none is metaphorical.
> (Lakoff 2006: 234)

This means that the philosophy of language does not include basic empirical evidence that would fall from the generalization as well as cognitive commitments. Furthermore, most language theories have their own assumptions which actually conform to the false comprehension of the literal meaning as presented above. This results in the following attitudes to metaphor: 1 – the traditional distinction between metaphorical and literal language, 2 – the complete rejection of figurative meaning, and 3 – the relegation of metaphor to the field of pragmatics. These three groups of viewpoint on metaphorical language are rejected by Lakoff as unconvincing. On the other hand, one cannot predict, as of now, what the possible form of metaphor's definition might be, as a consequence of above commitments, and hence no definition as such is postulated. However, Lakoff acknowledges certain hypotheses with regard to the future potential definition of metaphor, and these are connected with the literal nature of metaphor, e.g. Grice and Searle who propose that metaphorical meaning is merely a literal meaning that can be arrived at via some pragmatic rule; generative linguistics which rejects metaphor as uninteresting since it does not employ the logical formulae of meaning in a similar manner to Chomsky's generative semantics, or lastly artificial intelligence which views meaning as a algorithmic symbolic chain which can be manipulated (Lakoff 2006: 235-236). All the above-mentioned assumptions are challenged by the contemporary theory of metaphor which, according to Lakoff, has an image-schematic basis and presents the metaphor where there are multiple overlapping metaphors in a single sentence (Lakoff 2006: 235-236), or where both metaphors and blends interact to explain logically the instances of referential identity (Lakoff 1996: 118-119). This, on the other hand, calls for a simultaneous activation of numerous projections, which might invalidate the whole theoretical assumptions of other disciplines, e.g. artificial intelligence or information processing psychology (Lakoff 2006: 236-237). Specifically, Lakoff (2012) presents the so-called Neural Theory of Thought and Language (or NTTL for short). He explains in it the embodied notion of conceptualisation including abstract concepts. Lakoff recognises the need for cognitive primitives, otherwise known as cogs, or image schemas, that he refers to as universal mental structures which we are endowed with genetically or acquire fairly early in our developmental years. According to Lakoff such cogs form the basis of our

visual perception, motor action as well as mental imagery (for specific details see Lakoff 2012). Seen in this light, conceptual metaphor does preserve the cognitive primitive structure, too. Further, in the light of NTTL, humans possess the computational models for binding circuits within the brain, that conjoin idiosyncratic properties into the characteristic features of one and the same entity. A case in point might be the link between a shape and a colour of a particular entity, which are bound in the neural circuits into a relation. Lakoff advocates that when we think and operate cognitively, the existing pathways in the mind are activated and inhibited, and it is via such spreading activation and inhibition that we search for the meaning. Also, there is a concept of the so-called best fit, i.e. the easiest pathway for the brain to run along in order to produce understanding and meaning, which functions in the efficient manner, that is the least energy must be used for such a procedure. In this paradigm, there are fixed neural structures and fixed inferences which can be activated and inhibited by language. One such procedure is referred to as a neural simulation. Moreover, Lakoff presupposes that context-dependent inferences will crop up when context influences a simulation. Lakoff also recognises that within NTTL the theory of mental spaces as proposed by Fauconnier can assume a working position if regarded as a partitioned simulation, where each mental space constitutes a simulation and the mapping in-between such mental spaces function as cognitive bindings. Lakoff (2012), thus, perceives language and thinking processes as embodied and neural to a great extent, as supported by a wide range of empirical data (see the whole article for details). This perspective is of special interest to our research, and the neural basis of CIT will be mentioned as a potential development of future humour research (see conclusions).

From a philosophical point of view, the CMMT as proposed by Lakoff and Johnson has been criticised with regard to its deficient and faulty perspective on philosophy. Firstly, the main principles of CMMT are frequently vague, e.g. the existentialist account of objectivity ['Contrary to Lakoff (…), *objectivism* is not the name made up by Lakoff/Johnson, but was used by Hussler to characterise a philosophical movement that has important affinities with Lakoff/Johnson's objectivism.' (Haser 2005: 242)], as well as the incorrect usage of the term myth. There is a lack of concrete ideas, with the majority of the principles having already been put forward by philosophers such as Goodman or Putman (Haser 2005: 10-122). From the cognitive viewpoint, there are also some shortcomings in CMMT. Firstly, the distinction between the notions of metaphor and metonymy are not well clarified, to the extent that metaphors are usually defined with reference to similarity and metonymies with regard to contiguity involving referential shift. However, there are also examples of metaphors which involve

stand-for relations. (Haser 2005: 17; for more details see Haser 2005: 13-35). Secondly, the most central definitions, such as *meaningfulness* or *meaning*, which are crucial to any theory of metaphor and metonymy are avoided (Haser 2005: 8-9), or the concept of understanding, where the authors simply assume the following: 'Understanding a given target domain in terms of a given source can trigger many different conceptions (ways of 'understanding') of the target' (Haser 2005: 82) The understanding is presented as viewing one thing in terms of another, the way in which Lakoff and Johnson perceive both metaphor and metonymy, which appears to lack credibility to be sufficient. Similarly, Cserep (2014 online) points to the criticism of overusing the A is B type of metaphor in CMMT's analysis, which is not representative at all. Additionally, Cserep (2014 online) quotes that the majority of examples of metaphorical language used by Lakoff and Johnson, or general within metaphor studies, are either unrepresentative of genuine metaphorical language, or they are simply not metaphors at all (see also Gibbs 2011).

Haser (2005) also draws on the fact that Lakoff and Johnson utilised Grady's account of primary metaphors, however, they used it inappropriately. First of all, Lakoff and Johnson regard the notion of primary metaphor as a neural connection in the human brain, while Grady's idea is to treat it mainly as an entrenched association. The argument goes that neural connections and experiential associations may both give rise to metaphors, however, it is not possible to say that such connections or associations, at any point, constitute metaphors, and cease to be merely connections or associations (Haser 2005: 209). Secondly, it is suggested by Haser that cognitive linguistics frequently uses both terms metaphor and metonymy to describe phenomena which do not count as metaphor and metonymy, as the case is with primary metaphors, i.e. we have a certain redundancy and multiplication of the concepts (Haser 2005: 209-212). Thirdly, it is posited that there is no reason to distinguish between primitive and complex metaphors at all; it is proposed to refer to the phenomena in question as associations, mental links or neural connections instead (Haser 2005: 238). An alternative that Haser suggested is to start from concrete expressions and proceed to more abstract ones, irrespective of whether they are metaphorical or metonymic in nature (Haser 2005: 239-240). All meaning, and hence both metaphor and metonymy, is motivated by family resemblances to other expressions that are similar in the manner specified below:

> Once you have encountered a word with a given source meaning in a specific figurative context, you will be inclined to use other expressions with a similar or (at least related) source meaning in a similar (or analogous) metaphoric sense. Since a word is generally related to various other words that belong to quite different potential source domains,

> the original extension can trigger parallel developments in several domains. By the same token, a given figurative sense can be motivated by the presence of various extant „paradigm" mappings. (Haser 2005: 236-237)

Such a family resemblances-based notion of meaning where different meanings are closely related and hence may provide the context for the interpretation of a word or phrase is illustrated by *fortify* which may be comprehended in relation to domains such as WAR, VIOLENCE, BUILDING or STRENGTH (Haser 2005: 236-237).

Further, what has been reported by Ritchie (2013, after Cserep 2014) is the fact that metaphor research rarely takes into account the so-called emergent features of metaphor, i.e. the features that are associated neither with the source nor with the target, but which directly emerge from a metaphor in question. For Ritchie, such emergent characteristics ought to find their place in future studies on metaphor.

Lately, there has also been a great amount of cross-linguistic similarities discovered between divergent studies on metaphor, which clearly displays the fact that metaphor in its conceptualisation can be independent of any specific language (e.g. in Kövecses (2010)) who discusses the so-called universal metaphors). Also, in their experiments with reasoning about crime, Broditsky and Thibodeau (2011, after Cserep 2014) prove that metaphor does influence our perception, cognition and evaluative judgements to a great extent, which actually also signifies that metaphor might well be cognitive in its nature.

Circularity has also been criticised by many with regard to CMMT. Namely, it is assumed that conceptual system is metaphorical because there are numerous examples of metaphor in language. And our is regarded as metaphorical to a large extent because our conceptual system is metaphorical. These two premises are clearly circular, making the CMMT's methodology circular as well (Cserep on-line).

Cserep (on-line) enumerates types of metaphorical language that poses problems for CMMT, i.e. creative, poetic metaphors; image metaphors and finally nominal metaphors. However, she hurries to explain that due to embodiment, CMMT proponents mainly deal with conceptual metaphors, and not the 3 kind above.

Additionally, there has been some critique with recourse to the experiential basis of metaphoric research. Nevertheless, counterexamples which are given to demonstrate the issue are in fact mostly grounded in experience themselves (Cserep 2014). Moreover, Casasanto (2009) proposes his body specificity theory, which proves that people do perceive reality and think with recourse to their bodies. Based on his research, as well as other studies (Cserep 2014) it could be concluded that metaphors do involve embodied simulations and ought to be studied with reference to experiential background.

Furthermore, as Cserep (2014 online) states, there has been criticism of CMMT for the fact that it is context and society independent. However, as

Kövecses (2010: 215-227) rightly observes, CMMT has presently reformulated its theoretical background via the addition of cultural and social elements into the creation of metaphor.

Finally, Cserep (2014 online) mentions feedback on CMMT which is associated with the source and target and their nature. Firstly, the CMMT paradigm assumes the binary relationship between the source and the target and the concept they stand for. There is, also, no systematization between the mappings in different domains (Gibbs 2011: 535), and such mappings turn out to be too complex or irregular. Besides, metaphor is more dynamic in nature that the CMMT presupposes, too. As for Cserep (2014 online) CMMT possesses explanatory power in relation to regularities between source and target as well as different metaphors, however, as for the account of lexical and syntactic restrictions, or irregular features, it needs alternative models, unfortunately. For instance, Kövecses (2010: 302) suggests that CMMT and CIT might be able to work together for the sake of metaphor research, with either complementary or contradictory results. Kövecses (2010) also recognises the importance of the generic space with which CIT guards the selection from inputs to the blend.

A rather fine-grained critique of CMMT and Lakoffian ideas for metaphor interpretation has been provided by Steen (2014). Steen initially presents multiple issues surrounding Lakoff's perspective on metaphor. Specifically, he questions the possibility that all potential obstacles in the way of metaphor research might be resolved by means of Lakoff's neural theory of metaphor and the reference to processes of the brain, which is pretty indeterminate at the present state of research. Next, Steen doubts the understanding of metaphor as a mapping between the source and target. If such a view is applied to the comprehension of conventional metaphors, it must fail spectacularly, since the sheer idea that in such a case we create projections all over again, every time we evoke conventionalised metaphors, is a great exaggeration. This is turn puts a big question mark on the idea of metaphorical thought processes in humans, and necessitates the toned down version of Lakoff's neural perspective on metaphorical language and thought. Thirdly, Steen mentions a theory of Gibbs who explains metaphor in a historical manner. Namely, he claims that contemporary polysemy which is metaphorically motivated in resultant from diachronic language development, and it does not project onto dynamic on-line metaphorical processing in language. Additionally, Steen mentions also Glucksberg (2008) who is of an opinion that on-line metaphorical mappings are not comparative, but that they are rather of categorisation or abstraction origin. In a similar vein, Gentner and Bowdle (2001, 2005 & 2008, after Steen 2014) assume that on-line metaphor is rendered by means of categorisation process, in their Career of Metaphor Theory. Gentner and Bowdle claim

that when a metaphor is fairly new, i.e. in the beginning of its career, it requires a different mental processing effort on the part of the conceptualiser than when it is highly conventionalised, i.e. in the middle of its career, and when it is finally considered dead, i.e. at the end of its career. In view of this model, the cognitive nature of metaphor interacts with the linguistic form in which the mapping between domains is attained, and also the genuine metaphors work in a different manner than similes, for instance. Steen is in favour of the perspective that the Career Theory of Metaphor offers, i.e. in relating to metaphor in thought, by studying conventional versus new metaphors, to metaphor in language, by studying metaphors versus similes, and finally to metaphor in processing of information, by studying the mappings as related to comparison or categorisation phenomenon. Steen draws on their paradigm in his suggestions for future metaphor approach. Firstly, Steen advocates that a must is a research into the way that new metaphors are approached by language users. The question to be answered here is whether we resort to mappings on the basis of a simple comparison and similarity or rather on the basis of proper categorisation. Additionally, not only similes should be studied, which seems to be quite frequent and relatively straightforward. To this type of metaphorical relation we should add research on other such types to enhance its fullness and appropriateness. Secondly, Steen proposes to evaluate the depth of metaphorical processing in language, answering the question if our thought is really so very much metaphor-oriented. Here Steen quotes Giora's research (2003 & 2008, after Steen 2014), as well as Coulson's studies (2008 after Steen 2014), who both resort to processing metaphors as on-line linguistic phenomena and not cognitive ones, where by means of simple linguistic disambiguation, language users arrive at the correct interpretation of metaphorical statements. Steen thinks that such a perspective might also help to account for conventional metaphors, for instance the fact that Giora discusses the so-called salience of word senses that are evoked in language processing. Another problem that Steen recommends addressing is the relation between the notion of metaphor and language as well as thought. A case in point might be more research into the differences between metaphor's production and comprehension or the multi-modal nature of metaphor in learning or language acquisition, etc. Further, Steen advocates more historical and sociocultural research into metaphor and its workings. He states that although it might have been true that specific conceptual domains were used in a specific society or culture to conceptualise other domains, e.g. TIME or SPACE, it does not entail that such projections are still valid conceptually and are always activated when we process metaphors dynamically. Steen also quotes Casasanto's research into metaphor (2009) who proves in this experiments that people do think in metaphorical terms when they perform specific tasks, so metaphor is

vital in thought processes, however its relationship needs to be clarified both with recourse to language and thinking. Finally, Steen promotes further research into what he calls the deliberate notion of metaphor, i.e.

> (…) an overt invitation on the part of the sender for the addressee to step outside the dominant target domain of the discourse and look at it from an alien source domain. (Steen 2014: 38)

For Steen's part the difference between deliberate and non-deliberate metaphorical use is in the alteration of target domain in communication as displayed by the speaker and the hearer. And Steen also hypothesises that we might expect the deliberate metaphor to be treated as a mapping by means of categorisation rather than a comparison, which again goes against Lakoffian view on metaphors. Based on such prerequisites, Steen puts forward a multi-modal, specifically a 3D approach to metaphor studies, which basically sums up in the research as to why metaphorical thinking at all happens when we search for meaning in interpretation and production of language. Here goes the 3D taxonomy for metaphor comprehension:

Communicative values	Conceptual values	Linguistic values	Examples
Non-deliberate	Conventional	Metaphor	*Lakoff attacked Glucksberg.*
		Simile	*He is as stubborn as a mule.*
	Novel	Metaphor	*?* [no instances to be provided]
		Simile	*?* [as above]
Deliberate	Conventional	Metaphor	*Wasps, the wrong weather and why this summer's got a very nasty sting in the tail* (newspaper headline)
		Simile	*More like the shadow of his thoughts or something* (BNC JSU 136)
	Novel	Metaphor	*Metaphor Juliet is the sun*
		Simile	*Every junkie's like a setting sun.*

(Steen 2014: 40)

Thus, Steen wants to incorporate linguistic, cognitive as well as communicative studies of metaphor under one roof, so that we can move the research onto the tracks of metaphor as comprehended in a broad manner in language, thought and communication. Here is another graphic representation of the above-mentioned:

		Behavioral	
	Semiotic	Psychological	Social
Language	The linguistic forms of metaphor	Individual process and products of metaphor use	Shared processes and products of metaphor use
Thought	The conceptual structures of metaphor	as above	as above
Communication	The communicative functions of metaphor	as above	as above

(Steen 2014: 45)

In addition to that, Steen also proposes to assume a social perspective on metaphor research so that we can have a full view of the dynamics of metaphor as utilised by a certain society as well as culture.

1.2.5.5 Can blending be reduced to metaphor?

The current research into conceptual integration has raised some crucial issues, one of them being the fact that metaphor may be underlying the processes of blending. Fauconnier and Turner (2008b: 2) propose that metaphor ought to be regarded as a more complex phenomenon than 'the bundles of pairwise bindings', as it is presented in contemporary research, a case in point being a metaphorical understanding of TIME AS SPACE[21]. It should rather be thought of as an instance of a cognitive construction which incorporates many spaces and mappings constructed in the form of a network as a result of the cognitive integration process (Fauconnier and Turner 2008b: 54). Also, metaphors never result from the on-the-fly arrangement of information or pre-existing entrenched structures, but rather they are the end products of so-called *cobbling and sculpting* (Fauconnier and Turner 2008b: 54-55). The process assumes that on

21 Fauconnier and Turner (2008 on-line) suggest that in order to draw conclusions on metaphorical conceptual systems, based on the analysis of TIME AS SPACE, it is necessary to take into account cultural history as well as an individual's perspective on the notion of time. This can be exemplified by Radden is account of the metaphor in question who concludes that paradoxically, certain beliefs about the nature of time, which seem universal, i.e. the 3-D nature of time, turn out to be false, when applied to certain languages, e.g. Chinese, where, rather surprisingly, the future is perceived as being behind, and the past as still waiting ahead (Radden in Górska and Radden 2005: pp. 99-119).

the one hand integration networks are a mixture of knowledge and linguistic abilities, e.g. building networks and reaching conclusions. On the other hand, integration networks also comprise innovation and creativity. So the CIT-based networks, of which metaphor is merely one example, alongside other phenomena such as polysemy (Fauconnier and Turner 1998 on-line), will always be a mix of conventionality, conventionally-structured elements and new projections and compressions (Fauconnier and Turner 2008b on-line).

Another innovation that has to do with metaphor is the fact that, as an example of CIT, metaphorical integration networks will be the result of systematic compressions and decompressions. For instance, the cause-effect relations in metaphor might as well be compressed into a representation relation or identity relation in a particular integration network (Fauconnier and Turner 2008b on-line). However, Grady (on-line) suggests that blending is not sufficient to explain the process of metaphorisation, as blends are based on compression relations such as identity or cause etc. Primary metaphors, on the other hand, are correlations between mental experiences which do not, as such, underlie mental spaces (Grady on-line), but might form the basis for inputs in the blending (Grady 2005, for a detailed discussion see further in this section).

One more innovation pertaining to the theory of metaphor is the fact that the topology between source and target is not sustainable to the extent that if metaphor is viewed as an integration network process, its inferences shall be violated in the blended space. Namely, the emergent structure of the blend often finds source-target mappings clashing or incompatible, when the online meaning is created. In such circumstances, even the most basic correspondences might become elaborated in successful blended networks (Fauconnier and Turner 2008b on-line).

Lastly, the principle which relates to metaphor is the fact that conceptual integration links manifold cognitive phenomena and mental operations, such as counterfactuals, framings, categorizations, metonymies and metaphors, etc., as the end product of the same human ability to produce double-scope blending processes. As Fauconnier and Turner claim:

> (…) these phenomena are all the product of integration networks under the same general principles and overarching goals. They are separable neither in theory nor in practice: the majority of cases involve more than one kind of integration. The resulting products can belong simultaneously to any (or none) of the surface types 'metaphors,' 'counterfactuals,' 'analogies,' 'framings,' 'categorizations,' or metonymies.' (Fauconnier and Turner 2008b on-line)

This innovative approach to diverse cognitive phenomena links many of them together, and goes even further in claiming that they are frequently inseparable, operating simultaneously with one another. This attitude shall be explored further

on in the chapter. As for the novel comprehension of metaphor with regard to the conceptual integration, a good example of the above-discussed innovative characteristics of metaphor is Fauconnier and Turner's perception of TIME AS SPACE metaphor, which involves topological relations between multiple spaces, not just source and target as it was posited in the classical view of metaphor. In addition, it possesses an emergent structure of its own, which may be manipulated and altered in a variety of contexts (i.e. cobbling and sculpting). Compression is present to the extent that the time measured is irrelevant and we compress the different instances of TIME AS SPACE metaphor with the result of having one idealised timepiece defining universal time (example of TIME AS SPACE metaphor that were used include, among others: *Minutes are quick, but hours are slow. For me the hours were minutes but for her the minutes were hours. Next week was an eternity away,* or simply *Time came to a halt.*), and the understanding of the metaphor in question needs so much more than the mere projection of inferences between source and target (Fauconnier and Turner 2008b on-line, all the above examples of TIME AS SPACE were also taken from the text).

Finally, the proponents of CIT suggest that compression/decompression, which is closely associated with blending, gives rise to metaphor and metonymy. We shall focus on metaphor exclusively, and the influence that compression bears on metonymy shall be referred to further in this chapter. Let us then have a look at the following sentence: *Is your sleeping partner driving you to an early grave?* (Fauconnier 2008 on-line). This should be represented in the form of a diagram:

Figure 7. Metaphor as a result of inferences between multiple spaces



According to CIT, there are three input spaces distinguishable from the statement. The first one is the mental space which regards graves, dying and funerals (the mental space of death). The second one considers someone or something being pushed into a container (the image schematic space), whether a hole or a cave is of less importance. The third space pertains to the fact that human behaviour may induce a shorter life, here particularly for an individual to whom the question just mentioned is addressed (the mental space of human activity). What is truly relevant in the quoted example is the fact that the meaning of the blended space, whereby being pushed to grave equals reaching an early death, is not, however, the direct product of inference transfer whereas in classical metaphor it would be. Rather, the emergent metaphorical meaning is achieved through the interaction between inference transfer, compression, which here is of identity, i.e. the sleeping partner can stand for many sleeping partners who share the same problem, just as the addressee of the question posed may stand for many partners of those who snore loudly and thus are being driven to an early grave, and lastly, the emergent structure of the blend with its implications. This perspective is vastly different compared to the commonplace assumption that metaphor is based merely on inferences between the source and target domains, with the direction of the research into metaphor at the multiplicity of factors that are mixed together via conceptual integration in order to arrive at a metaphorical meaning (Fauconnier 2008b on-line).

At the end of this section, I would also like to present Grady's view on his primary metaphors as forming the basis for blends. Grady (2005) examines the nature of counterpart connections, i.e. mappings in conceptual integration, and he assumes initially that conventionalised patterns of metaphor may provide a tailor-made format for counterpart connections in the online construction of blending (Grady 2005: 1596). Grady argues that CIT usually regard metaphors as mappings of analogous nature (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 329-330, Coulson 2001). He claims that the metaphoric basis of blending may be connected with the fact that metaphors themselves comprise relations between distinct concepts that are similar and hence are related. Such similarity-based associations can be generated at will and can bring about a great number of mappings that would count as metaphoric in nature. However, as Grady notices, there may be various patterns stored in memory which can serve as mappings for metaphors, for instance correlation which is grounded in experience. Grady finds out that while experienced-oriented correlations[22] may function as motivation for metaphorical mappings, not all such

22 Grady (2005) also notices that for correlations to lead to metaphors three preconditions must be satisfied: sensory versus non-sensory association, shared super-schematic structure as well

correlations will necessarily lead to metaphors, some might bring about metonymy. Moreover, as Grady remarks, primary metaphorical patterns can function as templates for metaphors which will be universal and widely known, e.g. DIFFICULTY-AS-HEAVINESS. Yet again, not all primary metaphors will have a universal status, e.g. SIMILARITY-IS -CLOSENESS. So, Grady sums up his remarks on metaphors in the following manner: he states that there exist types of metaphorical mappings between concepts which can operate as likely candidates for input mental spaces in the blending process, yet they are not to be regarded as products of CIT[23]. Namely, Grady enumerates as such primary metaphors, patterns of personification and synaesthetic metaphors which function due to their own principles (Grady 2005).

Additionally, I wish to present the research on metaphors which are viewed as more entrenched within languages and hence are to be perceived as dead metaphors. This research has been conducted as a result of a 'career of a metaphor' model as envisaged by Bowdle and Gentner (2005) and its application to study metaphors. The model assumes that on conventionalisation, metaphors become connected with a metaphoric category and concept, which means that they will be used to categorise rather than simply compare two entities. This transition from similarity comparison to appropriate categorisation means that human categorisation is more economical and swift, and does not incorporate the brain into expensive in energy construal of a metaphorical comparison, but it rather appears to follow an existing metaphoric category, which enables language users to be economical and faster (Goldstein, Arzouan & Fans 2012). This perspective has been mentioned simply because it is claimed (e.g. Goldstein et all 2012) that the model is fully compatible with graded salience hypothesis as presented by Giora (Giora 1997), which could mean in the long run that humour may also be conventionalised, just as metaphors do, and there might be something such as a humorous category or concept, the use of which could simplify humour studies, at least to some extent.

To finish off this section, I shall present Coulson and Oakley's (2005) findings on the relationship between the figurative and literal meaning, i.e. metaphorical associations, and their relation to blending. The authors presume the great role of context within the search for meaning in language. In particular, they postulate incorporation of what Langacker calls ground: or current discourse space (CDS) into categorisation and blending, or Brandt and Brandt's (2002) notion of semiotic space. Langacker specifies that his CDS is a mental space, just in the manner as

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as the covariation. The last one is defined in the following way: elements of any scenario must vary directly with each other if they are to be joined in a metaphoric relation of any kind.

23 Grady's findings go hand in hand with Fauconnier and Turner who believe that metaphor is not more basic than blending and is of a more complex nature (see earlier in this section).

Brandt and Brandt refer to their semiotic concept, which means that contextual information is of cognitive nature, and it is crucial for interpretation of meaning in language. Coulson and Oakley (2005) go further by introducing a dual variants of ground into their research, the first type is called deictic and it denotes concrete preconditions for real life events, the second one is named displaced and it introduces deixis set to name the entities and the state of affairs in discourse, yet not the real ones. Based on this division of their ground, Coulson and Oakley specify that the decoded message of a statement is arrived at via contextual information in the meaning network (both local and a broader context is vital in interpretation). Now, seen from such a perspective, metaphor seems to be, for the authors, the manifestation of the shared conceptual models in converging domains. However, the untenability of the view where metaphor is a relation between the literal versus the non-literal stems from the fact that in conventional metaphors, as Coulson and Oakley notice, the mappings are attained through the automatisation of retrieval process, whose "emergent structure" of the blended relation is retrieved rather than constructed online. It is only in new metaphorical relations that similarity mappings are derived actively. In this light, Coulson and Oakley criticise CIT and its blending processes as applied to metaphors, stating that blending should direct attention to contextualisation. So CIT ought to incorporate the notion such as ground, but also other non-linguistic knowledge (e.g. encyclopaedic or background knowledge) into its explanation of meaning. I would like to pay special attention to this premise because in my analyses of humour I propose exactly that, as sociocultural as well as other contextual perspective in the majority of cases helps not only to explicate but also to enhance humour involved (check chapter 3 and conclusions).

1.3. Blending and metonymy

In this section, I shall refer to the cognitive integration in terms of metonymy. The interest will centre around the definition of metonymy and its position within language studies, in relation to metaphor. I shall also try to explain why metonymy, despite the fact that it is used occasionally as a basis for topologies within input spaces of cognitive integration, may not be considered primary to blending.

It appears to be standard practice for the linguists to connect metaphor with metonymy, at least in some respect. A case in point may be Feyaerts who has studied the conceptual hierarchies and their interrelations, and consequently has concluded that metaphors and metonymies are closely associated at a certain level of description, while at other levels, usually more schematic, such an interaction is non-existent within a conceptual hierarchy (Feyaerts 2003: 67). Further, as for metonymy specifically, Feyaerts claims that metonymy deals with

a referential shift from a salient easily accessed entity to a less prominent and more abstract one, which originates in the contiguity. There are a few forms of metonymic contiguity relationships, however, the degree to which the metonymy extends beyond the borders of the domain matrix is not vital (Feyaerts 2003: 67).

Croft (2006: 269-297) presents his view of metaphor and metonymy in relation to the interpretation of words and phrases based on Langacker's theory. Specifically, he calls metonymy a *domain highlighting* occurring with autonomous predications, while metaphor is referred to as a *domain mapping* which occurs in dependent predications. More importantly, it is stated by Croft (2006: 292) that '(…) the grammatical combination of a dependent predication and the autonomous predication(s) it is dependent on must be interpreted in a single domain (or domain matrix).' What this means is that in a single domain unit (or domain matrix unit), a metaphor would result in a projection, while metonymy would result in the highlighting of certain elements; which is more generally referred to as domain adjustment. As observed by Croft (2006: 269), the metaphorical or metonymic domain(s) and its/their components, together with their meanings, are adjusted for the purpose of conceptual domain unity, which is, on the other hand, defined as the fact that the meaning of the whole phrase or sentence has an effect on the meanings of its parts, and the fact that all the elements of a syntactic unit are to be regarded within a single domain.

Such a view of metonymy has been criticised by Ruiz de Mendoza because it does not recognise metonymy as a mapping, with the focus on metonymy as a referential shift and highlighting process only, which consequently prevents Croft from recognising that some metonymy is predicative, and can be interpreted as target-in-source metonymy, e.g. I'm parked out at the back (Ruiz de Mendoza 2003: 115-121). In addition, domain mapping and highlighting are viewed as independent, which does not hold true, since mapping is prior to highlighting and highlighting is also present for one-correspondence metaphors (Ruiz de Mendoza 2003: 129). In contrast, Ruiz de Mendoza perceives metonymy as closely related to a metaphor type which merely foregrounds some aspects of a domain without structuring it (Ruiz de Mendoza 2006 on-line). Further, metonymic mapping is either described as a mapping where the source is the sub-domain of the target, i.e. 'source-in-target' metonymy, or a mapping where the target functions as a sub-domain of the source, i.e. 'target-in-source' metonymy, with the total exclusion of the contiguity pertaining to metonymy (Ruiz de Mendoza 2003: 109). Hence the conclusion that metonymic mappings of both types are similar to one-correspondence metaphors (e.g. *Achilles is a lion* in Ruiz de Mendoza 2003: 111, where the character's bravery is related to the animals courage), as compared with the many correspondence metaphors which have a complex

sets of relations developed, with the exception of the fact that metaphors relate to different domains, while metonymy always remains within one domain. As it is one and the same domain, there is no possibility of mapping source onto target, which, in turn, leads to the statement that metonymies are inclusive and referential (Ruiz de Mendoza 2003: 109-130). Ruiz de Mendoza's stance on metonymy, i.e. the reduction of metonymy's types to the following: part-to-whole and whole-to-part, is criticised by Bierwiaczonek who does not fully agree with the two-dimensional treatment of metonymy. Bierwiaczonek provides the taxonomy of metonymy which distinguishes 4 types on meronymy-based metonymy:

a. Functional part-based metonymy. This metonymy works both ways: the functional part may stand for the whole, e.g. *a set of wheels* for car, and the whole may stand for its parts, e.g. *That's my car* referring only to the body of the car in a garage. (…)
b. Segmented part-based metonymy. Since the parts in the segmented-part meronymy are totally dependent on the whole, and, in addition, having on identifiable Gestalt characteristics, are not denoted by autonomous expressions but by partitives, this relation strongly favours the whole-for-part metonymies, as in *Here's your cake*, where cake stands for a piece of cake. (…)
c. Script-based metonymy, e.g. *I just stuck out my thumb* in response to the question *How did you get to the party?* As an instance of the metonymy EMBARCATION FOR THE WHOLE JOURNEY (…)
d. Frame-based metonymy, based on knowledge, i.e. Propositional models, of relations between and among various elements of a frame, e.g. the metonymy EMOTION FOR ITS CAUSE, e.g. *She's my pride*, AUTHOR FOR PRODUCT in *I've got two Renoirs*, TOOL FOR OBJECT, e.g. *tongue* for language, CONTROLLED FOR CONTROLLER, e.g., *The Mercedes has arrived* (…).
(Bierwiaczonek in Górska and Radden 2005: 26).

In view of such a four-type metonymy, Ruiz de Mendoza's two-tier division does not tally, in the sense that his division is applicable only to the first three types of Bierwiaczonek's taxonomy, whereas the analysis of metonymies point to the fact that actually the frame-based kind of metonymy is present in Mendoza's theory, but it is, according to Bierwiaczonek, incorrectly classified (Bierwiaczonek in Górska and Radden 2005: 27); for more on Bierwiaczonek's metonymy see below.

Barnden (on-line) argues that differentiating between metaphor and metonymy fails for the following reasons: contiguity versus similarity; source/target links surviving as part of the message or in passing structural correspondence and hypotheticality of source items. As a result, Barnden holds that perhaps instead of trying to distinguish metaphor from metonymy, or even situate the two on a continuum, it ought to be a priority to consider certain dimensions in studying texts, for instance: is this piece of text based on similarity or contiguity and to what extent? Is this hypothetical or imaginary? etc. Ritchie and Fauconnier (Barnden online)

suggest that metaphor and metonymy are simply labels that are convenient for pragmatic analyses of text, but other than that, these notions are vague and do not bring too much insight into text interpretation, hence this eliminativist stance, accepting only dimensional text analyses as appropriate, e.g. CIT (Barnden on-line).

Fass, on the other hand, supports the research by Lakoff and Johnson in that he accepts that metaphor and metonymy are separate phenomena. The differences between metaphor and metonymy are as follows: 1) how the shared aspect is selected, 2) the operation after the selection and 3) the effect of these. As for metonymy, the selected aspect in a certain property from the source relates semantically to the property of the target. Then, there is a substitution of one entity for another, and consequently, the referential metonymy appears. On the other hand, in metaphor, there is a certain property of the source that relates in the manner of analogy with a certain property of the target, which results in a surprising perception of similarity between the two (Fass on-line).

An interesting perspective on metonymy is provided by Bierwiaczonek who claims that 'the essence of metonymy is conceptual co-activation grounded in neural co-activation.' (Bierwiaczonek in Górska and Radden 2005: 11). Essentially, the assumption behind this hypothesis is the fact that if an individual connects two concepts in the form of metonymy, those two concepts are also highly likely to be associated with one another in the brain by means of neurons. This statement is supported by research in conceptual and phonological representations by Damasio (Damasio online; Bierwiaczonek in Górska and Radden 2005: 13).

Based on the above-mentioned claims, Bierwiaczonek proposes the following taxonomy of conceptual associations related to different neural connotations:

Figure 8. Bierwiaczonek's understanding of metaphor and metonymy (in Górska and Radden 2005: 14)

Conceptual relations:

concepts intrinsically included	contiguous concepts	separate concepts
hyponymy	meronymy	synaesthesia
plesionomy	antonymy	synonymy
converseness	complementarity	**metaphor**
synonymy	reversiveness	
	synaesthesia	
	synonymy	
	metonymy	

The diagram shows that metonymy falls into the category of contiguous concepts and neural links between them, whereas metaphor belongs to the category of separate concepts that coactivate each other, and also have connections in terms of neurons. How does the parallelism between concepts and neurons work? It is possible to distinguish a chain of correlations starting off with metonymy or metaphor, through semantic relations, via conceptual relation, and finally to neural circuits. All this is based on psychological research (mainly Damasio, see Damasio online). Bierwiaczonek himself admits that there is, as yet, no clarity as to the relevance of the link between metonymy, metaphor, or other terms such as inclusion, part and whole, etc. However, there future studies of the biological basis of cognitive phenomena seem to be fairly promising, taking into account the technological development in brain scanning, which would allow for experimental testing of the above hypothesis (Bierwiaczonek in Górska and Radden 2005: 32-33). Interestingly enough, Bierwiaczonek's account of metonymy fits well into the prototypicality effects, where metonymy as a contiguous concept requires the most prominent subcategory to be activated first, which then helps to activate the target, such relation being of metonymic nature (as above).

Yet another account of metonymy is of a pragmatic nature, the basis of which relies on the Gricean cooperative principle and Maxims of Conversation, which constitute the inferential model of communication (Sperber & Wilson on-line). The modified version of Grice's theory has been formulated into the Relevance Theory by Sperber and Wilson, which claims as follows:

> [A]ll of Grice's maxims can be replaced by a single principle of relevance – that the speaker tries to be as relevant as possible in the circumstances – which, when suitably elaborated, can handle the full range of data that Grice's maxims were designed to explain. (Sperber and Wilson, in Cummings 2005: 17)

The most basic feature of communication, whether verbal or not, is the intention of an expressor, as well as its recognition (Sperber & Wilson on-line). Similarly, in any theory of metaphor or metonymy the goal ought to be to infer the relevant intentions produced by a referential expression or sentence. Relevance is always a matter of degree, and never an all-or-nothing case (Sperber and Wilson on-line), so Sperber and Wilson state that metaphorical or metonymic meaning will also be conveyed and inferred to a certain extent. All these general rules will necessarily influence, in a major way, both the speaker and hearer in their communication process, and hence it will also bear an impact on phenomena such as metaphor or metonymy, treating them as inferential phenomena, rather than purely referential ones (Cruse 2004: 199). Such a line of argumentation is accepted by Panther and Thornburg (in Górska and Radden 2005), however only to some degree. Specifically, the authors evolve the Relevance Theory by adding

a constraint on it, i.e. they distinguish another, intermediate level of inferences that can function as both abstract schemas of inferences, and simultaneously also point to the specific level, in that they could function as a benchmark in the interpretation of utterances of discourse. A case in point may be conceptual metonymy, proposed to be labelled a multi-purpose conceptual devise utilised in all kinds of semiotic systems and also for language (Panther and Thornburg, in Górska and Radden 2005: 39). Metonymy, in contrast, is here understood as a meaning construction process, and not a mere substitution relation. Defining conceptual metonymy as a reference point (see above) is too liberal, even allowing for metonymy in cases that are peripheral (Panther and Thornburg, in Górska and Radden: 2005: 43). In this light, Panther and Thornburg provide the following classification of metonymy, divided into three pragmatic kinds: referential, predicational and illocutionary in nature, with the latter one being in focus (Panther and Thornburg, in Górska and Radden 2005: 44). Here is an example of speech act metonymy: *I would like you to close the window* – a wish that metonymically triggers the request (Panther and Thornburg, in Górska and Radden 2005: 45). Metonymy is characterised by a set of prototypical features, contingence being one such major feature. Another prototypical characteristics of metonymy is the conceptual prominence of the target meaning, as opposed to the less salient source meaning (which does not entail that source meaning is fully devoid of salience). It is metonymy that makes the target not only accessible (as in reference point view of the concept in question) but also easily available for its later elaboration in the proceeding context (Panther and Thornburg, in Górska and Radden 2005: 50). Taking this into consideration, the substitution view of metonymy is not completely mistaken, but merely serves as an extreme case with the target being as prominent as possible (as above). Thus, metonymy is viewed as a domain with both prototypical and peripheral instances, which may be rendered directly from pragmatics as such, although it does possess some inferential guidance to the interpretation of meaning, but as a construct that resolves the problematic issues between lexical and constructional meaning (Panther and Thornburg, in Górska and Radden 2005: 54).

Warren (2003) proposes yet another approach to metonymy and metaphor. Firstly, she rejects the cognitive distinction between these two on the basis of mappings between source and target related by similarity or analogy in case of metaphor, and related by contiguity in case of metonymy. According to Warren, such a view will not account for syntactic, semantic or functional differences between metaphor and metonymy, so Warren puts forward her own theory regarding metonymy, which would also allow for a better explication of metaphor. Namely, Warren differentiates between the so-called propositional and referential metonymy

(Warren 2003: 113-115). The former one can be illustrated by means of the sentence: *A: How did you get to the airport? B: I waved down a taxi*. [A taxi took me there] (Gibbs 1994: 327, after Warren 2003: 114). The characteristics would be as follows: a propositional metonymy will produce a relation between the source and target of a connection, rather than relatedness, and thus the source will not violate the truth conditions. In this way, a propositional metonymy will not instigate examples that will not be literal. In the case of referential metonymy, e.g. *She married money*, the source and target will be related rather than only associated, and their paraphrase will involve a modifier-head relation, for instance *money* stands for the person with money. Thus their relation will produce examples that will superficially constitute non-literal cases. Warren (2003, 2004 & 2006) stipulates that it is referential metonymy that is the most prototypical kind of metonymy. In addition Warren (2003, 2004 & 2006) proposes to view metaphor as a property-transferring operation, i.e. a semantic relation, and to consider metonymy a syntagmatic construction of the modifier-head kind, i.e. a syntactic relation, where head will be implicit and modifier will be explicit (for more examples of this type of metonymy see Warren 2004 on-line, or for a detailed discussion on referential metonymy see Warren 2006). Further, Warren does not insist on calling every instance of contiguity a metonymy, some such contiguous relations of modifier-head type might refer to adjectives, compounds or genitive constructions.

There is also another crucial perspective on the studies on both metaphor and metonymy as presented by Glebkin (2014 on-line) who has produced his own theory on the basis of Vygotsky's works as well as Lakoff and Johnson's CMT. Glebkin advocates that rather than seek and define the prototypical model of both metaphor and metonymy, together with its extension to psychological phenomena, Glebkin prefers to search for a relation between the prototypical meanings of metaphor and metonymy and basic psychological processes. Hence, Glebkin instantiates the phenomena in question as follows: metonymy corresponds to complex, situational entities as well as daily experiences. It is also closely associated with socio-cultural life of a community that uses it. On the other hand, metaphor corresponds to more abstract mental process of cognition and general thinking in the sense that it links the gap between the everyday and various abstract things. Glebkin's is then an alternative way of perceiving metaphor and metonymy, with a close relation to a society's way of cognition and daily life.

One alternative approach to metonymy is in terms of CIT. This approach does not deal with the definition of metonymy, nor does it distinguish between metaphor and metonymy as such. On the other hand, the CIT adherents propose to treat metonymy as a consequence of the access principle, or compression/

decompression in blending. The compression/decompression distinction can be illustrated by the following sentences: a) *The ham sandwich left a tip*, b) *The London broil wants it with onions*, c) *The blue car decided to place itself beside me* (Fauconnier 2008 on-line). All the sentences are anaphorical and for this reason understood with reference to an object, however, there is no need to describe this anaphora in more detail classifying it as a contiguity. By sheer reference in a certain context we are capable of comprehending the above metonymies. This metonymy type is represented in the following manner:

Figure 9. The anaphorical metonymy (Fauconnier 2008 on-line)



The alternative version of metonymy is claimed to be the result of compression to uniqueness in the following cases: a) *Chomsky reads himself a lot*, b) *I saw myself in the picture*. This metonymy type will make sense only within a certain domain, where the two entities are joined and one of them is ordinary and more casual, and the other unique and extraordinary. By such a link, the item referred to gains prominence and meaning. This phenomenon is illustrated below:

Figure 10. Metonymy as a result of compression to uniqueness (Fauconnier 2008 on-line)



On the other hand, the compression to uniqueness in the case of metonymy may well be opportunistic to the extent that such a metonymy is an incidental compression and does not necessarily hold in all potential contexts. Presently, there is not enough evidence to clarify either way, so more research into the compression effect in metonymy ought to be conducted. This would certainly extend out contemporary theory of metonymy, and possibly even as to metaphor (Fauconnier 2008 on-line).

A similar view on metonymy is presented by Ruiz de Mendoza (2003: 115-124, where it is claimed that different types of metonymy ought to be subsumed under a wider theory of metonymy which would incorporate its structural

properties as well. In addition, Ruiz de Mendoza advocates conceptual integration for the purpose of his study of metonymy, with a particular interest in generic space which is regarded as a metonymic development of the source category in metaphors (Ruiz de Mendoza 2003: 126). This would suggest that blending may explain metaphor whereby input spaces would be source and target respectively, and the generic space would be metonimically related to the source domain, for source-in-target metonymies.

In a similar vein, Barcelona advocates that CIT is a theory that can fully explain the processes behind metaphor and metonymy creation. Also, Tabakowska recognises the need to distinguish blending, on par with CMMT, as cornerstones of cognitive poetics, which nevertheless could be developed further by the incorporation of Peirce's theory of signs. (Tabakowska in Górska and Radden: 68-69).

1.4. Conclusions

In this chapter I have discussed the recent developments in the cognitive integration theory with all its innovations and modifications, as suggested by the proponents (sections 1.1.1 – 1.1.8). CIT has been presented as a basic cognitive operation that is capable of achieving human scale goals, such as expressing and (re)creating meaning. Blending's most crucial aspects, i.e. projection and compression/decompression interrelation have been suggested as the most relevant subparts of CIT whose exploration ought to be the focus of further attention, with its application of blending to artificial intelligence (Fauconnier and Turner 2008 online). Further, there is a need to relate CIT to other theories which exist on par with it and hence introduce multi-modality into the picture (Turner 2014 appendix & 2015). Similarly, Turner (on-line 2014a&b) advocates the parabolic slant of blending, where we utilise the notion of a story and apply it to the comprehension of some more complex procedure, using compression and decompression to make sense of it all. In Turner's view, language is based on compressions and decompressions of stories which facilitate our general understanding, hence the parabolic quality of it must be highlighted in research. What stems from that is the necessity to incorporate such parabolic quality of CIT into further research, too.

The complexity of the underlying processes of blending, however, has been compared and contrasted with such well-known phenomena as metaphor and metonymy. Also, an attempt has been made to answer the question of whether or not CIT may be reduced to pure metaphor and metonymy effectively[24]. Fau-

24 A similar attitude to humour is presented by Bergen and Binstead (2003 on-line) who advocate the notion of scalar humour that must be understood with reference to some 'domain-general cognitive mechanisms', for instance metaphor, imagery or polysemy.

connier and Turner (2008 on-line), therefore, propose that although blending makes some use of both, which lie at the heart of each conceptual integration network, it is not likely to be reducible to such phenomena (Fauconnier and Turner 2008 online). Hence it is the blends that shall be proposed in chapter 2 and 3 as a potential tool with which to analyse humour in general, as enhanced by some pragmatic elements, to give out the fuller picture of humour studies. In addition, in chapter 3, the analysis of the comic will follow to which I shall apply pragmatically-based CIT. In this way humour will be explained by means of blending, whereby the generic spaces, with the inputs, which may be connected by means of metaphorical or metonymic links, and also the blend with its emergent structure will provide us with a suitable method for explaining humour in its versatility, just like CIT encompasses diverse and frequently incompatible spaces. By default, it ought to become apparent, from chapter 3 and its explanation of the comic films, that humour, as analysed by means of CIT, will not be merely reducible to metaphor and metonymy, but use some other potential linguistic tools so as to generate input spaces. In addition, it will hopefully become evident from the analysis that the pragmatic notions such as society and culture of the humour receiver, or the encyclopaedia as well as the background to their culture, must be incorporated with the sheer blending in order to account for broadly understood concept of humour.

Chapter 2: Perspectives on humour research

2. Introduction

Conceptually humour is complicated and poses problems for its researcher. For centuries people have been attempting to clarify this phenomenon, though for the present there is minimal certainty in humour theorising. It is not to be assumed, though, that all the efforts directed at humour are in vain. On the contrary, numerous theories and presumptions that have evolved via analysis in the fields of study such as philosophy, psychology or linguistics ought to be fully appreciated. Not only do they provide an insight into humour theorising, but they also constitute the bulk of knowledge available for further research on humour. Additionally, the existing theories, although seen from relatively different perspectives and drawing many different conclusions, do have certain parameters in common, which should be treated as a positive sign and serve as a starting point for the humour researcher of today. In this chapter the following terms shall be introduced: humour, sense of humour as well as the humorous. The origins of the word HUMOUR will be explained (section 2.1), and an attempt at explicating why the definition of HUMOUR is, in itself, not straightforward will also be provided (sections 2.1.1 - 2.1.5). Despite the difficulties, I shall provide a set of defining characteristics for humour, as a guidance for analysis (section 2.1.6). Humour theories that have played a vital role in humour research over the years will be sketched out. Firstly, three basic groups of humour theories will be discussed, namely incongruity (section 2.2.1), superiority (section 2.2.2) and release theories (section 2.2.3). These have not ceased to significantly influence scholars, and they shall be presented from a philosophical and psychological background of humour research with their experiments and conclusions (section 2.2). Next, purely linguistic approaches to humour will be examined (section 2.3), as developed by Raskin (section 2.3.1), Attardo (section 2.3.2), Ritchie (section 2.3.3), Grice together with Wilson and Sperber (section 2.3.4), and finally Giora (also section 2.3.4). The possible similarities, if any, between their analysis will be pointed to, and also the immediate problems and corresponding critique arising from their work. Finally, a perspective on humour, which is based on mental spaces theory and its extension into CIT by Fauconnier and Turner, will be proposed as a potential linguistic theory. This has already been discussed in chapter 1, so here it shall only be presented as a novel approach to humour theorising (section 2.4).

2.1. Humour origins

It would appear that we are aware of what humour is, at least on the surface. However, a complete definition is as yet beyond our reach and when we attempt to trace the origins of humour, the subject matter becomes even more involved and complex. According to Bremmer and Roodenburg (1997:1), before 1682 the word *humour* was used in England to denote "mental disposition or temperament", and it was derived from the French language "in the meaning of one of the four chief fluids of the body (blood, phlegm, bile and black bile) (…)" (Bremmer and Roodenburg 1997:1, and more in Ruchbald 1998: 7-11, or in McDonald 2012: 9-10) which determined an individual's personality. So originally *humour* stood for what we would today call mood, and it was not until the late 17th century that the English language started to use the term in its more contemporary form. It is obligatory, at this point, to mention Lord Shaftesbury's paper, written in 1709, *Sensus communis: an essay on the freedom of wit and humour*, where the author describes the meaning of *humour* as similar to "facetiousness, comicality" (after Bremmer and Roodenburg, 1997: 1). This English usage of the word spread to other European countries such as France, Holland and Germany, and gave rise to the contemporary sense of the word *humour*. Nevertheless, one must realise that together with *humour*, many other words appeared that were often misunderstood, wrongly associated or confused with *humour*; for instance *laughter*, *wit*, *fun* or *a sense of humour*. A case in point might be a distinction made by Cicero between "wit of matter", which was connected with telling entertaining stories, and "wit of form", which denoted using puns or throwing humorous remarks (after Bremmer and Roodenburg 1997: 4). Clearly, the terms *humour* or *wit* in this particular instance were used interchangeably and without delimitations. Similarly, there have been many attempts at distinguishing between *humour* and other terms such as *funniness* or *the comic*, however, when it comes to providing definitions of these, such definitions appear circular and hence unacceptable.

At this point it is worth highlighting a social distinction that has previously been made between *laughter* and *humour*. The former used to be associated, from the Middle Ages onwards, with the lower classes and was considered a part of their popular culture; where jesting and buffoonery were regarded as far less than sublime, partly due to theatre actors and mimes in the medieval times, who played low social characters. The latter was linked to high society, with their more refined tastes and pleasures. This division was characteristic of ancient Greece and Rome. Nonetheless, these misconceptions were later abolished, for instance, following the revelations that in Holland many of the upper classes did

enjoy reading a certain manuscript with jokes which were not of a 'pure' nature, or thanks to the fact that after the Middle Ages, telling jokes became a pastime of the English gentlemen and elites. This is not to say, though, that certain subjects were not considered serious or sacred, and therefore were not suitable for the use of joking and amusement (Bremmer and Roodenburg 1997: 5-7).

All the above-mentioned factors contribute to the complexity of *humour* as a notion. The historical perspective and the literary traditions of *humour* (see Bremmer and Roodenburg 1997 for further discussion) have certainly accompanied the evolution of the term in question, and hence the definition of *humour*, and "(…) coining of our modern concept of humour seems to have been a by-product of (…) larger social developments." (Bremmer and Roodenburg 1997: 8, McDonald 2012: 12-20)

2.1.1. Problems with the definition of humour

Providing a clear and satisfactory definition of *humour* appears to verge on the impossible. There have been quite a few descriptions provided by scholars and pundits in different fields of study, however, none of these appear to be widely accepted and utilised for analysis. In fact, as Latta (1999) states, the existing definitions of *humour* are ostensive, i.e. they point to various examples of humour without actually depicting *humour's* meaning in a direct way. Therefore, Latta (1999: 3) risks making the following statement: "The concept of humour, as it stands today, is in a sense shallow, however subtle, complex, or fundamental to human psychology the phenomenon may be". Latta (1999: 3) also compares the ostensive depiction of *humour* to a primitive way in which a neolithic tribesman would attempt to denote the concept of star by pointing to the object in question. According to the author[25], this way of using any concept is certainly accurate, yet it does not display any understanding of a concept or its nature.

2.1.2. Formulae of humour definition

Another important issue connected with any definition is its form. As for *humour*, again we encounter some problems in this respect. On the one hand, a group of researchers claim that only an anti-essentialist approach to defining *humour* should be assumed. This principle was adopted in accordance with

25 Latta's critical evaluation of theoretical, up-to-date humour research is considered phenomenal, hence there will be numerous references to his line of reasoning, and his conclusions or critical remarks will be adopted in this paper for the purpose of further examination of humour.

Wittgenstein's family resemblance[26], and it is advocated by such researchers as Ferro-Luzzi, Goldstein or McGhee (after Latta 1999: 5). At the other end of the spectrum, we find those, Latta including, who presume there must be some essence to the nature of humour, the essence that is likely to be captured by a simple definition (Latta 1999: 6). According to Latta:

> It might well be (…) that the essential nature of humour lies not in a certain class of stimuli, not in an aspect of certain stimuli, and not in any psychological process narrowly defined, but rather in a certain complex psychological process or a certain complex pattern of response as a whole, described in broad, inclusive terms. (Latta 1999: 6)

Taking the above into account, Latta prefers to interpret an essentialist approach to humour in terms of a humour process, which is to be equated with any humour experience. Nevertheless, this assumption can be further expanded with reference to whether an essentialist humour process is stimulus- or response-based. To be specific, there are those who claim that humour arises as a result of a stimulus, such as a phrase, a gesture, or simply a perception of an object. At the other extreme are those for whom humour results from a response. For example, it is possible to count a smile or a chuckle as one such response to a humorous situation. The feedback to both approaches will be provided in the sections directly below.

2.1.3. Stimulus versus response-based humour processes

Latta (1999: 9-11) rejects the purely stimulus-based definitions of *humour* by Morreall, Harral, Beattie or Gerard, where *laughter* might appear as an additional criterion:

> This calls to mind the following picture: a certain quality (or a certain set of circumstances or an object or perception of a certain description) elicits a certain pleasant state of emotion or feeling with which every normal person is familiar, and laughter functions to express this state. This picture suggests that the key question is "What is this stimulus quality (or stimulus)?" for within the context of the picture this is the unknown factor, and once it has been identified it should be easier to say why the familiar response occurs. It is entirely possible that this picture is inaccurate, that humor just does not work this way. (Latta 1999: 10)

Latta criticises the stimulus-oriented theories as mistaken, as they strive for a stimulus (or stimuli) that would be characteristically exclusive to humour, these

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26 The notion of family resemblance was introduced by Wittgenstein as a concept whose meaning can be summarised as follows: the network of overlapping similarities (Ungerer and Schmid 1996: 25).

might not even exist, simply because it is not possible to say why such qualities (if any) evoke humour and what they have in common. Secondly, Latta does not entirely approve of the stimulus theories, for the obvious question arising from the reasoning that underpins them is as to why dispose of or conveniently forget the response to humour within humour framework. It is noted that there is no evidence to suggest that a response to humour does not play a vital role in humour processes, and it thus should not be included in humour theorising. On the other hand, a mere response is not an objective measure to assess humour. There might be a variety of responses to humorous situations, ranging from a shy smile, through giggling to laughing. Finally, it is also possible that a humorous experience will not instigate any proper response but will result in sheer confusion, e.g. when a person is presented with a joke but fails to understand it, or is even offended by its contents. Therefore, Latta proposes not to focus on the stimulus or response side of humour[27], which would be too difficult qualities to evaluate and experiment with, but rather on humour experience as a process (whether psychological, neurological or physiological) as both stimulus and response approaches might turn out to be inadequate for the description of humour.

2.1.4. Humour and the problem of circularity

Another vexed issue is circularity. When one thinks of dictionary definitions, for instance, one can come to the conclusion that the term *humour* is perceived as laughter, amusement or enjoyment. Furthermore, *humour* is closely associated with concepts such as smiling, a sense of humour, the comic or the humorous, too. The circularity undoubtedly poses a serious threat to a humour researcher, for it can easily confuse or lead astray. Lets now examine the false friends of humour.

If we take laughter or a smile as parameters characterising *humour*, we are certainly treading on dangerous ground. The reason for it is that not all laughing

27 A slightly difference perspective is presented by Kosińska in her analysis of conversational humour. This work is based on the fact that one of the functions of humour is to unite the audience in a speech act, i.e. by joining with others in laughter, the speakers find themselves part of a group and hence more powerful. Similarly, with the use of face and politeness terminology, it is possible to notice that producing conversational humour or participating in it, one can satisfy their requirements of positive face, i.e. the need to be liked and feel incorporated within a group, or the negative face, i.e. the need for independence and freedom. The same manifestation of the face is applicable to the hearer in their perception of the comic. In this light, the response to humour, whether conversational or other, ought to be labelled significant for humour studies (Kosińska in Stalamszczyk and Witczak-Plisiecka, 2007, pp. 133-142).

or smiling will automatically follow humour. There are even those who distinguish between a smile as an element not triggered by humour at all, and laughter as a proper appreciation of a humorous event. Nonetheless, such a division is groundless and bears no significance on humour theorising, as it is feasible to distinguish potential events where both a smile and laughter would be preceded by humour. Yet, there are also examples of these two responses which are completely devoid of a humour element (Clark 1987: 240). A case in point may be a nervous smile during an exam situation, an artificial laughter on the part of an individual that pretends to like a remark or a joke and feels the need to imitate the crowd or a group of peers, or finally a hysterical laughter as a sign of fear. Further examples on this matter are presented by Rothbart[28] (1976: 38-42) who discusses a model of laughter in connection with the incongruity theory of humour; in Pollio (1983: 214-222), where the author presents laughter and smiling as social events; in Hester (1996), where some organisational features of laughter in a social context are discussed, in Attardo (1994: 10-13) where the author stresses a close relationship between laughter and humour, and finally in the recent volume by Glenn and Holt (2013) where the physical laughter is described as carrying no semantic or linguistic content as such, yet it does influence the communicative value in interaction and communication (for more details on experiments with laughter and how it correlates with language, society and culture see Glenn and Holt 2013). Further, there have been suggestions that laughter might be an embodied experience, the grounds for it being the invention of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) which allows for scanning of the brain area to monitor certain changes that the brain undergoes while performing specific activities. This has led to a discovery by surgeons who while applying electrodes to an epileptic patient found out that her left frontal lobe's stimulation causes laughter (Toulouse 2005: 164-165). What is interesting is that the part of the brain responsible for laughing is also responsible for speech and manual dexterity as well. Such an experiment could suggest that if humour is connected with laughter at all, it may be treated as an embodied experience, however, more research would have to be conducted to establish more concretely this correlation.

One might conclude that both smiling and laughing might be present in a humorous event, but as both of these can also be linked to other emotions such as, for example, nervousness or fear, they should not be treated as objective characteristic features of *humour*. Though it is essential to bear in mind that the two qualities constitute, to some extent, a distinctive aspect of humour and are to be

28 I shall refer to Rothbart further in this chapter, while discussing theories of humour in detail.

incorporated within *humour* description (what their role is to be within *humour* definition and theorising shall be explained further in this chapter).

Simultaneously, laughter as a descriptive element in relation to *humour* poses another challenge to theorising. Namely, being a highly subjective notion, it is virtually impossible to determine why an individual might see humour in one particular event, whereas some other person will fail to do so in exactly the same circumstances. Moreover, other terms such as *amusement* or *enjoyment*, come into play here. These synonymous concepts are frequently involved within humour descriptions, however they bring about a degree of ambiguity themselves. To be more precise, they denote a certain pleasure, which can be triggered by laughter or even humour. Yet, these are again on the response side of humour treated as an emotion, and they must not be rated as crucial in theorising, for they give a researcher little if any clue as to what *humour* is or is not, so they do not reflect on the nature of humour. (Latta 1999: 13)

A sense of humour is also not to be regarded as the equivalent of the higher concept *humour*. La Fave, Haddad and Maesen (1976) present two definitions of sense of *humour*, the first one being:

> (1) A person possesses a sense of humour if and only if he is readily amused. For instance, if X finds a larger variety of stimulus situations amusing than does Y, then X has a better sense of humour than does Y. (La Fave, Haddad and Maesen 1976: 78).

This definition readily presupposes that a person with a sense of humour is either amused by almost everything, which does not rate the quality of their humour perception high, or is simply a "lunatic" (La Fave, Haddad and Maesen 1976) that finds hilarious those events that are not considered funny by the majority of people. The second definition:

> (2) It seems more useful to define sense of humour in the other common way - as the ability to be amused at one's own expense. Thus, for any X, X possesses a sense of humour if and only if there exists an occasion on which X is amused at X's own expense. (La Fave, Haddad and Maesen 1976: 79),

According to its authors, assumes that when we are amused, we experience a certain mental state at our own expense, which is a paradox, as one does not perceive anything happening at his or her costs as a process with happy consequences, but rather unhappy ones. To put it in the authors' words: "to possess a sense of humour entails mental experiences unhappily happy." (La Fave, Haddad and Maesen 1976: 79). Therefore, the authors conclude that no person is capable of possessing a sense of humour as defined above. What is more, La Fave, Haddad and Maesen go even further so as to deny the existence of a sense of humour completely. They proceed to give reasons for this state of affairs, among which they again mention

the problem of circularity of terms within the field, and the fact that humans are capable of laughing at their own expense, even though they much more appreciate humour deriding someone else, or some other culture with which they do not identify themselves. (La Fave, Haddad and Maesen 1976: 81-83) All the arguments against a sense of humour lead to the conclusion that a sense of humour, as previously understood, does not exist. Nonetheless, La Fave et al do not deny the existence of humour, and what is of paramount importance, they propose that "humour is a mental experience" as it exists in a human mind (La Fave, Haddad and Maesen 1976: 83). This is certainly a vital observation and shall be drawn upon in the later part of this chapter. The total denial of a sense of humour on the authors' part might be a drastic measure to take, but it shows successfully that *a sense of humour* should not be equated with *humour* as such. At the same time, it is believed that *a sense of humour* ought not to be so readily disposed of, since it constitutes a vital quality that any human being possesses (hopefully), which enables them to pay attention to humour, to differentiate it from other, non-humorous situations, and to appreciate it (more on the sense of humour see Martin 2007).

Ruchbald has more observations to make about a sense of humour (1998). He displays one of the older taxonomies of humour within the field of aesthetics, whereabouts the comic, i.e. "defined as the faculty able to make one laugh or to amuse" (Ruchbald 1998: 6), is diversified from other aesthetic values such as beauty, harmony or tragic. In this perspective, *humour* has a narrower meaning, as a subcategory of the comic, and what follows from this is that a *sense of humour* is not encompassed by the notion of *humour*. So one might repeat after Nicolson that such a dimension points to the fact that:

> (…) the sense of humour entails processes which are slower than those of the physical or immediate reaction; that it is an attitude of mind rather than an activity of mind; that it is a contemplative subconscious habit rather than an intuitive flash (…)" (Nicolson 1946: 14, after Ruchbald 1998: 6)

In Ruchbald's opinion, the question regarding the meaning of a *sense of humour* does not resolve the issue by clarifying the definition of *humour* and is rather a matter of different values or standpoints. Such a terminological confusion certainly does not assist the pursuit of defining *humour*, and serves here as an example of how the terms: *the comic*, *sense of humour* and *humour*, have been misunderstood over the past years.

Another fault in terminology, as Ruchbald puts it, lies within Anglo-American humour theorising where the word *humour* is used as an umbrella term for all its potential instances (Ruchbald 1998: 6). To be more specific, there are numerous definitions of *humour* that state ostensibly what *humour* is, providing examples

of humorous material such as jokes, cartoons or stories. Thus, *humour* and *the humorous* are treated as one, which in the eyes of many researchers is unacceptable (Latta, Ruch, Nicolson). Admittedly, this is not to claim that *humour* as a higher category does not encompass different kinds of *the humorous* within its taxonomy, however, this relation must not be simplified to a union whereby the boundaries of humour and the humorous become blurred.

Taking the above-mentioned aspects of humour theorising into consideration, at this point I shall refrain from providing my own definition of *humour*, as there are more factors to consider. Namely, there are also various humour theories to be acknowledged, before any definition is proposed, with regard to the fact that each theory assumes a different perspective, and within this particular perspective it ought to analyse *humour* and its characteristics.

2.1.5. Impact of other factors on humour

As if the complexity of humour as a concept did not hinder its research attempts enough, there are additional factors that need to be taken into account. These factors might seem of negligible value at first glance, however, after a closer inspection, it becomes apparent that the task of describing humour without them is pointless. Context is one such contributing factor to humour analysis. I would like to extend the concept to cover such matters as culture that one was brought up in, but also a wider perspective on culture, understood as the knowledge of the surrounding world. Furthermore, context could include the elements such as: historical perspective, social background, conventions and norms of behaviours accepted by a particular nation, community or simply a group of people sharing similar viewpoints (see more in Brzozowska 2000 & 2004 on-line – especially on the differences between Polish and English, as well as Polish and American perspective within jokes; or Gajda and Brzozowska 2000; Paton & Filby 1996: 105-125; Chapman & Foot 1976). As Alexander (1996) quotes Sapir's motto:

> We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation (Sapir 1929: 69, after Alexander:75).

By context, therefore, I refer to some factual piece of information that is necessary for humour to be perceived and appreciated within a community[29] (Nash

29 An interesting perspective on context in humour is also presented by Nowik. Her study of banter, which she defines as: '(…) mock-impoliteness (…) or verbal rudeness as a way of being polite.', proves that in certain cultures banter is allowed and even necessary, as in the culture of the British people, for the proper incorporation into the context of such countries.

1985: 2-5; Alexander 1996; see for a discussion in Giles et al 1976: 139- 153 and in Driessen 1997: 222-237).

Another factor that must be taken into account here is the existence, in some form or other, of creators as well as receivers of humour (Bergson 2007: 10). These two categories will be treated in the broadest sense possible, as they manifest themselves in a multitude of ways. For example, the creators of humour might be either ordinary people telling jokes in company, or comedians presenting themselves on stage. It is not unknown for film makers or book writers to produce humour, which would make them perfect representatives of humour creators. We could give numerous instances of this category but this is not the point here. What we wish to stress is the fact that there is always some humorist who presents humour, whether in an implicit or explicit manner, whose presence must be acknowledged in humour theorising. At the same time, there must always be some kind of audience, which functions as a respondent to the humour created. Again, the audience might be just one person listening to a joke or watching a comedy, it might be a whole group of people present at a comical performance, or simply an individual reading a joke book. And again, the presence of the humour receiver might be overt or covert. What must be remembered is to make efforts to incorporate these two categories into any aspiring humour theory (Ross 1998: 1-2; Chiaro 1996: 5).

When analysing humour, one should attempt to encompass the subjective nature of humour. What I mean by the subjective nature of humour is the individual preference that each person has, with respect to what they find amusing. It is clear that there are no two identical individuals (even when taking twins into account) with exactly the same interests and mental capacities, thus what follows is the variety of tastes in humour. A case in point may be the simultaneous existence of black humour supporters, irony fans or simply those who delight in puns. Certainly, the difficulty of the stated idea is understandable, nonetheless it is maintained that this diversity of tastes should at least be acknowledged for the purpose of humour theorising. It is not required that every humour terminology should explicitly incorporate subjectiveness, but what would be of invaluable assistance to humour researching is if any humour study could at least refer to the subjective bias of the comic. In this way, they would be aware of subjectivity and perhaps produce a better analysis with more significant results or conclusions for further research (Ross 1998: 4; Chiaro 1996: 5).

Additionally, what is more important is the fact that such banter is used as a politeness strategy, which obviously is problematic in view of various politeness theories that the author depicts. (Nowik in Stalmaszczyk and Witczak-Plisiecka 2007: pp. 203-210).

As there are subjective and personal preferences in humour, there are also numerous kinds of humour, so although the variety presents further difficulty for researchers, again the fact must be accepted as part of humour theorising and used in defining humour (Ross 1998: 75-109; Chiaro 1996: 5). Similarly, humour is based heavily on a receiver's social background, which has been examined by Kuipers (2005: 59). In particular, it has been observed that precisely what different people find hilarious relates to their gender, age, but most importantly to their social class and educational background (Kuipers 2005: 59). Kuipers also refers to the fact that different cultures might have different styles of humour, no matter how related they are, for instance she quotes British and American cultures that vary significantly in their use of humour, especially as applied to the sense of humour (Kuipers 2005: 58). Davies (2005) also stipulates, based on her research in stupidity jokes among various cultures, that because of cultural and context differences translating of (such) jokes is very difficult and sometimes even verges on the impossible (Davies 2005: 70-85). Observations like these certainly add to the complexity of the notion of humour, especially if it is to be studied as a universal process.

To summarise the discussion so far, it would appear that a definition of humour is impossible to attain, since so many of its determining factors act as obstacles. There are numerous definitions already proposed that vary significantly in their nature and with respect to each other, thus providing limited assistance in this task. Therefore, taking into account all the above-mentioned obstacles, an attempt shall be made at presenting a potential humour definition which shall be tested in the process of writing this paper, against the backdrop of real-life and contemporary humorous material in chapter 3.

2.1.6. Defining humour

In this study, a definition of humour that is to be proposed will be a linguistic one, particularly with heavy reference to cognitive linguistics. It will, therefore, not be a truly essentialist definition, though I believe this is the ideal to be drawn upon when theorising about humour. Nevertheless, with the present state of affairs within the field of humour theorising, there is no likelihood of composing an essential humour description. Still, this will be our guiding principle to try and attain clarity and simplicity via as much essentialism as is allowed.

Before the definition is provided, however, a concept that has aided the humour analysis should be briefly mentioned. To be more precise, Attardo (1994: 6-7), drawing on the Schmidt-Hidding, produced a simplified interpretation of a semantic field of humour which closely incorporates the semantic contents of

humour, i.e. different terms that could be suborganised under the term *humour*. Attardo's semantic field can be replicated as follows:

Figure 11. The semantic field of humour as composed by Attardo after Schmidt & Hidding



It is evident here that Attardo places humour on the same level as fun, ridicule or wit (hence the capitalisation). All four of these concepts are centred round the comic, with their other semantic equivalents[30] situated within their proximity. This idea of a semantic field of humour is vital, yet there are several modifications that can be introduced. Firstly, it seems that humour, in itself, is a central category, and not the comic as in Attardo's model, and we would ascribe to it the property of being a higher category, whereas categories such as 'joke', 'irony' and 'comedy' would be relatively lower categories. Under this higher category one might subsume other subordinate concepts that really build on the semantics of the category humour. There would be, in accordance with the cognitive perspective I wish to assume, more central members (close to the word) of the category humour, as well as less central or even marginal cases (further away from the word). Thus, the classification of humour would appear as follows:

30 The term *equivalent* is utilised here in a broad sense of a concept that is semantically close to some other concept, but only close, not an exact synonym, as true equivalents are not readily produced or found (Dirven & Verspoor 1998: 27; Cruse 2004: 154-157).

Figure 12. The semantic field of humour



Figure 12 can be indefinitely extended by adding other concepts that humour encompasses. Some criticism concerning this is likely, as the phrase 'indefinitely' has been adopted. However, as humour is not a static concept, but it is forever changing[31] this is precisely how humour should be treated, as Bremmer and Roodenburg say:

> A mistake common (…) is the tacit presupposition that there exists something like an 'ontology of humour', that humour and laughter are transcultural and ahistorical. (Bremmer and Roodenburg 1997: 3)

Therefore, some new subtypes of humour are constantly created and there must be an open space for them to be included within humour research. Coming back to the nature of humour as a prototype category, humour subsumes its members; the good members, such as jokes or nonsense, are positioned closer to the prototypical humour term. Less central members, such as comedy, puns or riddles are positioned further away from the central humour. And finally, on the verges of

31 The same holds for cognitive grammar which stipulates that meanings are dynamic and forever changing. For instance it has been suggested that 'the infinite flexibility of meaning' rests in context (Croft and Cruse 2004: 97-98), which is exactly true for humour studies. A similar attitude to meaning is adopted by Cruse where he states that:

> (...) meaning is anything that affects the relative normality of grammatical expressions. This is an example of contextual approach to meaning, because relative normality is a concept which applies only to combinations of elements; that is to say, it implies that meaning is to be studied by observing the interactions between elements and other elements, in larger constructions such as sentences (Cruse 2004: 41).
>
> In the same way, it is possible to approach verbal humour, where we treat words or sentences as elements and we perceive either similarity or opposition in their interrelations, humour being of the latter type.

our category humour we can find terms like cartoons or sitcoms, which could be treated as members of humour category that are broad in meaning, as they share many features with other categories, e.g. vision or drawing, etc.; as poor examples of humour category we would also treat sarcasm, for instance, as it is semantically close to another humour-related categories, e.g. ridicule, or allusions and parody that would be similar in certain respects with yet another category, i.e. wit. Hence, concepts such as humour, wit or ridicule, which Attardo presents as one semantic field, we would certainly separate as varying categories, diverging from one another. Furthermore, our semantic field is to be treated as a cognitive vertical hierarchy, but the concept of humour might also be comprehended horizontally, where there would be different linear kinds of humour ordered, starting from black humour, through racial or offensive humour, via irony and via politically correct humour and polite allusions or remarks, towards perhaps intelligent riddles, puns and finally word play type of humour.

Figure 13. Linear order of humour

black humour ---> offensive humour ---> irony ---> PC humour ---> allusions---> puns ---> wit---> wordplay

Obviously, the two dividing lines, horizontal and vertical must intersect and interweave, for the purpose of a full comprehension of the category humour. In addition to that, all other, non-linguistic factors that determine what humour is or is not (see previous sections 2.1.2 through to 2.1.6) must be brought into the picture at this time, and only in such circumstances are we able to present a definition of humour. Therefore, it is possible to infer, incorporating the principles of cognitive linguistics, that:

- humour is a cognitive, superordinate category with its range of subordinate members (some better, some worse instances of humour)
- humour has a linear dimension that constitutes its different types that again form a spectrum
- humour is a means of these two lines of reasoning, i.e. horizontal and vertical
- humour is any instantiation of language; whether verbal, written, gesture-oriented or graphic; that provides a stimulus, in its linguistic form; whether verbal, written, gesture-oriented or graphic; to which a response[32] follows in the form of humour appreciation

32 As mentioned above, both stimulus and response are not always obligatorily present in humour (see section 2.1.4) and ought to be regarded respectively as below: stimulus takes the form of

– he humour appreciation can range from a smile, through to laughter, including even a nod of the head, as long as it is accompanied by the mental comprehension of the humorous (however, it is necessary to remember that such understanding of the humorous may be invisible to the human eye, i.e. may be a cognitive understanding
– humour exists in a particular context, and suggests the presence of a humorist and an audience, whether implicit or explicit, who produce humour and respond to it
– humour is subjective, as well as context-oriented (the notion of context as applied to humour shall be dealt with further in the paper).

This definition, or rather a set of introductory assumptions on the nature of humour, shall be further elaborated on, in the course of this paper, especially in chapter 3 where we analyse the comedies in detail. It is possible, at this stage, to conclude that the analysis have fallen quite far from the systematic approach ideal. However, if anything, our definition is multidimensional. This is only a starting point and the definition provided here is, therefore, open to verification, which will be presented in the final chapter, after the research on the humorous material have been conducted and enough conclusions have been gathered to make necessary adjustments.

2.2. Psychological theories of humour

Now I shall focus on the modern classifications of humour theories, and following on from this will be a comparison of the above with our previous definition of humour.

Humour theories can be classified into three major groups (after Attardo 1994: 47): incongruity theories (or contrast theories), hostility theories (other names for this theory are: aggression, superiority, triumph, disparagement or derision theory) and finally release theories (or sublimation, or liberation theories). It is Attardo (1994: 47) who also provides an additional classification of the above theories that can be further subsumed under more general scientific efforts. Namely, the incongruity theories belong to the cognitive field, hostility theories are regarded as belonging to the social field, and release theories are linked with the psychoanalytical field of study (why this is so will become apparent while discussing each theory in detail).

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an instantiation of language, whatever its form might be, whereas response assumes the role of humour appreciation, again irrespective of its form.

2.2.1. Incongruity theories

Incongruity theories are rooted in philosophical deliberations, especially by Kant and Schopenhauer (see Attardo 1994: 47-48; Martin 1998: 25-28, Clark 1987: 238-246, Morreall 1983: 15-19, Weaver 2013: 14 & 28-38, McDonald 2012:49-63 and IEP online). Kant proposed a definition of laughter that proved crucial in the development of contrast theories, i.e. "Laughter is an affection arising from sudden transformation of a strained expectation in to nothing" (after Attardo 1994: 48). And Schopenhauer formed a laughter definition in which he referred to incongruity directly:

> The cause of laughter in every case is simply the sudden perception of the incongruity between a concept and the real objects which have been thought through in some relation, and laughter itself is just the expression of this incongruity. (after Attardo 1994: 48)

Therefore, it is not impossible to conclude that contrast theories are centred around the incongruous element in humour. As the term *incongruity* suggests, there must be some violation of what is being expected, as compared to what really happens in a humorous material. This impossibility to match expectations with the reality provides incompatibility, which further provokes laughter and humour. The essence of any contrast theory is quite straightforward and for this reason has numerous followers, e.g. Raskin, McGhee, Morreall, Nerhardt, Cetola, Paulos, Schultz or Rothbart (Attardo 1994: 48-49 and 2000 on-line, Latta 1999: 101-234, and Nerhardt 1976: 55-62), to mention just a few. Additionally, incongruity has been tested from a psychological stance (Schultz 1976: 11-34). There has recently been a great deal of criticism of incongruity theories. Latta went to great lengths to expose the potential fallacies behind these theories. Firstly, he starts off by criticising all the incongruity supporters for providing invalid definitions as part of their humour analyses. Latta himself refers to a dictionary definition of the concept *incongruous*, and based on this essentialist definition, he concludes that incongruity presupposes that: "something *A* and something *B*, though connected or associated in some way, do not go together, match or fit in some way." (Latta 1999: 104) What is more, Latta proposes a set of assumptions, following the dictionary definition, that should always be present, i.e.

(1) there is always a lack of "fit" in incongruity
(2) incongruity is a relation between A and B; this relation is mutual
(3) incongruity entails that A and B are incompatible from a certain perspective (Latta 1999: 104-105)

On the basis of the three assumptions, Latta analyses numerous incongruity definitions incorporated by researchers into their experiments and renders these

inaccurate. A case in point is McGhee's definition, or rather definitions of incongruity, first as ridiculousness, then as follows:

> That incongruity is central to all humor is an assumption adopted throughout this book: that is, something unexpected, out of context, inappropriate, unreasonable, illogical, exaggerated, and so forth, must serve as the basic vehicle of the humor of an event (after Latta 1999: 107),

and finally:

> [T]he perception of an incongruous relationship (absurd, unexpected, inappropriate, and otherwise out-of-context events are included in this term) forms the basic foundation for all humor experiences (after Latta 1999: 107)

Such definitions are not satisfactory for Latta, as they involve numerous synonymous words to present incongruity. It is not uncommon that synonyms are misleading in the sense that they are not exact equivalents of the concept in question. For instance, INCONGRUOUS seen as closely related to ridiculous, illogical or absurd does not produce any meaningful description. Moreover, the extended definitions, with continuously added 'equivalents', confuse researchers and certainly do not lead to the vital observations on humour. Hence Latta renders useless the incongruity theories centred around false definitions of their flagship concept.

Similarly, Latta criticises restricted definitions of incongruity. He gives as an example Schultz's definition of the term: "Incongruity is usually defined as a conflict between what is expected and what usually occurs in the joke" (after Latta 1999: 115). From this statement only one conclusion follows, i.e. that incongruity is obligatory in humour, which perhaps could be accepted, if it was not for the fact that not all incongruity must result in humour. Additionally, as Latta also points out, due to the above-mentioned criticism, many incongruity theories are ambiguous or defective in themselves.

Another important aspect to mention in connection with contrast theories is the emergence of the so-called resolution theories. Resolution theories presuppose that the perception of incongruity in itself is not necessary and sufficient to humour appreciation. One more element is needed in order to arrive at humour, namely incongruity resolution. As Rothbart remarks:

> Resolution of the incongruity, either within the context of a joke (…) or in an achievement setting (…) may lead to smiling and laughter. Failure to resolve the incongruity in the joking situation leads to perplexity or confusion and no smiling or laughter (Rothbart 1976: 38)

Therefore, not only does a humour respondent have to perceive an incongruous element, but they also need to be able to solve the conundrum created by the humour. Then and only then do we appreciate humour.

The resolution theory has led to a great number of experiments, mainly psychological ones. The results of these, however, are fairly surprising. Rothbard (1976), for example, concludes from her studies that resolution of incongruity rates high in jokes and hence might be vital for humour, however, it may also interrupt humour appreciation in other forms than jokes, e.g. visual incongruities. Rothbart also comments that it is possible to appreciate humour without actually resolving humour incongruities (Rothbart 1976: 52), which I find slightly confusing, since the two observations render each other obsolete. Further experiments relating to resolution theories were carried out by La Fave, Haddad and Measen (1976: 89), who signify that one of the ingredients of an appropriate humour theory is not incongruity as such, but rather what they call a perceived incongruity.

By researching the resolution theories, it becomes apparent that there is no agreement whatsoever in relation to resolving incongruity. Latta again points out the inconsistencies, i.e. if there is incongruity in humour, but the subject does not necessarily perceive it, and even if they do take notice of it, they do not necessarily have to resolve it to appreciate humour (Latta 1999: 234). The fallacy of this line of reasoning leads Latta to reject all incongruity based theories of humour, and to deny any fundamental basic humour processes (Latta 1999: 235). Suls, on the other hand, criticises resolution theories on the grounds that the resolving of the incompatibility in them might bring more incongruities into existence, on the grounds that certain stimuli that provoke humour do not possess an incongruity resolution element, e.g. some comedians achieve humour by flouting jokes rather than telling them correctly. Similarly, some pleasurable activities such as logical puzzles do involve resolution of some kind, however they do not provoke humour at all, and that is why, according to Suls, resolution theories are false (Suls 1983: 51-54).

Finally, Köestler, on the basis of contrast theories, proposed his own idea of humour creation, which is as follows:

> (…) humor results from bisociation - the perceiving of a situation or idea in two habitually incompatible frames of reference. The bisociation causes an abrupt transfer of the train of thought from one matrix to another governed by a different logic or rule of the game. (after Suls 1983: 40)

Köestler regards bisociation as a feature of all forms of creativity, thus equating humour with other human activities (Levine 2006: 6). However, what follows from this equation is the problematic issue as to why humour, or laughter more likely, should be provoked by bisociation, and not any other response to the incompatibility acknowledged. A case in point may be constituted by scientific revelations that bring about awe or respect (Suls 1983: 40).

Misattribution theory is another framework on humour proposed by Zillmann and Bryant (1991), which assumes that the funniest instances of humour incorporate the disparagement of the target towards which we already exhibit a negative attitude. The authors' work is based on Freudian research on joke work, and they presuppose that there are tendentious as well as non-tendentious elements as part of humour. The latter ones, such as play on words or exaggeration, distract us from the real target of the comedy, i.e. from the tendentious element, e.g. from the belittlement of a person or thing we dislike, and through laughter we can be entertained at the expense of someone else's misfortune. To simplify, we are capable of laughing at someone else, because we misattribute the funniness to the non-tendentious elements present, which usually constitute the bizarre or incongruous aspects of the humorous example in question (Zillmann and Bryant 1991, p. 275-277; Martin 2007, p. 53). Additionally, it is worth mentioning that in accordance with the misattribution theory the receivers of humour cannot quite decide why they think a particular situation is comic, so misattributed is their perception (Zillmann and Bryant 1991). This theory is a valuable example of an extension of Freudian theory on humour, and it can also be treated as an instance of superiority theories. Yet, as Martin points out (Martin 2007, p. 53) there is very little data suggesting that all humour would necessarily involve disparagement. Furthermore, Zillmann and Bryant themselves rate their theory as a theory of enjoyment or amusement, but not as a theory of humour as such (Zillmann and Bryant 1991, p. 272). Hence, misattribution theory must be subsumed under the label of superiority theories with certainty, but it cannot function as a valid general theory of humour.

A similar perspective of humour is presented by Spencer in his physiological theory of humour. Like Freud, he claims at "(…) laughter, because of its semi-convulsive actions, depletes nervous energy and thus provides relief from any initial apprehension." (Zillmann and Bryant 1991, p. 269). Therefore, Spencer's theory is again only a modified Freudian view, where humour serves as the aid in the reduction or cancellation of unpleasant emotions, and it cannot be regarded as a general humour theory.

Similarly, Hurley, Dennet and Adams (2011) present their paradigm commonly referred to as detection of mistaken reasoning, which presupposes that humour developed because it strengthens the brain's ability to detect mistakes and solve problems. In their book *Inside Jokes* the authors present their view that humour is a phenomenon which is based on problem-solving. The human brain processes data and is used to finding out the mental scripts which do not fit into the context and therefore are incompatible, just like solving a task involves processing data until the one good script is chosen, and the resolution provided. So

in a humorous situation, the brain detects the inappropriate reasoning, script or piece of information and holds it as an error, so humour is merely the detection on the part of the brain of some mistake in our reasoning, here the incongruous data very much alike to practical task resolution. Interestingly, Hurley, Dennet and Adams make reference in their work to CIT, and discuss the incongruous mental spaces, just as in blending. Therefore, I firmly believe that my proposition to treat CIT as a general theory is fully compatible with their more scientific paradigm. In this light, it is feasible to observe that blending and mental spaces ought to be recognised as a general humour theory, applicable to any humorous example or situation, be it a joke, a comedy moment or a witty remark. The detection of mistaken reasoning serves as a justification for as well as a useful neurological perspective supporting my theory of humour analysis.

2.2.1.1. An illustration of incongruity theories

In order to provide an illustration of incongruity theories of humour, it is obligatory to explain that the incongruity that results in humour may be of many kinds. Namely, if we only restrict ourselves to verbal humour, it is possible to distinguish incompatibility on the following levels of an utterance: structural, which again can be divided into phonological, morphological, lexical, syntactic or graphological; as well as linguistic, which is also divisible into semantic-, pragmatic-, discourse- or register-oriented factors. However, I would like to give just one example, as the incongruity works in a simple manner. Let us have a look at the following statement: *Make up for your life* (Ross 1998: 26). According to incongruity theories, it will be humorous as it can be understood in two incompatible ways. It is possible to understand *make up* as either a noun or a verb, which changes the meaning of the whole phrase drastically. Hence, it is the incongruity between the syntactic forms of make up that will suffice to explain humour of the example given.

2.2.2 Superiority theories

Superiority theories have their roots in both philosophy and psychology (McDonald 2012 33-48, Weaver 2013: 25-27). The whole idea of superiority, or disparagement, dates back to antiquity when Aristotle and Plato regarded laughing processes as arising from the response to weakness or ugliness (Martin 1998: 28-29). However, it is Hobbes who is perceived as the true father of superiority theories. Hobbes proposed that

> (…) the passion of laughter is nothing else but some sudden glory arising from some sudden conception of some eminence in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of

> others, or with our own formerly (Hobbes after Martin 1998: 29; Hobbes on-line, Paulos 1982: 2, Russell 2007: 501-510, & IEP online)

What can be inferred form the above is that disparagement theories are based on the relation of superiority/inferiority; a person, or a group of people are superior as they ridicule and laugh at some object; the object, whether human or inanimate, being the butt of a joke (Attardo 1994: 49). The feeling of superiority is created as a result of the object's degrading characteristics, mistakes, defeat in a challenge, etc. Hence, the 'sudden glory', and the hostility or even aggression towards a ridiculed object, allows the victorious side to express their advantage over the defeated entity in the form of laughter (Levine 2006: 103-127; Morreall 1983: 4-14). However, as Martin (1998: 31) points out, the hostility towards an object does not necessarily have to be a permanent feeling on the part of the superior victor, it might just be a temporary trait evoked by a particular situation that involved a certain degree of disparagement towards the ridiculed entity[33].

There are many followers of the superiority theory, such as Bain, Leacock, Ludovici, Sidis or Gruner (after Martin 1998: 29). It is also important to mention the name of Bergson who viewed humour as a social phenomenon used to correct inappropriate conduct (Attardo 1994: 50). As Pollio (1983: 224-225) stated, humour according to Bergson was understood as follows:

> (…) the mechanical encrusted on the living - in which the comic person is seen as a thing with life removed. [Pollio elaborates further on Bergson's perspective:] If laughter is a unique human behaviour that expresses momentary freedom from body, then a mechanical body only calls attention to the fact that our body (…) is no such thing, and we laugh both as a recognition of the difference and as affirmation of its significance. What we also affirm by laughing is our identification with the thing-like aspect of our body even as we somewhat shakily assert our intermittent freedom from it. As Plessner (1970) put it: We *are* a body and *have* body and laughter is our expression of this fact of existence. (Pollio 1983: 225)

The superiority theories have been much appreciated but also heavily criticised. The main line of argument is that superiority theories might well be explained in terms of incongruity theories and, therefore, can be treated as a subclass of

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33 A comprehensive notion of Schadenfreude, i.e. a feeling of delight at others' expense, is studied in detail by Hartmann et al (2008 online) where it is proposed that the superiority over someone else's misfortune is a type of humour that interacts with other factors, such as envy, resentment or status in order for Schadenfreude to appear. In humour, this phenomenon might serve the following purposes: ascertaining a positive image, dealing with fellow competition and finally either distancing group members from one another or allowing for social common grounds and understanding, with the latter one being most often the humour tactics (Hartmann et all online).

contrast theories (Suls 1983, Martin 1998). To be more specific, one may stipulate that the idea of laughing at the expense of others results directly from the sudden and unexpected incompatibility between the expectations of the superior side, that initially does not await hostile remarks, and what follows in the form of disparagement.

La Fave et al (1976: 64-66) criticise Hobbes and his idea of superiority theory on the grounds that equating laughter with amusement is not feasible (see section 2.1.5). La Fave et al (1976: 64) claim that the suddenness that Hobbes introduced into humour analysis was later misinterpreted by his followers. According to the authors, suddenness does not imply the timing and shortness of humour interpretation, but rather a novel and unexpected ingredient that provokes surprise (which would be compatible with incongruity frame). Thus, the assumption made by Hobbs that what amuses must be surprising, and new to the amused person, would, according to La Fave et al, suggest that old jokes and funny stories, once heard, cannot produce laughter. However, La Fave et al (1976: 64) notice that Hollingsworth conducted experiments which indicate that surprise is not a prerequisite of humour, though it not to say that surprise might not boost amusement under any circumstances.

La Fave et al (1976: 64-65) argue that there must be some perceived incongruity present for humour to be appreciated, and the notion of incongruity, whether perceived by the receiver of humour or not, is questionable (see previous sections). Also, La Fave et al reject superiority theories as highly egocentric and individualistic. It is also true, to some extent, that humour can be egocentric and individualistic, though not necessarily compulsory. Especially as La Fave et al believe that Hobbes' notion of forming alliances with other superior people does not have anything in common with humour or laughter, but it rather presupposes that ridiculing others and viewing oneself as a better individual than someone else is closely connected to protective instincts in man (La Fave 1976: 65).

Finally, superiority theories do come in for some critique as they confusingly adopt interchangeably the two distinct notions, that of *humour* and *laughter*, and this is not practicable (see section 2.1.5).

2.2.2.1. An illustration of superiority theories

A good example of superiority theories of humour can be provided with the help of the following joke:

> A blonde calls up an airline ticket counter and says, "How long are your flights from New York to Atlanta?" The ticket clerk replies, "Just a minute, madame…" "Thank you," says the blonde, and hangs up. (Jarsz 2008: 40)

The humour results from the realisation that the blonde in the joke is plain silly and does not even apprehend that the clerk's reply to her question is a polite request to wait a moment, before the answer is provided. The laughter will commence as we place ourselves superior to the blonde and hence laugh at her lack of common sense, the blonde being the butt of the joke above. At the same time, the superiority allows us to feel much better than the blonde, which provides the pleasure and also adds to humour.

There is also the so-called ontic-epistemic theory of humour advocated by Marteinson (2005) who stipulates that a stimulus which precedes humour is to be perceived in terms of the ontology of social life and being. It is especially important with reference to the epistemological implications of ontology and its connotations that can be both valid and incompatible with the state of the world around us. Humour originates in an epistemology, i.e. it stems from the realisation that being part of the society with its cultural conventions, the receiver of humour, who cognitively attributes truthfulness and falsehood to the state of the ongoing affairs, suddenly comprehends the set of criteria different from those of material logical thinking or common sense. "Laughter anesthesizes the mind to protect the social animal from the forbidden knowledge of the culture's lack of ontic foundations" (Marteinson 2005, p. 125). So via the confrontation with the humorous discourse, whatever its form might be, the human being realises that the discourse is contrary with the material state of affairs around them, and has to laugh in order to deal with the ontic-epistemic problem of existence. Well-founded as this philosophical theory might be, it is compatible with all types of basic humour theories at present, i.e. superiority, incongruity or release frameworks. Hence, it cannot be attributed the label of a general humour theory.

Still another perspective on humour is presented by the so-called benign violation theory (BVT) as advocated by Veteach (Humour 1998, pp. 163-164) or MacGraw and Warren (2010 online). In their view, the comic hinges on the violations which are, at the same time, perceived as beginning. What this means is that in each humour context there is an alternative norm present which would point towards the fact that what is happening, though bizarre or outside the convention, could be accepted as a norm. Furthermore, the receiver of humour is characterised by a weak predisposition towards the violated norm, which, on the other hand, suggests their distance from the violated norm. Violations can take all kinds of form: they can be understood as any situation that is threatening as long as the threat itself appears to be benign (MacGraw and Warren online). Although the theory seems valid, as it specifies the prerequisites in humour explanation, it is once more another evolutionary theory treating humour as evolving from threatening and dangerous situation in man's life, which can be subsumed

underneath incongruity theories (there is always the norm and the "acceptable new norm" which is incompatible with the former. Hence, BVT is well-formed as a theory, but not a genuine overall humour framework.

2.2.3. Release theories

Release theories of humour are founded on Freud's experiments within the field of humour (Attardo 1994: 50, 53-57; Morreall 1983: 20-37, McDonald 2012: 64-76, Weaver 2013: 38-41, and IEP online). Freud was one of the first psychoanalysts to have focused on humour thoroughly and he distinguished between three kinds of humorous experience: jokes, the comic and humour (Martin 1998: 18). Each of these categories presupposes some psychic energy that has become redundant and is disposed of as laughter. Through jokes, that were regarded by Freud as a verbal type of amusement, one releases his own aggressive or sexual impulses that are usually repressed[34]. The comic involves non-verbal type of amusement for Freud, e.g. slapstick comedy or circus clowns, and the respondent first accumulates a certain degree of energy as to what should happen; however, as the anticipated events do not occur, the respondent again releases the useless energy via laughter. And finally, what Freud understands by humour is situations that involve some negative emotions, e.g. fear or anger, where the ability to notice an incompatible element in this negative situation enables an individual to release the negative energy through laughter, and thus avoid the negative feelings or consequences. Hence, humour is here only a subpart of what would normally be referred to as the notion of *humour*, and might be treated as a coping mechanism. (Martin 1998: 18-20). Freud's theory has been studied by others including: Kris, Feldman, Bergler, Grotjahn and Christie (Martin 1998: 19). Nevertheless, there has been a strong opposition to Freud's hypotheses. It has been noted that humour as represented by Freud's three categories is not a theory of humour but rather a theory of psychoanalytical nature of certain amusement stimuli and responses, and furthermore, it has been shown that at least some of Freud's observations, including those following his experiments, were not always true, or simply false. Similarly, as held by Martin:

> (…) there is little evidence that the level of enjoyment of jokes and cartoons is directly related to the degree to which the impulses they convey are repressed. Instead the bulk

34 In his book *The Joke and its Relation to the Unconscious*, Freud presents an in-depth analysis of humour in relation to behaviour, particularly jokes as a process of gaining pleasure for oneself and others, for the enjoyment of the psychic and as release of emotions, among others (Freud 2002: 115-176).

> of evidence suggests that people laugh most at humor relating to impulses that they themselves *express* overtly in their behaviours and attitudes, rather than repress (Martin 1998: 25).

Both Freud's utilisation of the three-pronged distinction of humour, including jokes, the comic and humour itself, and his division as such, remain confusing and misleading, which cannot be a good basis for a true humour theory, but could be referred to as the 'psychogenesis' of humour processes (Schultz 1976: 17). Freud's release theories could also be subsumed under contrast theories, as it is possible to distinguish the incongruity of elements, i.e. either between the expectations and what really occurs, or between the situation and the reality, sufficient to provide for the appearance of laughter.

A similar perspective of humour is presented by Spencer in his physiological theory of humour. Like Freud, he claims at "(…) laughter, because of its semi-convulsive actions, depletes nervous energy and thus provides relief from any initial apprehension." (Zillmann and Bryant 1991, p. 269). Therefore, Spencer's theory is again only a modified Freudian view, where humour serves as the aid in the reduction or cancellation of unpleasant emotions, and it cannot be regarded as a general humour theory.

2.2.3.1. An illustration of the release theories of humour

To give an example of release theories, it is necessary to remember that via such theories a person who becomes amused is to release their inner tensions and fears, which are connected with certain taboo subjects. For instance, taboo subjects include sex and excreta, death or religion, i.e. the subjects that are not supposed to be amusing, but rather can bring grief to a person's life. Therefore, Freud's idea was to explain that laughing at problematic issues makes a psychotic person release their pent-up anxieties, which allows for the '(…) regaining from the activity of a psyche a pleasure which in fact was lost only with the development of that activity.' (Freud 2002: 228) What Freud means by this statement is that people who fear some topics, such as death, acquire the very anxiety in their mind, and by laughing at the very subject matter, they can face the fears, release the negative emotions and thus get rid of them. In this way, humour is basically equated with the release of fears and negative emotions. Bearing all this in mind, let us look at the example of humour: 'Two men pass each other in a graveyard. One says, "Morning." The other replies, "No, just walking the dog."' (Jarsz 2002: 111). Firstly, the mere idea that in the cemetery some people might be walking a dog is unexpected. Secondly, the word morning which is intended by the speaker as a shortened version of good morning, is understood as mourning. The homophones that are ambiguous again relate to the idea of after-death remembrance

of a late relative, which is mocked in the joke above. All these light-hearted associations make the matter of death seem less grave, which leads to humour and laughter. This, on the other hand, dissolves fears and allows for the pleasure of the psyche, according to release theories.

2.3. Linguistic theories of humour

Linguistically there has been a considerable number of inquiries conducted as to establish the nature of humour, and what ensues is a vast array of theses. Almost all offer some general approach to humour that would explain how funniness is achieved and what its requirements are. However, the data varies so much between such hypotheses, usually in a perspective specifically selected by the research conductor, that it is frequently too demanding a task to search for similarities among these hypotheses, and in this way to generalise further about humour. For this very reason, the following section will introduce only the most pivotal linguistic theories with their critical evaluation. What will follow is the demonstration of the author's views on humour that might be estimated as a coherent hypothesis, after closer inspection.

2.3.1. The Semantic Script Theory of Humour (SSTH)

The Semantic Script Theory of Humour, or SSTH for short, was formulated by Raskin (Raskin 1985) within the general theory of generative grammar. The main assumption behind SSTH is the existence of humour competence, as an associated concept based on Chomsky's idea of competence[35]. Now, just as Chomsky (1965) presupposes that a native speaker of a language is capable of determining whether a sentence is grammatically correct or not, much in the similar manner Raskin presupposes that a native speaker/hearer of a language possesses the ability to decide whether a sentence is humorous or not. This is referred to as humour competence. Simultaneously, Raskin follows Chomskyan generativism

35 Chomsky defines the notion of competence as what a person knows about language, and contrasts it with performance, i.e. how they use this linguistic knowledge in language production and comprehension (Fromkin et al 2003: 12). Chomsky also defines in detail how this competence-performace distinction functions:

> Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech community, who knows his language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention or interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance (Chomsky 1965: 3).

in that he postulates that a native speaker/hearer, who is characterised by this humour competence, is an idealised individual captured within a homogeneous surrounding, unaltered by any social, psychological, historical, etc. factors, and who has not been told a certain joke, as yet. The idealisation evokes the notion of the so-called 'potential humor' (Attardo; 1994: 197) where the context of a joke is not critical to the true nature of humour, but where this very context does play a role in humour apprehension. Now, the above-mentioned principal tenet of Raskin's SSTH involves the following strategies:

> A text can be characterized as a single-joke-carrying text if both of the (…) conditions are satisfied:
> i) The text is compatible, fully or in part, with two different scripts
> ii) The two scripts with which the text is compatible are opposite (…). (Raskin 1985: 99-100)

The two predominant conditions provide logical formulas to be satisfied for effective humour recognition, which conform to the principles of generative grammar. As far as the idea of a script is concerned, a script[36] (or a frame, which is another label for the same concept) is to be interpreted as a well structured bulk of information on something, in its broad sense; a script is a cognitive configuration on the part of an idealised speaker/hearer which informs them about how things are performed, arranged, etc. (Raskin 1985: 81-84; for more on this subject see also Attardo 1994, Fillmore 1977, Goldberg on-line, and Brown and Yule 1983).

A script comprises typical data, i.e. what is customary or usual for people to do with regard to certain activities. Raskin distinguishes two types of script: 'macroscript' (Raskin 1985: 99-100; 104-107) with information organised in a chronological manner (a good example of it would be a script of shopping where a person goes to the store, chooses products to purchase, joins the queue and finally pays for the items), and 'complex script', which is built on the basis of other scripts that are not chronologically ordered (a case in point may be the script

36 The notion of script originates from artificial intelligence, and it used to name a construct that would stand for, within computer memory, aspects of knowledge that is needed to process discourse information. In cognitive linguistics, a script means a dynamic construct that represents the basic level events, such as visiting the doctor or washing up. A similar concept, again from artificial intelligence, is the notion of frame, which represents general patterns of knowledge about a concept, e.g. Lakoff's mother frame (Taylor 2003: 90-93; Taylor 2002: 203; Croft and Cruse 2004: 8.& 17).These two terms, script and frame, together with similar notions of schemata, scenes, scenarios, or ICMs are considered as overlapping with the notion of domain (Taylor 2003: 90).

of travelling by plane, where we have a variety of activities involved: e.g. going through security, shopping in the duty-free zone, drinking and eating, reading a book or a magazine in a departure lounge, proceeding to the relevant gate, visiting a toilet, boarding the plane, etc. – all these may not necessarily appear in the pre-arranged order). Whatever the script, it is linked to a certain word.

The kind of knowledge that can be found in a script is another important aspect to consider. Raskin (1985) notes that a vast majority of encyclopedic facts can be found in the lexicon, and these are activated while processing sentences. Scripts, whether they are lexical or non-lexical (e.g. restricted knowledge scripts that are normally connected to lexical ones) and information they carry are linked with one another by means of different semantic relations, e.g. synonymy, antonymy, etc., thus forming a 'semantic network' (Raskin 1985: 104-107) which incorporates all the information a native speaker/hearer possesses of their own culture. The semantic network assists in decoding the meaning of sentences on the part of a speaker/hearer. Therefore, the decoding is accomplished by scrutinising all the elements of a sentence against the background of the semantic network and sifting out the possible combinations of potential renderings, until one interpretation is labelled the ultimate meaning, as it is considered well-formed. Humour processes are comprehended in a similar way (Raskin 1985: 104-107).

There might also be some overlapping between two or some more scripts, which is either partial or total. In the first case, two scripts will only be compatible with each other to some extent, while the latter case assumes that two scripts are fully congruous. Additionally, Raskin (1985: 114-116) proposes the notion of the 'script-switch' trigger, i.e. the elements of a sentence that make it possible to switch between two, or more, compatible scripts.

Raskin's idea of scripts oppositeness, that ensures humour appearance, can be represented by three categories: actual and non-actual, normal and abnormal, and finally, possible and impossible, which in turn can be further divided into more ordinary oppositions such as: 'good/bad, life/death, obscene/non-obscene, money/no-money, and high/low stature' (Raskin 1985: 107-114).

To sum up, following Raskin's two-condition hypothesis, a piece of text will be humorous if and only if it is fully, or at lease partially compatible with two opposing scripts (Raskin 1985: 99-100).

Raskin's SSTH certainly represents a breakthrough in language studies on humour, as it is the first formally composed theory that also presents a substantial number of examples confirming this theory (Raskin 1985:.148-179; 180-210). Secondly, SSTH is formulated in an essentialist manner, hence the essential features are easily applied to humour studies, which is evidenced by the interest that SSTH has stirred among researchers who have adopted SSTH for the purpose of

further analysis, e.g. Chłopicki (1997) and his study of Polish humour in certain short stories or Vega (1990) who applied Raskin's hypothesis to humour analysis in learning English as a second language, or the wide acceptance that the SSTH has among psychological humour researchers, etc. (Attardo 1994: Ross 1998; Chiaro 1996).

There are a few comments to be offered. Any researcher who perceives the comic from the cognitive stance must question the notion of *humour competence* as understood by Raskin. The notion is couched in terms of generative grammar, which stands in opposition to the cognitive mode of thinking about language. Since Chomsky reduced his idea of competence merely to grammar, how it was possible for Raskin to extend this concept further into humour studies is not exactly clear, for the simple reason that so far humour theories have not been in a position to define humour or its prerequisites precisely (whereas grammar has been fairly consistently delimited by Chomsky's finite set of rules). Hence to speak of humour competence without any major description of the term in question appears to be problematic.

In connection with humour competence, Raskin, modelling his theory on Chomsky's generative grammar, presupposes the identification of an idealised native speaker/hearer who is not restrained by any cultural or encyclopaedic knowledge and exists in a homogeneous society. This speaker/hearer also has to be presented only with humorous material they have never heard before. This idealisation appears unconvincing, since it would be difficult to imagine a native speaker who is not influenced by the context of their life, or by the narrowly-defined context of a joke[37]. According to cognitivists, it makes little sense to distinguish between background or encyclopedic knowledge, for they exist and intermingle within the mental capacities of each person, and not only within a humour respondent. Moreover, if we do imagine a native speaker/hearer whose mind functions as a blank canvas, how will they be able to understand and appreciate humour purely on the basis of linguistic data manipulation, and without any reference to non-linguistic factors? According to Raskin, they will basically refer to their lexical knowledge involving certain non-lexical information, i.e. semantic particles. This is rather incorrect. If a native speaker/hearer is idealised, how is it possible for them to possess lexical knowledge intertwined with certain semantic knowledge that is not exactly non-linguistic, but at the same time goes

37 An interesting perspective on the distinction between semantic and pragmatic knowledge is provided by Bach (on-line) who does recognise the distinction, but at the same time states that it might not always apply in a straightforward manner to all the contexts.

beyond the lexicon to encyclopaedic or background information. Therefore, SSTH would appear to be a good foundation for future studies in the field of humour, though there are some associated problems. SSTH is misleading in as far as it offers inconsistent and self-contradictory premises. What is more, the analysis is restricted exclusively to the humour of jokes (i.e. 32 jokes being analysed which again does not shed much light on humour in jokes alone), which does not reflect in any predominant way on humour in general, in comparison with the abundance of genres that humour in its broadest sense encompasses. Hence it must be rejected as an invalid hypothesis on humour understanding, tough it may still be valid for a lexical analysis of semantic humour in jokes.Raskin lists two necessary and sufficient conditions[38] (similar to generativism) for humour to appear. Again these constraints, as viewed from the cognitive perspective, are not valid, if we deduce that humour might be a prototypical phenomenon with more central and marginal examples as its members. Consequently, it becomes apparent that SSTH's generative and hence limited-in-use conditions could prove unusable (a further discussion on this will be presented after we have conducted a humour analysis on particular examples).

Attardo (1994: 208), although being influenced by the SSTH, criticises Raskin's postulations on the grounds that they are primarily concerned with jokes, and hence the application of the SSTH to any other text will be awkward, in Attardo's view. Additionally, Attardo claims that as the SSTH is a semantic-oriented theory it automatically disregards any other non-semantic factors in jokes or humour (Attardo 1994: 208).

A more formal criticism of Raskin's SSTH is presented by Ritchie (2004: 72-76). Ritchie opposes the too general idea of a script and its organisation. Especially one that just specifies, in very loose terms, that the script will comprise some information. According to Ritchie, there are no details as to what kind of data exactly one can find in scripts and how this data is ordered. In fact, Ritchie states that based on Raskin's definition a script might be 'any type of knowledge structure whatsoever' (Ritchie 2004: 72). Similarly, the notion of oppositeness with regard to two scripts is again not well determined. 'The weakness of this is that there is no theoretical definition of what it means for a script to describe

38 The idea of necessary and sufficient conditions (or criteria) for category membership dates back to Aristotle who maintained that categories can be described by means of essential, or binary features, which comprised the necessity for a particular class of entities (Cruse 2004: 127). The structuralists, such as Chomsky, adopted this idea for the purpose of their analysis of language. Nonetheless, it is a controversial notion to imply to the study of metaphor, metonymy or CIT, as discussed in chapter 1, as it prevents from the full understanding of the concepts in question.

scenarios which are actual/non-actual, normal/abnormal, possible/impossible' (Ritchie 2004: 73). In a similar vein, we could add that the notion of overlapping script information put forward by Raskin can be criticised, i.e. what overlaps, and how, is not exactly clear from SSTH. Owing to all the fallacies of SSTH, then, Ritchie is inclined to think that the theory is in desperate need of more punctilious exploration (Ritchie 2004: 72-80). At some point, Raskin himself realised that steps should be taken to improve SSTH. He admitted that his hypothesis views all jokes as the same, which is an incorrect assumption, owing to the fact that they all follow from script opposition and overlapping. Another problem that arises is the application of SSTH to other joke-type texts that are more sizeable, and hence do not comply with Raskin's maxims (Attardo 1994: 222-229; Ritchie 2004: 72-80). In a similar vein, Bing and Scheibman (2014) criticise SSTH for treating humour as resultant from merely script opposition, which does not present the full picture, especially with recourse to more complex examples. According to Bing and Scheibman (2014), blending and CIT are much better at explaining the nature of the comic, as they to some extent incorporate the notion of script opposition in the form of their input spaces, but what is more, these paradigms also offer a further development on humour creation, i.e. the blended space, which truly offers a potential to enhance and strengthen the comedy in question via its emergent potential. Thus, Bing and Scheibman (2014) advocate CIT as it can be subversive (not exclusively, however) and it allows for the creation of utopias and dystopias, unreal and hypothetical situations, which on the other hand, provide use with the potential to formulate alternative ideas to deeply rooted convention and stereotypical thinking. Specifically, in their study the alternative ideas relate to the notion of feminism and male/female relations and authority, where blending and CIT allow for challenging expectations and assumptions and thus allow for the redefinition of these, too (for a detailed discussion see the complete article).

2.3.1.1. An example of SSTH

The following text was given as exemplary of SSTH by Raskin: 'Why is a looking glass like a philosopher? Because it reflects.' (Raskin 1944: 249). In order to explain humour in question we need to think of two varying scripts that are opposed. The script-switch trigger in this example is the word "reflects" which brings about two incompatible scripts: the first one is the script of light reflection (which is a complex script) and the second one is the script of thinking over things (which is a macro script). Certainly, both the scripts are completely opposed and it is only the word "reflect" that joins them. Additionally, the opposition in the example is of the possible versus the impossible nature, which can be further divided into

high/low stature, to the extent that reflection such as pondering would be of higher nature, while a simple process of a glass that reflects light is of a low nature, as compared to the thinking process. Finally, according to Raskin's theory, humour results from the opposition and incompatibility of the scripts concerned.

2.3.2. The General Theory of Verbal Humour (GTVH)

The General Theory of Verbal Humour, or GTVH for short, is a by-product of re-evaluation of SSTH by Raskin and Attardo (Attardo 2004: 222-229). As the name suggests, its goal is, presumably, to describe any kind of humour text, not merely jokes[39]. Furthermore, the GTVH is proposed as a linguistic theory in contrast with the semantic SSTH, so it is broadened to other linguistic departments such as textual linguistics, narrativity theory and pragmatics, as well. Raskin and Attardo retain the notion of script opposition and overlapping, but they also introduce other principles, which are called Knowledge Resources (or KR for short). Thus KRs formally include: the script opposition (SO), the logical mechanism (LM), the target (TA), the narrative strategy (NS), the language (LA) and the situation (SI). Let us now look briefly at these postulations.

In what follows we shall only briefly mention the Script Opposition (SO) principle which has already been elaborated on in SSTH (see section 2.2.4.1). SO is most abstract in its nature, and it is represented by a fairly general rule stating that any hilarious text will display an SO.

The Logical Mechanism (LM) is responsible for bringing together two interpretations in a joke, e.g. scripts. LM can be activated in the form of a juxtaposition, false analogies or figure-ground reversals. It represents 'a "logical" logic' (Attardo 1994: 226), which stands for 'a distorted, playful logic, that does not hold outside of the world of a joke' (Attardo 1994: 226).

Another parameter is the Target (TA) and its task is to nominate the butt of a joke from the selection of groups or individuals stored in Knowledge Resources, e.g. a Scottish person who is tight-fisted might be singled out by TA as the centre of ridicule in a particular joke. However, it is vital to notice that non-hostile jokes that do not scold anybody or anything have this category empty.

The Narrative Strategy (NS) criterion assumes that any joke will be organised in some type of narrative form, e.g. a dialogue- or riddle-based joke or a simple narrative text, etc. It is, one might stipulate, a notion comparable to the literary genre.

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39 Vaid et al (2003) have conducted an experiment with jokes and the timing of humour, the result of which is compatible with Attardo's incongruity perception theory as well as Giora's incongruity resolution theory.

The next parameter that I will refer to is the Language (LA) which "contains all the information necessary for the verbalization of a text. It is responsible for the exact wording of a text and for the placement of the functional elements that constitute it" (Attardo 1994: 223). LA is closely associated with paraphrase, as any joke-based text can be reworded using different lexicon, for instance, or slightly varying syntax. However, LA is to guard the precision of the punch line and its final position, on which humour hinges.

And finally, the Situation (SI) is to depict, as the name suggests, the scene of a joke, i.e. objects, characters involved and their actions, etc. This parameter will be present in the better part of jokes, but it might be ignored completely in certain humorous texts, where a very general type of scene is sketched and the focus is not directly on the situation as such, but on other elements of a funny text.

Having defined each KR parameter, I shall proceed with further discussion of the GTVH. The hypothesis identifies a formula for any interpretation of a joke:

Joke: {LA, SI, NS, TA, SO, LM } (Attardo 1994: 226),

Where the Knowledge Resources must not be thought of as equal, in the sense that some of these may bring more to a joke's interpretation than others. Thus GTVH is said to be capable of generating humour in an infinite way (Attardo 1994: 222-229).

Although the GTVH is an improvement on the SSTH, in the sense that because of the Narrative Strategy and Language parameters there is the possibly GTVH can account for any type of humour, there are still problematic issues with this theory, that need addressing. First of all, I am of an opinion that the GTVH is not a general theory that has in its capacity the ability to explain any humour. As much as it can be appreciated that there is NS and LA that supposedly account for a variety of humorous texts, it must also be admitted that the two principles are not particularly elaborated by Raskin and Attardo. In fact there is no definite and precise description of any of the Knowledge Resources, as Ritchie points out (Ritchie 2004: 72). Besides, despite the fact that both Raskin and Attardo simultaneously advocate the GTVH as a broad theory to account for any humour, they only use jokes as their point of reference, e.g. when expounding the theory's principles, which potentially appears to be an inconsistency. Moreover, Attardo himself remarked that the GTVH poses problems with regard to its application to longer humorous texts (Attardo 1994: 229). Leaving that aside, the theory has never been tested against the background of alternative humorous genres, and in spite of the fact that its Narrative Strategy might be comparable to the genre recognition device, it is still much too sweeping an association, apart from being under-defined, to be fully recognised.

Another line of criticism follows from acknowledging the script notion, as a direct consequence of the SSTH. As specified before (see the section 2.3.1.1), Ritchie disapproves of the poorly defined notion of the script and also oppositeness and overlapping in the SSTH. Hence, it becomes apparent that certain ideas have not been developed, but have rather been directly redrafted from the original SSTH.

One more serious reservation regarding GTVH is advanced by Ritchie (2004: 76-77). He rejects the proposition of the KR parameters as lacking more sophisticated structure. Namely, Ritchie agrees that the principles are stated, but they lack a reference to some more central humour mechanism, which has not been depicted by Raskin and Attardo. The six parameters are merely symbols that might be utilised as a mere joke-analysing procedure, for a joke is not, in itself, a combination of symbols, as far as Ritchie is concerned (as above).

Admittedly, Ritchie asserts that the GTVH presents merely some general textual features, rather than humorous characteristics (Ritchie 2004: 78), for it can be argued that KR parameters are likely to be characteristic of any text, e.g. LA, or even TA. Additionally, for Ritchie a proper theory of humour must be falsifiable, so the GTVH fails spectacularly on these grounds, as one might add more KRs. This is even postulated by Raskin and Attardo; however, there is no strict definition as to what counts as a valid parameter (Ritchie 2004: 79). And finally, Ritchie criticises Raskin and Attardo because they do not provide instantiations of texts where only some elements of their theory would be visible, thus bringing about the lack of humour, and comparing it with amusing examples in which those theoretical ingredients that were missing are present. Such an exercise would be particularly essential, as Ritchie believes, because it would make it possible to determine whether it is at all feasible to differentiate between humorous texts and sheer misinterpretations in view of the SSTH or GTVH, and their weakly defined concept of opposition (Ritchie 2004: 79).

In conclusion, because of the fact that both the SSTH and GTVH have flawed assumptions that are not clarified in a precise way, they cannot be treated as accurate and fundamental theories of humour.

2.3.2.1. An example of GTVH

As stated above, a joke will necessarily consist of the following:

Joke: {LA, SI, NS, TA, SO, LM } (Attardo 1994: 226),

The parts of which formula may add to humour in varying degrees. To understand how the theory works, let us focus on the example below:

> At a sophisticated party, two guests are talking outside. "Aha," says the first one, in a sophisticated tone, "Nice evening, isn't it? Magnificent meal, and beautiful *toilettes* (lavatories/dresses), aren't they?" "I wouldn't know," answers the second. "What do you mean?" "I didn't have to go." (Attardo 1994: 63)

Firstly, the language (LA) component does ensure that the joke has a punchline, which centres around the word "toilettes" and that it becomes the punchline at the end of the joke when the last sentence triggers the ambiguity. Secondly, the situation (SI) component organises the setting of the joke that is the elegant party with smart guests who discuss the event. All the scenario is presented in a narrative form (NS) which dramatises the whole scene even more. Next, we have an opposition of scripts (SO) which becomes apparent on the ambiguity of "toilettes", rendered either as posh clothes or as toilets, which are juxtaposed by differing perspectives of the people in the joke (LM). Such a juxtaposition is achieved via the superimposition of the logical context (for one person it is clothes, for another it is lavatories initially) with the illogical context (the reverse respectively), which completes the overlapping and opposition and culminates in humour.

2.3.3. Ritchie's proposals

In his book *The Linguistic Analysis of Jokes* (2004), Ritchie articulates his own proposals on how to analyse humour. His observations are just observations and he does not compose a theory of humour, which Ritchie frequently makes clear. However, these observations do serve the primary purpose of setting parameters for the study of jokes, so that in future, on such basis and still further research, a more general theory of humour could be built. For Ritchie, the configuration of such a theory will take years, as he is inclined to think that there is too much uncertainty now with regard to humour. Despite the fact that numerous hypotheses in relation to humour are being forwarded constantly, there is a deficiency of proper critique and validated evidence as to what genuinely constitutes humour and how it should be tackled. Therefore, Ritchie endeavours to conduct an analysis of jokes following certain assumptions of his own, which have compiled over the years of his experiments. Thus, his analysis of jokes aims to:

> advocate an approach to humour theory based on detailed description of particular subclasses of humorous phenomena;
>
> illustrate how various classes of jokes can be analysed relatively formally, focussing particularly on the *linguistic mechanisms* involved; (…)
>
> offer some tentative suggestions about the main information factors in simple jokes. (Ritchie 2004: 2-3)

It is obvious that Ritchie does not propose a solid theory, but he rather tries to work methodically through his observations of how jokes reflect on humour in general.

The defining aspect of Ritchie's study is the fact that he works in the field of computer programming, hence he endeavours to establish that it is viable to produce a computer program which will successfully analyse or create humour. Such an objective imposes its own perspective on Ritchie's experiments; namely, as computers operate on a binary basis, a set of logical formulae should be proposed, according to which any computer system would inspect jokes introduced to it, and explain what is humorous about them[40]. Ritchie draws heavily on Chomsky's linguistics[41], as it is primarily structure-oriented. Ritchie's need for in-detailed description of a future theory leads him to believe that by adopting Chomsky's line of thinking he will also be able to initiate the project that leads to a universal theory of humour. This is why, just as Chomsky, Ritchie will use strings of words as a basic form of description together with the principle of grammaticality and ungrammaticality. The author will treat joke texts as strings of words, and grammaticality notion as equivalent to having the properties of a joke, or not. Moreover, the description of jokes and their classes will comprise

40 A similar perspective on humour is presented by Mulder & Nijholt (2002 on-line) who present many computer models of humour explanation that are available for researchers. Within the CASA (Computers Are Social Actors) paradigm, Mulder and Nijholt survey the contemporary theories and applications of these into practise with regard to humour, which constitutes a riveting perspective on computational modelling in humour research.

41 Chomsky in his study of language stresses the independence of grammar, i.e. the fact that it exists irrespective of any semantic input and hence to describe grammar there is no need for any semantic representation. Further, in order to describe grammaticality, the fact that non-grammatical or less grammatical sentences exist is irrelevant from the point of view of syntax. The only conclusion is then that grammar is autonomous as well as independent of meaning (Chomsky 1957: 17). This view has been adopted by Ritchie, by only partly which will become apparent in the final part of section 2.3.3 where it turns out that Ritchie actually denies the autonomy of grammar and accepts that both semantics and pragmatics are indispensable to the systematic study of jokes. This novel attitude agrees with the cognitive stance of language, according to which there intersection of different parts of language, such as grammar or semantics, is crucial. A case in point is the study of metaphor, metonymy or blending in chapter 1, which proves that it is impossible to separate structure from meaning or its usage. No sense would it make to comprehend any of the above merely in structural way, as there inferences and additional connotations would be disallowed, thus distorting the true semantic and pragmatic value of such phenomena. In this manner, we shall also approach the analysis of humour in chapter 3, which again will illustrate the approach to language and the comic opposite to Chomsky's.

the syntax of jokes. Once Ritchie has described completely the ways of jokes, he will have produced a theory of jokes, which will not be an ultimate theory of humour, just as Chomskyan theory of grammar is not a complete theory of linguistics (Ritchie 2004: 9).

Another crucial point that Ritchie makes is the fact that he wishes to work on verbal humour, rather than verbalised humour, where the latter might suggest only humour pertaining to the way the words are expressed by any given conveyor of a joke, which is not Ritchie's objective. Ritchie wants to analyse 'jokes which are expressed by means of a linguistic system (…)' (Ritchie 2004: 13). Ritchie claims that the causative force of humour may comprise a set of factors where the relationships between those need to be specified, as yet. He justifies his choice of jokes on the grounds that these are frequently collected into groups and are relatively easy to study, as they are self-contained and usually of small capacity, and hence manageable in a consistent manner. Similarly, Ritchie agrees that a social factor is essential in humour theorising, i.e. that within one community there will be consensus as to which texts are jokes, and which are not perceived as such. Furthermore, he presupposes that different kinds of jokes will bring about humour in varying ways. Ritchie recognises the need for formality in humour experimenting, hence he puts forward a selection of benchmarks to be incorporated into his inquiries:

> (a) All terms should be clearly defined, so that there are only a relatively few primitive (undefined) options and the relationships between all the concepts are made explicit and precise.
> (b) In seeking to explain empirical phenomena (e.g. jokes), theoretical statements should be framed in terms of the abstract formal constructs of the theory, not in terms of the entities being studied.
> (c) It should be developed in sufficient detail that it is not merely a renaming of existing informal insights.
> (d) It should be clear what would count as evidence for associating any abstract concepts with particular texts; that is, assignment of analyses to texts should not be a wholly subjective matter.
> (e) The theory should have a clear relationship to theories of language, in the sense that it should show the relationship between humorous and non-humorous texts, in terms at lease of structure and possibly also of processing.
> (f) The theory should be falsifiable, in the sense that it is conceivable that there could be data which do not conform with the theory, and it should be made clear what would constitute such a counter-example. (Ritchie 2004: 12)

Ritchie proposes that one can distinguish two classes of jokes: propositional jokes and linguistic jokes. The former kind possesses a delivery mechanism which shows in what manner the linguistic interpretation of this particular joke

type leads to a double rendering of the joke (pre- and post-punchline, as Ritchie puts it), hence it merely displays how humour is delivered. For Ritchie a propositional joke must include some contrast between its deferring interpretations, or some inappropriateness brought about by one of those renderings. The latter joke type, a linguistic joke, is only concerned with a combination of linguistic elements that comprise it, and it has no delivery mechanism whatsoever. Ritchie provides a list of factors that would be crucial to both propositional and linguistic jokes. These include: background information, which can be accommodated or not; supplementary aspects of a text; and finally any extraneous data which might not be necessary to the central idea of a joke, but which is not purposeless, e.g. marginal content or structure type (Ritchie 2004: 183-185). Supplementary content, i.e. supplements, should not be regarded as a sufficient prerequisite of any joke, because according to Ritchie supplements, being not obligatory with regard to a joke's narrative, should rather be treated as a characteristics of general narratives. Ritchie enumerates the following supplements to jokes:

- inappropriateness;
- question-solving whenever a jokes has a form of a puzzle or question, and requires some solution;
- thwarted expectations;
- disparagement of a target in generalised terms;
- superiority over some joke character;
- embellishment, i.e. making a joke more dramatic by adding a detail or two to the narrative;
- dramatic tension in the form of a structure of a joke, e.g. repetition;
- facilitation in the sense that a joke teller might want to refer to a device, e.g. a certain wording, that ensures a smooth joke rendering on the part of a recipient;
- parallelism in the sense that a joke form parallel to any other popular form, e.g. catch-phrases, will boost humour; prank played on the recipient by tricking them (although the extent to which this results in amusement might vary);
- ingenuity on the part of a joke teller, that enhances humour reception; and finally funny words, i.e. the choice of certain letters or wording might sound more humorous.

All these supplements, though they may appear in jokes, can also be found in non-humorous texts; therefore, they should not be regarded as necessary and sufficient (Ritchie 2004: 179-182). Ritchie's supplements are similar to those Berger

(see Asa Berger[42] 1998: 18) proposed as a selection of necessary and sufficient ingredients of humour creation, but there are fewer of them in Ritchie's work.

Ritchie does not present his observations about the structure of jokes as a homogeneous theory of jokes or humour. In essence, he merely examined a small number of jokes, preferring to treat the findings as a structural characterisation of the components of the joke kind, the 'syntax of jokes' (Ritchie 2004: 185), which forms the basis for future exploration. In addition, Ritchie critically summarises his own analysis producing a direction for further investigation, which is unusual, since most other researchers would either just present their findings or simply compose their observation into a theory of some kind, without trying to detach themselves from it and evaluate it in a critical way. Thus, Ritchie is inclined to believe that his joke analysis is merely in a form of a sketch, and hence more joke types as well as structures need to be investigated in order to provide a general theory. Similarly, the joke parameters included in his research have to be further examined and redeveloped, perhaps, to acquire a form of primitive constructs. Moreover, Ritchie stresses the need to be more formal in dealing with humour, which is a direct criticism of his own account where Ritchie is only able to make minimal progress, as his analysis is fairly informal.

Ritchie's humour hypotheses are based on generativism, since they restrict humour to a simplistic logical process that might be defined by a few formulae that will further be introduced to computer programming so that humour might be artificially generated or explained. Nevertheless, we do appreciate the consistency in his methodological approach to the task. Ritchie provides a thorough description of the notions he will be using throughout his research and relies on these without any doubt. Nevertheless, he himself calls for a more scrupulous methodology in his own critique, which would bring about more objectiveness

42 Asa Berger (1998) enumerates quite a few supplementary essentials to humour in jokes in the following categories:
Language: allusion, bombast, definition, exaggeration, facetiousness, insults, infantilism, irony, misunderstanding, over literalness, puns & word play, repartee, ridicule, sarcasm, satire
Logic: absurdity, accident, analogy, catalogue, coincidence, disappointment, ignorance, mistakes, repetition, reversal, rigidity, theme/variation
Identity: before/after, burlesque, caricature, eccentricity, embarrassment, exposure, grotesque, imitation, impersonation, mimicry, parody, scale, stereotype, unmasking
Action: chase, slapstick, speed, time (Asa Berger 1998: 18-55)
These additions certainly do not all appear in one joke at the same time, but the more are present, the funnier the joke becomes. Surprisingly, some of the mentioned features will appear in our analysis of film comedy productions, so it would seem that they are valid not only for jokes but also for humour in general.

in its scientific manner. A case in point might be psychological testing (Ritchie 2004: 186-188).

As for computer programming, Ritchie believes there is still more research needed in order to compile any possible humour theory, or hypothesis rather, with computer science, so that the production of humour software is attainable. Admittedly, any possibility of humour generating or explaining programmes seems to be highly visionary, due to the fact that humour processes are too much dependent on a human brain's processes and intelligence, which is again subjective. Therefore, developing a computer programme that would be able to create humour would equate, to a large extent, with creating an artificial human mind, which is, at least for the time being, a mission impossible. Nonetheless, we do not reject Ritchie's goal to implement humour into computer programming, because his observations are crucial enough to be incorporated within any humour theorising, whereas his meticulous and logical line of reasoning can facilitate the future task of the formulation of a general, universal theory of humour.

Another criticism of Ritchie's computational humour theory is the fact that he implements a Chomskyan perspective into humour studies. From a cognitive point of view it is unworkable, since it restricts humour to a language capacity describable by means of generative rules (Chłopicki on-line). However, the choice of structuralism with regard to computer studies on humour is justifiable, which certainly simplifies the goal and provides some reassurance, even if this proves unjustifiable, for future progress within the field (Chłopicki on-line).

Further weaknesses within Ritchie's framework have been put forward by Chłopicki (on-line). Firstly, it is pointed out that Ritchie, just like Raskin before him ill-defined script or its oppositeness. Additionally, Ritchie used certain terms in his research which are not sufficiently defined, e.g. *context*, *concept*, *linked*, *similar*, *linguistically appropriate*, *interpretation* as well as those more typical of humour: *obviousness*, *conflict*, *compatibility*, *contrast*, *inappropriateness*, *absurdity* and *taboo* (Chłopicki on-line). However, it is recognised that the notions of *context* and *concept* have been denoted in accordance with cognitive perspective (Chłopicki on-line), which is regarded as a major breakthrough, i.e. for a scholar using generative frame to incorporate cognitive elements into it, and also to recognise their importance. Secondly, a vital generalisation is proposed by Ritchie in terms of joke classes, namely:

> A propositional joke has a delivery mechanism which indicates how the linguistic processing of the text can give rise to a pair of interpretations (loosely, pre- and post punchline). It seems that such a joke must involve either CONTRAST between these two interpretations or some degree of INAPPROPRIATENESS in—or indirectly suggested by—exactly one of these interpretations. A linguistic joke, on the other hand, is defined

> by a configuration of linguistic elements, involving notions such as phonetic similarity, segmentation into words, etc. It has no comparable component of delivery mechanism. (Ritchie 2004: 183; Chłopicki on-line)

Similarly, Ritchie, in his structural analysis of jokes, stresses the importance of pragmatic elements within these jokes, e.g. the knowledge and comprehension of the audience of a given joke. Equally, Ritchie underlines that a joke 'well-formedness' does not entail merely grammatical correctness, but refers also to semantic and pragmatic appropriateness, which can be illustrated by propositional jokes (Chłopicki on-line).

To conclude, Ritchie discusses the bulk of humour research with an interesting perspective and his analysis ought to be regarded as an example of a well-formed and compatible experiment, which serves the purpose as a blueprint as well as a point of reference for other future endeavours to categorise humour. Despite the fact that it does not refine or broaden any previous theoretical attempts in a substantial manner, and despite the fact that it is slightly speculative or approximate, and evades forming solid hypotheses and definite answers to humour perception, it does constitute an indispensable insight for anyone wishing to research humour further. Accordingly, I shall draw heavily on Ritchie's efforts, and I shall adopt his conclusion that one needs to advance from specifying what makes a joke (in Ritchie's case it is a joke, but it might be any other genre) into conclusive clarification of what is humorous (Ritchie 2004: 188).

2.3.3.1. An illustration of Ritchie's theory

As Ritchie (2004: 188) states himself, his proposal of theoretical statements to do with humour is more about what makes a joke amusing and what in this joke is funny. There is a long way from this approach to explaining humour, which is understandable in a computer programming environment. However, Ritchie gives examples of how to arrive from the logical equations to what really is funny. Let us inspect the following definition by Ritchie (for more computational definitions of humour see Ritchie 2004: 189-199):

> DEFINITION: NARRATING A SITUATION
> A text *T* is *a narrative resulting in S* iff *S* is the most obvious interpretation of *T*.
> (…) *a delivery mechanism* is a mapping from a text-interpreter and a text *T* to a pair of situations (*S, S'*) such that S is an interpretation of an initial substring of *T* (not necessarily proper) and *S'* is an interpretation of *T*. (Ritchie 2004: 198)

This procedure is adopted for narrative jokes, which will now be observed:

> An English bishop received the following note from the vicar of a village in his diocese: 'Milord, I regret to inform you of my wife's death. Can you possibly send me a substitute for the weekend? (Ritchie 2004: 206)

The joke above is treated as T, and it results from the situation of the death of vicar's wife due to which the vicar wants to be substituted by some other vicar for the weekend, which functions as text interpretation S. There is, on the other hand, another interpretation which is not a substring of T in the way S is. The alternative interpretation which makes the joke funny is the understanding of the vicar's request as a need to receive a substitute for his late wife for the period of a weekend, this interpretation being considered S'. As a word of explanation, I would like to pay attention to the definition of delivery mechanism regarded by Ritchie as a mapping, which makes a relevant connection between Ritchie's theory of humour and CIT. For this reason, it is worth having this association in mind when analysing humour with blending in chapter 3.

2.3.3.2. Other Computational Approaches

An interesting model of humour is proposed by Katz (1993) who claims that his neural connectionist theory of humour is superiour to classical incongruity theories. Katz puts forward that humour centres between two concepts which are incongruous and are stored in the neural network associated with two distinct triggers. These activate both internal and external factors behind the abovementioned incongruous concepts. According to Katz, the correct timing of the incongruous triggers may bring about an arousal condition whereby two incongruous concepts are interpretable for a brief moment, whether the incongruity behind it is resolved by the humour receiver or not is of minor importance. "Theoretically, when the thresholds of the neural units are lowered, humour effects (…) are associated with the greater activation levels than available normally" (Roeckelein 2006, p. 124; after Katz 1993). All this being fine, the connectionist model of humour explains the biology behind the comedy, however, it does not provide any insight into what constitutes humour and how it is obtained. Thus, the connectionist model must also be considered as a well-thought of theory, but not a general theory of humour as such.

Pattern recognition theory is another case in point that refers back to a neural model of the brain for humour explanation. Clarke (2010) advocates the use of humour as a neurological adaptation process, which again is connected with evolution of humour notion from the primordial endorphin-oriented response to our present humorous experiences. Clarke puts forward that humour is a pattern recognition process in modern culture, whereby patterns are defined as "(…) all sorts of ideas that spring to mind at the use of a word" (Clarke 2012, p. 32). He also claims that these have been established conventionally into a framework of repetitions that provide assistance and enrich modern cultural life. These repetitions are exactly what connects different patterns. Thus, the above definition

of a pattern can be modified as follows: "A pattern is any two bits of information in which there appears to be a degree of repetition." (Clarke 2012, p. 32) or "(…) any two bits of information we choose to categorise as both separate and similar" (Clarke 2010, p. 40). Additionally, context does not belong to humour as such, but only facilitates it. Seen in this light, humour can be regarded as any other data processing by the brain, i.e. pattern recognition, and it is placed alongside creativity as one of the crucial components of human intelligence. Yet, comedy perceived only as pattern recognition runs parallel to any other neutral theory of humour, assuming some opposition in repeatable patterns, which secures humorous effects. Therefore, it is biologically and cognitively viable as an option explicating humour, and probably any type of it, however, it cannot serve as a general theory of humour, and therefore it will be put to one side.

2.3.4. Pragmatic approaches to humour

Within the pragmatic framework, I wish to present and comment briefly upon two slightly different approaches to humour that rank highly on the current taxonomy of pragmatic theories of humour, though they have their fallacies. The first method is based on Grice's theory of conversation (Grice 1996 & on-line; Levinson 1983: 100-118; Cummings 2005: 17-21; Sperber and Wilson 1981: 155-178; Sperber and Wilson on-line; Austin 1975; Carston 2005). Grice claims that the participants in a conversation must collaborate in order to make sense, which is well-known as his cooperative principle:

> "Make your contribution such as required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged." (Grice 1975, 45).

This presupposes that a flawless communication requires clarity and a certain degree of opaqueness between the speaker and the hearer. Furthermore, Grice surmises that a successful communication between a speaker and a hearer additionally requires adherence to a set of principles accepted by a given culture or society as a norm; these principles are called maxims of conversation, and if and only if a speaker and a hearer comply with these, their communication will thrive. Grice's maxims read as follows:

> "Quantity Make your contribution as informative as is required. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
> Quality Do not say what you believe to be false. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence
> Relation Be relevant
> Manner Avoid obscurity of expression. Avoid ambiguity. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). Be orderly." (Grice 1975, 45-46)

What the above maxims basically assume is that any person taking part in discourse must give an appropriate amount of information, not too much or too little; they must be truthful with what they say; they must speak on the relevant topic and, also, they must be clear and unambiguous in their speech. Participants in communication may choose to cling to the maxims thus producing truthful and relevant conversations that consist of standard implicatures of the literal. Alternatively, they may either flout the maxims openly, and hence construct conversational implicatures of the figurative nature, or they may decide to violate the maxims hiding it from the other discourse participants[43], in either case such a communication does not follow Grice's Cooperative Principle, and hence is faulty and imperfect (Grice: 1996 & on-line, Levinson 1983: 10-11, Cummings 2005: 17-21; Sperber and Wilson on-line; Goatly 2012: 228-229).

Additionally, Grice distinguishes between what an utterance says, i.e. the explicit (hence explicatures), and what an utterance implies, i.e. the implicit (hence implicatures). This division is further advanced into the division between the semantics of a statement[44], with its truth-conditional content, that is regarded as a sentence meaning, and its pragmatic side, i.e. what is being implied[45] (Carston 2001: 1-34). Based on this theoretical background, attempts have been made, even by Grice himself (for a more specific discussion of Gricean irony see Wengorek-Dolecka 2005: 60-69), to equate flouting of maxims with the production of non-literal language. Such flouting can also be viewed as a theory of humour.

Consequently, whenever we encounter humour, we deal with some violated maxim of conversation, where literal explicature does not make sense, and, therefore, we look further for an appropriate, more figurative interpretation that does not readily make itself available, but is the only correct rendering of the humorous text (for more on Grice's humour theory see Attardo 1994: 271-292).

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43 Violation occurs when the the speaker intentionally breaks one of the maxims, but hides it from the speaker; while flouting happens when the speaker openly breaks one of the maxims, which the hearer is expected to notice (Goatly 2012, 228-229).

44 A similar point is raised by Hogeweg (2009 on-line) who claims that meaning is dynamic and it is the product of interpretative process whereby the most optimal candidate for meaning rendered is chosen in a particular context as the meaning of a word. In this way, meanings and interpretations of words can differ in relation to different contexts, too.

45 An interesting perspective on the semantics-pragmatics division is provided by Carston (1999 on-line) who advocates that both semantics and pragmatics are merely two kinds of cognitive procedures that are used in order to understand utterances, i.e. decoding and inferencing respectively.

The obvious criticism of Gricean model follows from the fact that if two participants are absorbed in a conversation and one of them flouts the maxims to achieve humorous effects, they actually do not adhere to Grice's principles, and thus take part in a flouted conversation. This assumption of non-adherance to Grice's principles, on the other hand, bears more consequences. Namely, if the two participants are engaged in an unsuccessful communication and produce humour, how come they understand each other and the humour involved, or how come they are able to appreciate it or to convey any message at all, simultaneously displaying a non-cooperative type of behaviour (Attardo 1994: p. 275). A similar critique might apply to irony and its perception, too (Goatly 2012). In spite of that, people are capable of making sense of humorous remarks or texts; hence they must communicate properly. How is it achieved? There are several explanations of this, one being provided by Attardo who explains that Grice's theory may still stand if one does not regard humour in terms of maxims' violation, and if one supposes that the decoding of humour consists of reaching an illogical interpretation, and then 'backtracking' so that one can find a suitable rendering (Attardo 1994: p. 276).

> The decision to backtrack can be seen as a first hint at the solution of the problem outlined above: the hearer seems to assume the speaker's cooperative intent even *after* his/her failure to provide a text with a literal (…) sense. (Attardo 1994: 276)

Attardo advocates the modified version of the Gricean theory of humour[46] as proposed by Wilson and Sperber in their "mention theory"(aka echoic theory of irony[47]), according to which an ironical utterance is in reality simply the mentioning of another utterance (Sperber and Wilson, after Attardo 1994: 277, Cummings 2005: 17-21). The mention theory also advocates that humour does not really violate the maxims, but that the supposed flouting is performed by the humorist, usually on a fictional level, i.e. a different level to the one on which communication takes place, so a speaker reserves a distance between himself and what he utters. This is why the violation of maxims is basically mentioned,

46 In his more recent work, Attardo (2000) states that Gricean understanding of irony as an example of implicature and flouting one of the maxims, i.e. the maxim of quality (see this section earlier for explanation), should be considered erroneous. Rather, irony may well be created by the violation of any of the maxims of conversation, for Attardo's part.

47 An interesting reference to Sperber and Wilson's echoic theory of irony has been made by Kreuz & Glucksberg (1989) who put forward their "echoic reminder theory". This theory claims that an ironical statement merely refers back to what the authors call "an antecedent event", such events being e.g. expectations or implied norms. Seen in this light, irony operates as an expression with which to display one's disapproval towards a certain situation.

and not factual. The echoic theory of irony is treated as one-stage approach to irony in that it requires equivalent processing of the utterance's data on both levels of interpretation (Attardo 2000). Nonetheless, this theory also poses problems when one deals with absurd or nonsense texts that do not appear to mention anything overtly, and that might display no detachment between a speaker and his utterance (Goatly 2012). In a similar fashion, a dead-pan production of ironical remark on the part of the speaker means that this speaker will not signal to the hearer that his utterance is to be treated as a joke (Attardo 2000). Also, all irony is not necessarily echoic in its nature (Attardo 2000). What is more, there are humorous texts whose intention is to deceive a hearer so that amusement is attained, hence there is no mentioning there at all, and clearly the maxims of conversation are flouted on purpose (Attardo 1994: 283-286). Consequently, Grice's theory of humour as a process of flouting conversation maxims appears to be unsubstantiated to a large extent.

Another pragmatic humour theory is put forward by Giora (Giora 1999a&b, 2002 & 2011; Attardo 2000; Martin 1998: 98-99; Norrick 2002: 1336), and it is primarily concerned with irony. Giora envisions a theory of discourse which generates a well-composed text that:

(1) conforms to the "relevance requirement", so that all its messages are conceived of as related to a discourse topic - a generalisation (…) stated explicitly at the beginning of the discourse;
(2) conforms to the "graded informativeness condition", viz., that each proposition be gradually more informative (but at least not less informative) than the preceding one; (…)
(3) explicitly marks any deviation from the previous requirements with a digressive connector such as 'by the way' or 'after all'. (after Norrick 2002: 1336)

Based on these principles, one starts a text's interpretation process by referring to the most salient meaning(s) first, which do not have to be literal in their nature, called the graded salience principle (Norrick 2002: 1336, Attardo 2000). The notion of salience is incorporated by the mental lexicon and it might be influenced by the following factors: what is conventional, frequent, familiar and prototypical[48]. If more salient renderings of a text are not sufficient within a certain context, then the less salient meanings are created. Thus, her theory is regarded as a two-stage approach (as opposed to Sperber and Wilson's one-stage approach[49])

48 Giora advocates the notion of the priority of salient meanings instead of the literal ones, hence the name of her theory is graded salience hypothesis (Attardo 2000).

49 For more information on types of irony studies see Attardo 2000.

to ironical humour, where the first stage produces insufficient or implausible data, hence the second stage works in the manner of reformulation of the first one, so as to arrive at some relevant interpretation (Attardo 2000). There is also a second phase, called "contextual integration phase", during which activated senses can be preserved, dismissed of as inapplicable and unmanageable, or finally left to disappear (Norrick 2002: 1336-1337). Giora assumes that irony incorporates the presence of both literal as well as implied meanings, and that the relation between these is the one of the indirect (i.e. non-explicit) negation. She also puts forward the fact that irony will necessarily retain both of such senses at all times (Attardo 2000). Giora's hypothesis concerning humour has been successfully applied to irony, as well as to jokes analyses. According to Norrick, Giora's account is comparable with that of GVTH (see section 2.2.4.3, or Norrick 2002: 1337), and both these theories offer quite accurate means of describing irony, jokes and puns. However, the weakness of Giora's theory is that she analyses joke texts, and not joke performances, as Norrick points out:

> Although built around a discourse theory, Giora's treatment of jokes reduces them to independent texts, rather than treating them as elements of conversational interaction. As currently formulated, her theory does not integrate facial expressions, gestures, props, imitations, and other non-discourse behaviour (…). Again, the prosody and timing of the oral joke performance do not enter into these theoretical considerations. Moreover, (…) Giora's discourse theory remains inexplicit and untested in many particulars. (…) By making relevance central, the theory builds in all the imprecision of that concept as well. (Norrick 2002: 1338)

Thus, it becomes apparent that Giora's theory of humour suffers from a number of weaknesses pertaining to her joke analysis. Nonetheless, her model is well-devised and widely applicable, which can be exemplified by Giora's (2011) recent psycholinguistic experiments which deal with the notion of irony in context-oriented environment. Specifically, she (2011) conducted a series of tests to measure whether it is possible for the anticipated irony to be processed in an easier manner that the unexpected ironical discourse. Certainly, the intuitive view would be to assume that where we are somehow prompted about the upcoming irony, we will perceive it faster and without any reference to other non-ironical sense. The results, interestingly, prove the complete opposite. Giora (2011) concludes that in reality it does not matter if the irony is anticipated or not, its comprehension is not in any way aided or made easier or faster. To be precise, ironical understanding rests on the fact that we still first go to the most salient meaning, which later on is retained while we finally resort to the ironical sense. Giora's findings support her salience hypothesis in the processing of humorous discourse. In addition to that, Giora (2011) also proves that there is not need to distinguish

between figurative or literal meaning in theoretical paradigms, as the process of comprehension is predetermined by salience in the following form: in an anticipatory context for irony, its interpretation is not immediate, first we construct incongruous salience-oriented renderings at the level of a sentence, and then we retain these, no matter if they are literal or figurative, and on their basis we formulate compatible and non-salient renderings, irrespective of the fact that they might be literal or metaphorical, which does not have any bearing here.

There has been recently a great amount of feedback received on pragmatic theories of irony. One of such critiques may well be provided by Mizzau (1984 after Gibbs and Colston) who affirms that the sheer context for irony will prime the ironical interpretation in a direct manner, so that it is not essential to access the literal, or non-ironic, meaning in irony first, in order to comprehend the ironical sense. Moreover, Mizzau (1984) distinguishes the following three interpretative paths for irony: 1 – we access the ironical meaning first, 2 – we access the literal, i.e. non-ironic, meaning first, and finally 3 – the simultaneous interpretation, with both literal and ironic meanings accessed at the same time.

On the other hand, Attardo (2000) criticises relevance theoretic framework on irony due to the fact that it is formulated around the one-stage model of irony with the simultaneous processing of both literal as well as ironical senses. In his opinion, such propositions cannot differentiate between, for instance, an ill-formed utterance in terms of its semantics, and a newly-formed sentences which exemplifies metaphor, irony or any other indirect figure of speech. Specifically, Attardo believes in the technique for irony's interpretation which is referred to as "fail-then-recovery" strategy. This basically means that when faced with an ironical remark we arrive at a literal, non-ironic meaning initially, which fails to bring any meaningful rendering within a particular context, hence we resort to a search for another meaning, so as to recover the interpretation[50]. What is more, Attardo (2000) advocates his own, pragmatic theory of irony, which will certainly operate as a two-stage model of interpretation. Within his framework, it is assumed that the utterance will be considered ironic if it is: a) inappropriate contextually, b) relevant, though inappropriate in a context, c) created by the speaker intentionally and with the speaker being fully aware that his remark is inappropriate in the context mentioned, d) necessary for the hearer/audience/receiver of humour to realise the three previous prerequisites. There is also one more theoretical option, in case when the hearer/audience/recipient presumes

50 Incidentally, Attardo's "fail-then-recovery" take on irony happens to be compatible with Giora's salience hypothesis (see earlier in the section).

that the ironical utterance has not been produced on purpose. Then the above points c & d do not apply, as simple as that. For Attardo, relevance and appropriateness do not have to be codependent, as relevance is truth-insensitive, whereas appropriateness is truth-sensitive. However, he does notice that both usually appear together. Interestingly, Attardo advocates the view that appropriateness is explicitly context-biased, hence his theory of irony, which may be viewed as an appropriateness theory, is two-stage, yet without any specific order of rendering meaning, thought Attardo is in favour of Giora's proposal that sense data processing might be conducted in order of salience (Attardo 2000). Also, in view of his appropriateness theory, Attardo presupposes that irony exhibits a pragmatic function, i.e. is the speaker wants to be inappropriate in communication, e.g. to achieve humorous results, they will have a purpose to it, and this higher purpose may be realised via the Principle of Perlocutionary Cooperation in discourse management (Attardo 1997, Attardo 2000 & 2003).

Another set of pragmatic theories of humour is oriented around incongruity and/or its resolution. One of the more interesting perspectives here is presented by Goatly (1994) who deals with the so-called genre-oriented way of construing relevance[51]. Specifically, Goatly follows the relevance-theoretic background for his humour interpretation, in that he describes a humorous utterance's rendering in terms of efficiency processing of information in order to achieve maximum contextual effects. So both the speaker and the hearer will behave in the same manner as if they were trying to be relevant in discourse, with the slight exception that the speaker will intentionally introduce into his joking remarks the so-called "cognitive dissonance", i.e. some incongruity or incompatibility. The hearer's reaction to this is the surprise and the need to re-evaluate the original interpretation, which is performed with recourse to encyclopaedic knowledge on the part of the hearer. Hence, the hearer is enlightened as to the fact that his initial rendering of discourse has been misleading and that he has been led up

51 Here is the citation from Goatly (1994: 15) which explains his interest in genre-based relevance theory. Namely, Goatly states that: "(…) many uses of language do not have the exchange of information as their primary purpose and that different types of genres of communicative acts demand different ways of computing relevance involving different degrees of processing effort and different amounts of time taken in the process." This is a direct comment on Grice's cooperative principle which advocated discourse as exactly that, i.e. data exchange between participants in any conversation. In a similar manner, Giora (1997) as well as Vicente (1992) notice that metaphors which are typically associated with poetry can be found at one extreme of the continuum, while the literal, or salient, metaphors used in interaction will be found at the other end of the spectrum.

the garden path (hence the garden path sentences), all this combined with the delightful surprise of the incongruity and its resolution bring about the comic (Galinanes 2000, Goatly 1994). Hence, humour can be said to be based on the perception and resolution of the comic, following Goatly's comment that humour might be defined as a kind of discourse which inherently requires, for maximum of contextual effects, some processing amount of effort which is not minimum, as in a normal relevance theoretic paradigm, but which is however limited, otherwise the humour would not sustain (Goatly 1994)[52].

Another interesting relevance-theoretic slant on humour approach is provided by Jim and Wang (2012) who analyse verbal humour in talk shows by Joe Wong. They attempt to explain how come humorous effects appear in communication, for which the precondition will be the mutual cognitive environment of the speaker and the hearer/or the audience as the case might be here. Jim and Wang, advocating human communication as an ostensive-inferential process, believe that a speaker must communicate a stimulus which is obvious for both the speaker and their audience, which on the other hand is to make sense of such a stimulus. Additionally, resting on Blakemore's assumption that "(…) successful communication is achieved only if the actual context matches the one envisaged by the speaker" (Blakemore 1987: 28), Jim and Wang come up with the notion of the mutual cognitive environment, also following Sperber and Wilson's definitions of context. Specifically, the first one being their early work definition which runs as follows: "a context is a psychological construct, a subset of a hearer's assumptions about the world" (Sperber and Wilson 1987: 698), and their second theorem presumes that "any shared cognitive environment in which it is manifest which people share it" (Sperber and Wilson 2001). Drawing on the two perspectives, Jim and Wang talk about the mutual cognitive environment as a prerequisite for the realisation of the speaker's verbal humorous comment (Jin and Wang 2012). Further, Jim and Wang also discuss the processing of information pertaining to relevance theory[53]. According to them,

52 In a similar vein, Galinanes (2000) discovers that humorous novels are distinguished by a more restricted amount of processing effort (in order to apprehend and delight the humour present) on the part of the hearer, or rather reader in this case, in the form of a strong implicature introduced by a novel's author. Compared to poetic metaphors, we experience the complete reverse of the situation, for in poetry, meaning as communicated via metaphors is implicated in a weak manner so as to encourage the hearer/reader to search through his wide-ranging pragmatic context for interpretation.

53 Jim and Wang present their theory of verbal humour with direct reference to Sperber and Wilson's principles of relevant communication, i.e. cognitive principle of relevance: "Human

the gap between the maximal relevance expectations on the part of the hearer/audience, and the optimal relevance on the part of the speaker is formed, such gap being responsible for humour which makes the hearer/audience delighted (Jin and Wang 2012). This gap ensures that the hearer/audience directs more of their attention towards processing of the verbal input to resolve the incongruity in the input, which helps to attain comedy on the part of the hearer/audience (Jin and Wang 2012, after Huang 2007[54]).

Yet another pragmatic framework that appears to be relevant for humour studies in terms of it being based on relevance theory is Yus's approach. He is of an opinion that comic discourse does not really violate maxims in terms of RT merely, but it rather ought to be explained as a relevance-theoretic interpretation path, with some manifest assumptions on the part of the speaker who intends to create humour (Yus 2003: 1301). Also, the speaker's assumptions may be realised in an explicit or implicit manner. Quoting after Yus:

> The humorous intention focuses on the context that is built up in the processing of the (eventually correct) covert interpretation against the already processed (accessible) interpretation of the initial part of the text (Yus 2003: 1309).

What Yus proposes here is that we need to resolve some incongruity present in the humorous discourse, via trying to uncover the general relevant meaning of the whole discourse, including in it the hearer's search for relevance where they are led up the garden path when they select a particular kind of rendering, which brings about humour. In addition to that, Yus speaks of three elements that might explain the appearance of humour, i.e. the resolution of incompatible on-line renderings, the fact that the hearer finally realises they have been led up the garden path by the speaker (which Yus names pseudo-resolution, as it does not resolve the incompatibility on the part of the hearer, and if anything it adds to the already exisiting incongruity), and the final element being the interactive relationship between the hearer's context together with the humorous discourse. Yus's theory of humour then needs to be similar to the ostensive communications

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cognition tends to be geared to maximization of relevance", and the communicative principle of relevance, i.e. "Every utterance (or every act of ostensive communication) communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance." (Sperber and Wilson 1987)

54 According to Huang (2007), relevance theory stresses two factors in communications: the first one constitutes the cognitive effects of discourse in the form of contextual effects which are entrenched within a cognitive system, and the second one is the processing effort which the same cognitive system is to expend so as to yield a satisfactory rendering of any input being processed (Huang 2007: 183). It is to the latter that Jim and Wang also relate in their version of relevance theory as applied to humour.

where the hearer aims at finding out the speaker's intentions and thus interprets meaning required in a particular situation. In this way, Yus describes humour as an incongruity resolution process in which the humorist predicts the relevance-theoretic operations in the mind of the speaker, who on the other hand must find humour as an interaction between the speaker's intentions as well as the context (Yus 2003 & 2012). Similarly, Piskorska (2012) follows into Yus's footsteps in that she too thinks of humour as a mechanism which may be arrived at via implicature or explicatures and accessing context in terms of setting up a common ground with the hearer/audience who experiences a joke. However, Piskorska goes slightly further in that she introduces her won propositional attitude assignment which basically assumes that the hearer/audience must assign the correct propositional rendering to each assumption in a humorous discourse. Specifically, it is all about recognising the intentions of the person who makes a joking remark, and finding out whether the intentions introduce a realistic or rather a comic backdrop to discourse. In his more recent work, Yus (2013) proceeds to the distinction between two broader kinds of jokes, i.e. the jokes by means of which the speaker manipulates the audience's interpretation path, and the ones whose origin of humour is centred around the popular sociocultural stereotypes, which are either reinforced or invalidated. Furthermore, Yus concludes his observations on humour in jokes in the remark that the comic is decoded in the process of mutual parallel adjustment of interpretation, which assumes an explicit reading, its implicated reading and the rendering which becomes clear thanks to context accessing. These conclusive statements again are fairly relevant in any humour research, for my part, therefore I shall try to implement their use in my analyses of the comic.

Another perspective on irony is presented by Rodriguez Rosique (2013) who advocates the approach to irony as a "transgression of quality" which bears an impact on what is uttered or inferred from an utterance. She is of an opinion that irony acts like a "shockwave" in a highly productive manner, influencing different levels of discourse. It can impact on, for instance, a spoken remark, upon the implications stemming from an utterance, or any other discourse piece, and even some pragmatic strategies. Thus, Rodriguez Rosique presents irony theory as a part of what we know as incongruity theories of humour, with a specific recourse to discourse and pragmatics in general.

On the other hand, Dynel (2011, & 2012 in Wałaszewska and Piskorska) advocates the alternative theory of humour, as opposed to RT paradigm. In a similar vein to Yus, she is fond of incongruity resolution as a basis for humour explanation. Also she favours the approach to jokes and humour specifically which would describe the cognitive mechanism which triggers humour analysis

and is also responsible for joke taxonomy which would be formulated on the basis of incongruity resolution. In Dynel's view, humorous jokes can be rendered via the so-called "cognitive rule" that resolves the incompatibility within a joke's context through making it congruent with the initial, garden-path part of the joke in question (Dynel 2009 & 2011).

Isao Higashimori (2008) also advocates humour interpretation by means of RT. He agrees in pretty much the same way as Yus or Jim and Wang that joke data processing is less economical than processing ordinary discourse, in that there is more cognitive effort involved in rendering of jokes than in the usual relevance search of communication, at the expense of an increase in humour and comic effects. The increase in the processing effort is due to the fact that jokes, for instance, or any other instance of the comic, require the interpretation of more than one meaning in their message. The conclusions that Higashimori draws from the above are as follows: 1 – the discrepancy between two senses[55] at which we arrive while interpreting humour brings about laughter, 2 – humour may also be resultant from strange or out of the ordinary reference assigned for a concept in a joke. Based on these assumptions, Higashimori provides a classification of implicature-based jokes, which looks as follows:

type 1: humour originates from 2 contradictory implicatures
type 2: humour stems from an absurd assumption
type 3: humour stems from an absurd implicature
type 4: humour originates from 2 contradictory assumptions
type 5: humour centres around parallel processing
type 6: humour centres around a rhetorical question
(Higashimori 2008)

In addition to that, Higashimori (2008) distinguishes the definition joke types, where the comic is resultant from the definitional versus non-definitional rendering of a word, metalinguistic jokes, where humour comes from the difference between the actual world and the same linguistic form or analysis, stereotype-based jokes where as the name suggest the humour results from a

55 Higashimori (2008 on-line) mentions the fact that according to RT the encoded message, which any discourse piece can become, even a joke taken as a whole, is to be decoded by means of relevance search. However, there is also the so-called narrowing, i.e. the use of a concept which is more specific than the usual encoded message, or the reversed so-called loosening process, i.e. extending the use which is fairly specific. These two phenomena can also be incorporate into humour, and hence the increase in the processing effort on the part of the hearer when searching for relevance.

culturally/contextually well-known stereotypes, and finally resemblance type jokes, in which the resemblance can be associated with syntactic/lexical form, sound or propositional content (Higashimori 2008). All these classifications prove useful when trying to study humour. Nonetheless, Higashimori does not stop here. HE goes a step further and generalises about the semantics of humour within jokes, as rendered with the aid of RT. Here is the list of his conclusions: certain jokes will invalidate the first accessible meaning in favour of a more unlikely meaning, certain jokes will generate absurd or nonsensical meanings, certain jokes will involve the simultaneous access to two different meanings without the necessity to get rid of one of these, and finally, certain jokes will construct two interpretations, out of which one will necessarily be dropped (Higashimori 2008).

A different view is presented by Solska (2012 in Wałaszewska and Piskorska) who does not follow suit in her relevance-theoretic interpretation of humour. On the contrary, Solska claims that interpreting puns has nothing to do with incongruity resolution or disambiguation, for how can this be true, if the person producing a pun purposefully highlights two converging renderings of one and the same message.

A slightly more complex perspective on irony is presented by Simpson (2011) who appreciates various diverging models of irony and does not specifically point to one which could rule over the others. Simpson basically advocates intersection of varying theories which all have something interesting to say. In particular, he claims that a multidimensional, eclectic perspective on irony is much better as it brings researchers and issues connected with irony closer together. Also, based on real instances of irony, Simpson distinguishes five common categories of irony which apply to its numerous instances: oppositional irony (Gricean irony), echoic irony, conferred irony, dramatic irony as well as ironic belief. Specifically, Simpson (2011) advocates more interdisciplinary research on irony rather than binary accounts of the phenomenon in question. It is such accounts that will encompass this complex feature of language with all its grey areas, which is a conclusion that might as well be applied to all humour research nowadays.

An interesting perspective is displayed by Palinkas (2014) who conducts a comparative study in relation to both metaphor and irony, with the help of CIT. Apart from the fact that both phenomena can be tackled via CIT, which appears to be the only similarity between the two, Palinkas (2014) concludes his analysis with a set of numerous contrasting remarks distinguishing metaphor from irony, and here are the observations he puts forward:

metaphor	irony
- mapping between 2 mental constructs	- mapping between 3 input spaces
- concerned with domains	- concerned with mental spaces
- entrenched knowledge	- fleeting conceptualisations
- grounded in bodily experience with	- no entrenched conceptualisations but
- the physical and cultural world	rather on-the-fly (less motivated) conceptualisations
- maps objection and relationships between them in the blend	- maps complex scenarios
- projects to a single element in the blend	- projects to different elements in the blend (no fusion here!)
- one of the inputs underlies the topology	- both inputs organise the structure of the blend
- mapping from 1 input to 2	- mapping to the blended space
- only consistent elements are blended	- contradictory elements can be blended

What becomes apparent is the fact that CIT is a tool with which to analyse metaphor and irony, but the two phenomena in question clearly presuppose different cognitive entities and different patterns for their comprehension. All in all, the irony can be studied by means of blending, which proves the point that CIT is capable of being used as a humour theory.

Another pragmatic study of irony which is worth mentioning with recourse to humour theories is the echoic theory by Wilson (2014). Who notices the following features of irony in her model: 1- ironical attitude must be expressed, i.e. the more obvious the echoic statement, the more likely the irony is to be realised; 2- irony requires a high degree of mind reading on the part of the hearer, which is certainly more than in the context of literal utterances; 3- there is the so-called normative bias in irony, i.e. people use irony when they want to complain or criticise something that does not meet their norm standard; and the last one, i.e. 4- the ironical tone of voice: e.g. a flat or deadpan intonation, lower pitch of voice, slower pace of speech as well as the greater emphasis on the words than if compared with the literal statements. The above observations are based on the

relevance-theoretic account of irony, and confirmed by some psycholinguistic experiments that Wilson quotes, which enhances the more modern approach to humour. In a similar vein, one can say that Wilson aims for a more holistic attitude to irony studies, which again runs along with the more contemporary manner of humour research. Just like Chiaro and Norrick (2009) advocate in their recent work, humour ought to be studied in interaction, with recourse to real examples rather than the ones that are artificially created for theoretical reasons. Chiaro and Norrick also call for interdisciplinary perspective on humour, which can actually help the future progress and evolution in the area. Especially taking into account such extra-linguistic information as gestures, posture or prosody, etc. In addition to that, humour is also perceived to play important pragmatic roles when interactive. A case in point might be Gerhardt's study of the comic in the reception of media (Gerhardt 2009) where it is humour that creates group identity and interlinks in a multi-modal way with the funniness presented on the TV screen, for instance. A crucial account of the so-called failed humour is also an example of how funniness is associated closely with context and interaction between people who communicate. In particular, Priego-Valvertle (2009) presents his analysis of double voicing approach in humour studies, following Bakhtin, where humour presupposes speaking in a voice which is separate from one's own. Hence, humorous statements relate to two separate enunciations, the first one being exactly what one says, the second one being what one observes. The latter one signals the switch to comic mode of communication, and humour can frequently be unsuccessful here when a person fails to recognise the latter voice, or the variations between two voices. All this is related to the fact that humour is predominantly based on the shared knowledge between the people who communicate. Also humour can fail spectacularly when some salient piece of information is absent from one of the participants in an interaction. Furthermore, the fact that humour is socially and pragmatically significant is the experimental study of reactions to unexpected funniness. Bell (2009) proves the point by showing that a typical response to conversational humour which is of a disruptive nature in an interaction, due to the behavioural expectations on the part of the recipients of it, is usually rudeness or event aggression. Another negative effect of humour which is unexpected due to culture differences is the miscommunication or misunderstanding between spouses of different nationalities who try to be funny inter-culturally. As Chiaro (2009) shows, humour can be the source of marital difficulties, unless the spouses are prepared to work at it and learn to appreciate the other half's sense of humour, in which case the comic can act as a bonding element and enhance smooth interaction between married bilingual couples. Similar conclusions are arrived at by Ervin-Tripp and Lambert (2009)

who studied friends (both female and male groups) sharing embarrassing and funny moments with each other. It turns out that women when self-disclosing strike a chord and build their friendship around such humorous moments which provoke laughter and build camaraderie between them. As for men, they also take part in humorous troubles talk but their remarks are not to reveal ridiculous and embarrassing behaviour on their part, but they are to be transformed into exaggerated witty and entertaining tales which turn the negative feelings into the positive outcome, which in turn provokes laughter in men and also builds male friendship[56]. All in all, it seems that humour is crucial when we consider it as a pragmatic element present in our linguistic interactions, either boosting them and simplifying matters, if preconditions of mutual understanding and effort are made, or functioning as a hindrance in communication.

I would like to end this section of pragmatic approaches to humour with the empirical data collated while conducting experiments on verbal irony processing. Specifically, the experiments have had the goal of comparing how general humour as well as the notion of contrast correlate in studies of irony, which itself relies on contrast. Calmus and Caillies (2014) started with their view on irony as a phenomenon relying on incongruity between the situational context and the ironic statement. According to Calmus and Caillies (2014) the semantics of irony is non-existent, to the extent that an ironic utterance and its non-ironic version are indistinguishable, unless we introduce context into it. Following this set of hypotheses, Calmus and Caillies conducted two experiments: the first one was to do with rating ironic remarks and their literal equivalents, the second one measuring the contrast between humorous ironic statements and their non-ironic literal counterparts. The former experiment proves that ironic remarks were marked as more contrasting than their literal versions[57], whereas the latter one pointed to the non-linear relation between contrast as well as humour. Namely, humour is based around moderate contrast only, so when we have too much contrast in a piece of discourse, or too little (appearing as if there were almost no contrast at all), there will be no irony, or humour perceived by the

56 What is interesting is that Ervin-Tripp and Lambert (2009) also prove that self-disclosing comedy depends strongly on friendship, which may be replicated by the analogue of private self-disclosing humour on stage. I shall try to incorporate their findings in my own analysis of the comic in chapter 3.

57 This conclusive evidence from the experiment proves the empirical data from Colston and O'Brien (2000) who also found out that verbal irony uses the possible contrast between spoken utterances and the context in which they are produced.

hearers/audience/receivers of the comic. Summing up the practical tests, Calmus and Caillies (2014) conclude that irony is a technique for humour production, but only in the case when humour is centered around gentle ironical contrast between what is uttered and the utterance's context. In my opinion, these findings can have an impact on humour studies in general, however, it is necessary to conduct more experiments in this area to prove if such conclusive remarks would be true for all humour, or which types of it, if not all.

The above mentioned paradigms are particularly interesting, hence I shall attempt to incorporate such conclusions into my own analyses of the visual humour, in order to see if the same applies there. In particular, I would like to say that the more current pragmatic approaches to humour are of particular interest to me, since they try to instigate collaboration between different theories in order to explain humour, and they also base their research on empirical data that brings about concrete proof in relation to humour studies. Also, I would like to state that relevance-theoretic orientation in humour studies encounter a number of problems. The first one to mention is the fact that it is predominantly applied to jokes or irony. This seriously limits the scope of research and does not provide a full enough insight into humour, therefore I would recommend more elaboration on the data of pragmatic research (Goatly 2012, Aarons 2012, Cummings 2005, Attardo 1994). Secondly, the comedy as envisaged by pragmatic accounts is thought to arise out of the dichotomy or incongruity of opposing scripts, renderings or meanings that spring to mind from the discourse in question. Whether such a dichotomy does prove reasonable or not in relation to all humour types, as the case may well be, there is still an open question of how many implications we do need to draw to achieve comic effects and interpretation of humorous discourse, and what kind of implications these might be, too (Goatly 2012: 256). Further, the idea of context is also not well incorporated into RT or other pragmatic theories as applied to humour, which does seem to pose the gravest criticism here. As Goatly (2012) rightly observes, without context, RT is just some fuzzy perspective which applies to humour. For, if any discourse and communication is inferential and requires recognition of intentions, we should say that humour analysed by means of RT should also make use of this premise, otherwise we would be forced to treat humour as context-independent and this is rather a mission impossible (Attardo 1994, Cummings 2005). What is promising, though, is the fact that pragmatics centres around the participants of a discourse scene, i.e. the speaker and the hearer, or the variations of these such as the audience, the receivers or simply the viewers of a communicative scenario. And this is precisely that Turner (2014 appendix & 2015) advocates as an implied notion in CIT. For my part, nonetheless, the participants of a humorous discourse,

as well as the broadly understood notion of context that they bring with themselves to any communicative situation, ought to be added to CIT as an explicit element in its search for humorous meaning, which I shall focus on in chapter 3.

2.3.4.1. An illustration of pragmatic theories of humour

Although the pragmatic versions of humour theories, as advocated by different scholars, do differ to some extent, it can be appreciated that as a way of explaining humour these theories will refer to the relevance notion of communication and its violation. In this light, I would like us to analyse the following example of a humorous text: "Doctor, doctor! I've only got 59 seconds to live." "Just wait a minute, please." (Jarsz 2008: 239). If we analyse the relevance of the first statement, it becomes apparent that the most appropriate response to such an utterance would be the one that assures the immediate help. What we are presented with is totally irrelevant in an ideal patient-doctor environment. However, it may become relevant only if we take into account the fact the the doctor might not be particularly bothered by the patient's life, which is possible. However we want to look at it, the clash between what we expect as relevant and what is produced flouts the maxims of a good communication, the duality of perspectives adding to humour.

2.4. Closing remarks

This chapter started with a discussion on the notion of humour. Having demonstrated that the term itself is far from being well defined, an attempt was made at showing how and why various definitions of *humour* appear to be misleading, the conclusion being that humour is difficult to define in a systematic manner. It seems then that it is appropriate to offer more *humour* definitions of a greater magnitude that will serve as a guidance for future research, and will also form a selection of principles to evaluate critically. This, in turn, and eventually, ought to aid the development of a more compact, essential *humour* definition.

The conceptual term of *humour* has been compared with its approximate synonyms, such as *laughter* or *amusement*, which is to prove the redundant circularity still present in humour defining process.

Also, some of the most important theories of humour, that play a crucial role within humour studies in general, have been discussed. Not only have I investigated the linguistic hypotheses relating to humour, but I have also referred to psychological and philosophical propositions, so that our subsequent humour presentation is not restricted to one perspective only. These theories have been compared and contrasted and their critical issues have been raised. Simultaneously, I have shown that there are elements about each theory, which are

important to general humour research, though in doing so I have arrived at a somewhat pessimistic conclusion that none of the existing hypothesis is as yet ready to be labelled a general theory of humour. All the proposals are to be advanced and further examined for any future progress. However, perhaps such a multi-modal attitude to humour studies would do it good, especially when it comes to comparing and contrasting theories and models. In particular, such an interdisciplinary perspective on comedy might result in further progress and it might enable researchers a more thorough insight into the potential problems associated with the notion of humour and the search for theories which explain it. I would even risk saying that humour research ought to rely on a multitude of theories and approaches which perhaps complement one another, and to a certain degree it might be of benefit in the long run, simply because there might not be one and only paradigm which explains the origin of humour exclusively, and what we might need instead is a set of criss-crossing perspectives which altogether accommodate the human use of the comic, from distinct perspectives and including extra-linguistic information, such as gesture, facial expressions or body language, to name just a few. This would certainly run parallel with the recent approaches to language and cognition.

In chapter 3 I shall present my own view on the matter of humour. Despite the fact that what shall be presented might be just another project in the catalogue of already existing theses, my approach, based on CIT as enriched by pragmatic notion of the speaker and hearer, context-dependency and interdisciplinary perspective, is novel because it potentially establishes the general foundations of humour on the basis of its multidimensionality.

Chapter 3: The conceptual integration analysis of the British comedy productions

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, British humour will be analysed in terms of mental spaces and conceptual integration theory, the principles of which are discussed in chapter 1. To achieve this, the following comedy titles have been selected: *the Best of Ronnie Barker, Carry On, The Office and Extras*. For each comedy production, a brief description of its background will be provided, though their full appreciation will require the reader to experience each production in the medium original intended. A specification of how the involved mental spaces function and a diagram which graphically displays the blending processes forming the basis of humour will be available, as graphs, directly after each example. The comic effects should become more accessible on the description and explanation of CIT. Following the analysis, a number of outcome assumptions will be discussed, allowing for the conclusion that CIT is capable of expanding our understanding of humour, and hence it ought to be more widely recognised as one of the potential contemporary theories of humour.

3.2. Humour Analysis

The humour analysis below introduces the reader to particular elements of CIT through a step-by-step approach, starting from fairly simple characteristics (sections 3.2.1. through to 3.2.3.), progressing further into the highly complicated and currently developed features of blending (section 3.2.4.), such as vital relations or (de)compression. Afterwards, I shall submit concluding remarks (section 3.3.), referring to the analysed material in relation to blending. Consequently, a diagram shall be put forward in preparation for future general humour studies. Such a diagram can be scrutinised further by research in respect of other possible media, e.g. visual humour, gestures or purely verbal puns, irrespective of its form or kind.

3.2.1. The Best of Ronnie Barker

Lets begin with the Access and Identification principles of blending within Ronnie Barker's comedy moments.

The first example depicts the situation where a man enters a shop to buy fork handles. He communicates his wish to the sales assistant, however, the

pronunciation of 'fork handles' makes the item in question such that the seller interprets it as 'four candles'. The London dialect pronunciation of the purchaser, who drops the sound 'h' regularly, means that he joins the two words together into a smooth four candles, which the assistant fetches for him from the shelf. The comedy is based on the pun that involves using the cognitive integration perspective, for the purpose of which shall be implemented the Access and Identification Principle, thus preparing the grounds for the mental spaces and their correspondences. Firstly, there needs to be a distinction made between two input spaces and a generic space. The latter introduces general elements and the roles of the whole scene, i.e. people, activities, place and tools, which are then realised by input spaces 1 and 2. Hence, input space 1 will be a mental space of the ideal shopping situation with elements such as: an ideal shop assistant, an ideal customer with perfect pronunciation, and the expression used in trading between them, i.e. 'fork handles', together with common conversation and interaction; whereas input space 2 will involve the mental space of the film, incorporating the shop assistant, the buyer who speaks incorporating slang expressions, amongst which there is 'four candles'. The corresponding elements of input space 1 and 2 are matched in accordance with Identification Principle stating that for a description of *a* (here input space 1), we may use *b*'s description. Also, the Access Principle is of importance. It entails that such a description of *a* will be joined with *b*, so that access is given to the topological relationship between *a* and *b*. In the light of the above, it is possible to impose the notion of an ideal shop assistant onto the seller from the film scene. Similarly, we superimpose an ideal buyer onto the London customer of the series. Lastly, the ideal pronunciation of *fork handles* is mapped onto its dialect equivalent *four candles*. Additionally, we might distinguish one final element, i.e. (mis)communication during the act of shopping. The ideal space of commerce will have perfect communication, while input space 2 will have its equivalent, i.e. miscommunication. Although the humour of the scene analysed above is centred on mispronunciation, in the sense that it is mispronunciation that remains the centre of the joke moment, the context of the scene is also important. The extent to which the setting, characters and visual elements are added to the blend, and will therefore add to the humour, will vary from person to person. It is an individual who is presented with the film fragment in question that might choose to include into the blend their own associations which are brought about by different scene elements, the effect of which can only stress the incongruity of what is expected in an ideal shopping situation in comparison with the film context.

Diagram 1. Four candles



Summing up, the above mentioned correspondences from input spaces 1 and 2 are joined into topological mappings, owing to Access and Identification, and further projected onto the blend. Such projections aid our explanation of humour within the blended space, which arises due to the incongruity of the blend's novel correspondences. To be more specific, all the relations of the blend are incongruous, but central to the understanding of the comic is what is present in input space 1, i.e. fork handles and what is mapped onto it from the input space 2, i.e. four candles. Due to the mispronunciation by the customer, who drops the letter *h* from the word handles, and shifts the accent, the sound *k* moves from the first to the second word. In this way, we arrive at the blend where fork handles and four candles are merged as one correspondence. Hence, when we run the blend, we encounter a degree of ambiguity, which justifies the humour. Specifically, the incongruity which resides in the blend is resultant from the cognitive notion of a projection that we perform in order to make sense of the comedy. This also means that the incongruity has been resolved and acknowledged. Diagram 1 shows how the blending of this comedy moment is performed graphically with the aid of a conceptual integration network (i.e. the diagram's type name in CIT). It is also vital to observe that the above scene fits into the idea of a shared topology network, where all the spaces present share the same correspondences. Namely, the projections from the generic space and from the inputs share mappings. There are, however, two different organising frames belonging to input space 1 and 2 respectively. The blend, on the other hand, also possesses its own emergent structure. All this becomes easily accessible from the diagram, and such a cognitive integration network is referred to as double scope shared topology network.

One important point must be made before we go any deeper into the analysis. Whereas the first analysis centred on the verbal humour stemming from the words used by the buyer, on a micro level, the second example will zoom out of the verbal aspect and give us a broader picture of humour, such zooming in and out being characteristic of conceptual integration, as is its application. The zooming in and out of the comic scene is clearly performed by a necessary humour receiver, and I presume the notion of such must be incorporated into all further analyses that I perform. Without the person who receives and processes comedy, bringing with themselves all their context and knowledge, no humour theory can exist. Therefore, whenever I discuss humour in later instantiations, and I talk about zooming in or out, and the meanings and blending involved, I always presume the pragmatic notion of a humour receiver as well as the humour creator (here it is the directors of sketches or films analysed) there, which I shall return to at the end of the chapter in conclusive remarks.

What we can see in the case of the above example is the formation of mappings on the basis of the Access and Identity Principle as well as their projection into the blend, together with the process of running the blend, i.e. accessing the information from mental spaces and topologies. A similar process takes place in another scene from a Ronnie Barker show. This time it is the Porridge comedy that provides the second example for analysis.

The Porridge fragment shows Ronnie, a criminal in prison, who is challenged to solve a crime mystery occurring within the jail. The whole scene concentrates upon the fact that Ronnie liberates tinned fruit from the kitchen (with the help of his cell mate) and later intends to consume them in his cell, a practice that is forbidden. More specifically Ronnie has discovered that someone has deprived him of his precious treasure, i.e. the tinned fruit, and he has decided to unmask the villain. The humour of this situation can also be analysed in terms of cognitive integration. Firstly, there is a generic space with the following roles: institution, people, and activities, and we also have two input spaces: space 1 which is the mental space of a morally upstanding person, for instance a detective seeking the truth and justice; and space 2 with a criminal who demands justice, despite the fact that he has been thieving himself, in the first place. These two people are projected to the blended space as a mapping, i.e. as one and the same person, which happens in accordance with Identity Principle (description of *a* admits *b*'s description). The blend is then composed, completed and elaborated on, thus novel associations securing the emergent structure of the blend, as well as the formation of the incongruity of such relations, via the nature of mappings. The incompatibility of such blended elements, together with the two superimposed spheres that are incongruous, results in the comic effect. Yet, how do we arrive at the emergent structure of the blend? Initially, we compose the topological elements projected into the blended space, so we juxtapose a morally sound character with Ronnie the villain detective. Following that, we complete such correspondences by adding relevant pieces of information from the input spaces concerned. For instance, the notion of an ideal law abiding citizen carries with itself the features of personality such as honesty, a law-abiding nature, truthfulness etc. These will be automatically brought into the blend and superimposed on Ronnie the villain detective's opportunism, deceitfulness or unscrupulous behaviour, the result of such a juxtaposition being the clash. Similarly, it is possible to superimpose the idea of the honesty from input space 1 onto the moral code of the input space 2. This will also result in a clash, since honesty from mental space 1 cannot be matched by the moral code of the criminal in prison. The latter, although called the moral code, is really a set of rules to be used among thieves for sustaining of their own position. Further, this moral code does not disallow crimes altogether,

but simply sets a framework for its implementation. An illustration of this is when Ronnie steals mint polos off Ives after completing a discussion at the table with his inmates about the disgusting crime of thieving in prison. In addition to that, a further incompatibility in the blend stems from the topology between the object of crime in input 1, and the tin of pineapples in input 2. The relation is not necessarily funny in itself, however, it brings more opposition to the blend in the sense that the ideal space of a detective will include the object of a crime that carries with itself consequences. For instance, we can imagine that stealing millions from the national bank or depriving a reputed museum of its prominent paintings may constitute a valid object of a crime. Whereas if we think of a tin of pineapples that were apparently stolen from Ronnie, who himself stole them from the prison kitchen, it can hardly be called a serious object of a true crime. Vital to the structure of the blend is also the prison structure, where in the film the criminals presented are allowed to socialise forming Cowboy clubs or knitting associations. This concept clashes, indeed, with the perception of an ideal input space 1, as the criminals in a standard prison could be of a higher calibre, i.e. murderers or drug traffickers, etc., who would not pursue such activities as meeting in pastime groups, let alone knitting. These topological relations then add to the opposition of the blend, simultaneously reinforcing humour. Finally, the elaboration commences, which means that additional associations, which do not stem from the blend's novel relationships, are brought into the picture. A case in point might be the associative idea that Ronnie does require other criminals to obey a law and monitors their activities, while at the same time disregarding the law, which certainly adds to the comic. However, it is crucial to remember that different supplementary associations to humour, functioning on different levels, will be identified by different viewers in the blend via online meaning creation. This can be defined as a dynamic extension of the blend's contents. This occurs immediately after the blended relations have been established. Specifically, a conceptualiser is capable of juxtaposing the role model prison, which would originate from the moral space, and its rules, with the film prison. In particular, it is feasible to think of the former prison as a place where order and discipline are imposed on criminals who serve their punishment accordingly. Simultaneously, we perceive the latter mental space, where there is only a hierarchy of prisoners trying to make deals about everything and survive inside, while 'doing porridge'. In addition to that, such criminals are engaged in various free-time activities, such as knitting or discussion clubs. If we were to further run the blended space and merge the separate worlds into one, it would certainly provide us with more comedy. Such a simulation is not far from many humorous examples, where comedy is only reinforced via emergent structure of what has just been blended.

Diagram 2 shows the cognitive integration processes at work here, and also the double scope shared topology network, just as in the previous case.

Diagram 2. Tin Fruit



3.2.2. Carry On (up the Khyber)

Having shown how the Access and Identity Principles work, and how the emergent structure of the blend is developed and run as a whole, we can now consider humour, with a particular focus on optimality principles, involving: Integration, Web, Unpacking, Topology, Backward Projection and Metonymy Projection; all of which have been introduced in chapter 1. The principles will be defined with reference to what has become one of the legendary British comedies, namely the Carry On series. Unfortunately, it is only possible to focus on just a few episodes from one part of the serial, i.e. Carry On Up the Khyber, for the simple reason that the whole complete series comprises 34 films, and it would certainly be too elaborate a task to discuss the whole series within this paper. However, the humour of Carry On is of a particular flavour, and all the parts display similar techniques to arrive at the comic. The first Carry On moment is based on the words of a Scottish private who serves in what was then the Indian mountains, particularly in the region of the Khyber Pass, during Queen Victoria's reign, and who, due to the cold climate, decides to wear a pair of long Johns, disallowed among the Highlander regiment. When discovered, he attempts to defend his actions by uttering the words: 'Oh, how the wind rustles up in the passage'. These words bring about a whole new meaning to what could seem, at the first glance, an ordinary phrase.

To explain conceptual integration, we must relate to the generic space and two input spaces here: generic space which features these elements: place, people, particular area of space, and a natural phenomenon. In input space 1, we distinguish the real life space of India's passage between the mountains during the British reign therein, and input space 2 – the film space of a pass in the Scottish private's body, i.e. his back passage. The other elements include: the wind and its rustling which in both spaces is a natural phenomenon. The two spaces are brought together and superimposed by the principles of blending, and thus, they are transported into the blend to form relationships of incompatible nature, which causes humour. Diagram 3 shows how the elements of the two mental spaces collide. Namely, the composition and creation allow for the projection of the following mappings into the blend: the Khyber Pass and the body's arse. Here we must bear in mind the Cockney Rhyming slang denoting bottom, specifically 'Khyber'[58].

58 In Cockney rhyming slang 'Khyber pass' means arse, as it rhymes with the Cockney dialect for pass. It is often simply reduced to just Khyber, in the same way 'syrup of fig' - 'wig' is reduced to syrup.

Diagram 3. Khyber Pass



What happens next is the formation of new relations within the blend that clash with each other, the incompatibility being the basis for comedy; and, at the same time, good grounds for elaboration and emergent structure. Drawing on the correspondences holding in the blend, we might add to them more encyclopaedic knowledge and other background knowledge that the conceptualiser of humour in this case might have. A case in point may be the idea that the private's pass is as huge as a passage in the mountains, etc., therefore online semantic elements enhance the humour even further. The mappings form a tight web of counterpart relations that are traceable forwards and backwards from the blend to ensure a close-knit web of correspondences (i.e. Integration, Web, Unpacking, and Topology principles). Thus, the blend and the mental spaces form a meaningful composite structure of corresponding mappings that is manipulable enough (Integration, Web and Topology). Such a manipulation always sustains the initial topologies without effort on the part of a conceptualiser, and we can decompose the blend back to its inputs (from the pun of the Khyber Pass back to input space 1 where it stands for a region in India, and to input 2 where it refers to a bodily organ), and then again return to the blended relations without great effort (here we would have the reverse process, all such manipulation being referred to as Unpacking). Still more, the metonymic distance between elements within respective input spaces is shortened, so that the closely associated elements are projected as one and the same mapping (Metonymy Projection principle). A case in point is the metonymic relation between the name Khyber Pass itself that denotes a geographical region of India and also the part of the body, which are treated as one topology. There is no backward movement feasible once the blend's emergent structure has been fully elaborated (Backward Projection principle). Otherwise, the cognitive integration would not function as a composite explanatory procedure, and simultaneously, the humour would also be distorted.

The Optimality principles can also be analysed in relation to some other humorous parts of Carry On, which are of a purely linguistic nature. Namely, the situation presenting the British governor in India visiting the Indian Khazi, who is a British subordinate, may well serve as an appropriate illustration.

Initially, before the meeting of the Khazi and the governor takes place, there is a long series of greetings exchanged between the Khazi and the governor; the governor finalising the welcoming procedure with the expression that brings about the comic, i.e.: 'Up yours!'. It is vital to put this remark in the whole context of the greeting exchange, though. When attention is given to the preceding statements, it is apparent that the governor's responses are basically the shortened forms of what the Khazi is saying, so instead of repeating the whole utterance to return the greeting compliment, the governor simply echoes the ending part of each sentence.

However, in the last shortened version he uses, there is more to the meaning than merely the finishing of the statement. 'Up yours!' evokes the two input spaces, the first one being the communication channel ended in the grammatically correct, shortened version of the statement (input space 1); the second relating to an insult in the British culture (input space 2). The generic space encompasses such elements as: person A, person B, communication, speech acts. The other elements that one can enumerate within both input spaces are as follows: two language users, a speaker and a hearer, whose roles are exchanged with the flow of the discussion and who are engrossed in a conversation, exchange thoughts and utterances, are trying to be polite, and finish the conversation by means of some utterance. It is possible to bring these input spaces together into the blend. Thus, speaker 1 and 2 from input space 1 will be mapped onto the Khazi and the governor from input space 2. What is more, general conversation from input space 1 will be mapped onto the exchange of greetings between the Khazi and the governor from input space 2. It is also possible to map the function of the conversational exchange from input space 1, which is the exchange of information and greetings, with what becomes the insulting remark. And finally, 'Up yours!' from input space 1, which functions as the ending part of an ordinary conversation, will be mapped onto the insult from input space 2. Bearing all such correspondences in mind, it is possible to pay attention to the manner in which optimality principles work, as was observable in the previously described scene. Namely, all the mappings constitute a tight-knit network of correspondences, which can be traced forwards and backwards (Integration, Web, Unpacking and Topology). To be specific, the mapping of Khazi onto speaker/hearer 2 can be separated back into the following relations: Khazi of input space 2 and speaker/hearer of input space 1. The reverse procedure is also permitted. Moreover, the metonymic distance between elements within particular inputs is shortened, and hence such elements are projected as one mapping, for example Khazi and his 'face' (Metonymy Projection). All the mappings, then, are transferred onto the blend in accordance with creation, composition and elaboration. Once this is achieved, no backward movement from the blend is possible (Backward Projection), as this would distort the text coherence. The elaboration ensures that the online humorous reading of the blend's content is created via the incongruous relation as well as the additional connotations brought about on the part of the scene's conceptualiser (see Diagram 4). Thus, we might, for example, imagine how Khazi reacts to the politely wrapped-up insult thrown by the governor, and how they both start the intelligent discourse full of subtle remarks and innuendos. All these additional associations lead to the enhancement of the comedy, through online meaning creation.

Diagram 4. Up Yours



The optimality principles also hold in the dinner scene of Carry On. This time the whole dinner scene that takes place during a crucial battle will be

used, and not merely a single fragment of a scene, as before. Hence we are going to deal with a fairly complex network of mental spaces, which results in multiple diagrams for the scene, ranging from Diagram 5a to Diagram 5g (see below).

Initially, we have to distinguish the following generic spaces, as well as two input spheres. The generic space includes place, people, and activities. The first input space functions as the role model idea: a battle taking place on a suitable battleground, with a governor general overseeing its command from a suitable vantage point, or command post, one who later sets an example for his army by taking part in the fighting; soldiers fighting honourably and fiercely, so that they can save their priorities; fighting for country and honour; being proud of one's own country; trying to defend oneself and win (input space 1). The second input space presents a dinner event with all the family members or guests gathering around the table of the dining room, everyone eating and participating in a casual conversation, gentle music in the background (input space 2). All these cognitive spaces can be united into the blend according to optimality rules. Hence, first, the mental spaces acquire their closely connected correspondences that can be manipulated, and that form a tight web of relations later projected into the blend (i.e. Integration, Unpacking, Topology and Web, which are displayed in Diagram 5a). Secondly, metonymic distance is shortened (Metonymy Projection) where possible, and while the blend is composed, completed and elaborated on, no movement backwards is possible (Backward Projection), so as not to ruin the novel structure and meaning. Thus, everything is mapped onto the blend in the form of these correspondences: the role model soldier preparing for battle is mapped onto the movie dinnertime scene; the general who directs the fierce army is mapped onto the top host of the dining party – the governor who proceeds with dining and partying while his army are attempting to contain the attack. In addition to that, we might distinguish between the following relations: 1 - battling army as compared to the relaxed dining guests; 2 - bravery compared with fear; 3 - fighting and shooting compared with eating and drinking, joking, i.e. proceeding with dinner and conversation. Furthermore, there is one character, through which we perceive the difference between fighting and partying, namely Brother Belcher, a civilian bystander trapped in a war zone. He is the only person present at the film dinner party who appreciates the military consequences of the attack, so he functions as a direct connector for the two mental spaces, and also brings about comical effects. The incompatibility of the scenes united in the blend (see Diagram 5a) can only be appreciated as comic.

Diagram 5a. Dinnertime Battling



What is more, the blend's emergent structure also facilitates the incongruity and, in this very fashion, humour. Specifically, online meaning creation allows us to imagine, perhaps, that the movie's party will still continue with the dinner, and at some point will possibly decide to get up from the table and have a shooting match which is again treated as a game, after which they will get back to the tables and treat the incident as completely irrelevant. We might also imagine the brave Kaliban's army, who were fighting courageously but in the end lost the battle, as deeply frustrated. Having a nervous breakdown, because the British regiment has ignored them, they are taken to a psychiatric hospital, etc.

The complex blend is further enhanced by utterances that may be analysed in terms of cognitive integration networks of their own. The following statements made during the dinner party scene shall be given meticulous attention. We shall provide relevant quotations below, followed by a brief analysis and a relevant graph. At the end of this section a more complex diagram of the whole dinner party incident is presented.

Here Brother Belcher, a missionary, is portrayed as a person afraid of the noise, as he refers to it, emanating from a battle outside. However, the governor understands the noise with regard to the music played by the orchestra present at the party. The humour focuses on the word *noise* which functions as a connector for different mental spaces that are linked, thus bringing about a generic space and two mental spaces with the following elements: generic space: people, event, result; 1 - dining table, governor and Brother Belcher, the battle and the noise of fighting coming from outside (Belcher's perspective); 2 - dining table, governor and Brother Belcher, the music sound of the orchestra and their performance (governor's interpretation). The optimality principles ensure the tight-knit structure of the correspondences within the mental spaces, and how they are projected. When we superimpose the two perspectives in a blend, their incompatibility, i.e. the noise of fighting compared to the noise of the orchestra playing creates the comic effects (see Diagram 5b – a double scope shared topology network). Online meaning creation ensures further possible renderings of the scene, such as the fact that Brother Belcher might not be able to bear the echo of the shooting and killing, whereas the governor takes it as read that the orchestra is so appalling and upsets Brother Belcher so much that the members of the band are to be disposed of. After such an emergent structure is created, dismantling the blend backwards is impossible. What must be stressed is the fact that the manner in which we process information in the blend is opportunistic, i.e. we can speak of a certain degree of opportunism in the recruitment of accidents, or relations, into the blend. It is performed subjectively by a conceptualiser, and it is to do with their knowledge and associations such relations of the blend bring

about. It is almost certain that each language user could interpret the above scene in a slightly varying way, depending on their perspective and viewpoint. Thus, another CIT rule of achieving human scale is fulfilled, too.

Diagram 5b. The Noise



In this example, Lady Ruff-Diamond talks about a strong wind, and this is the connector that evokes laughter. Again, there are two mental spaces here, too: 1 includes wind as a natural phenomenon, 2 includes gastric gases. These two are incorporated in the generic space and whose elements are as follows: place, people, situation. If the two are joined into the blend their incongruity brings about humour (see Diagram 5c). Additionally, the expression "*to go down well with somebody*" can be understood in two ways: 1 - to be well received and accepted by someone, 2 - to be well digested by a person that has eaten something (in this case, a missionary was eaten by the natives). When the two mappings are projected into the blended space, according to the composition, creation and elaboration, they produce humour, thanks to their incompatibility and the blend's emergent novel structure (see Diagrams 5c & 5d – both are a double scope shared topology networks). Equally important is another feature of CIT, namely mental simulation by which a conceptualiser who wishes to interpret the example must perform a cognitive effort of simulation. What this means is that in the case of the wind remark, both the natural phenomenon and the gastric gases are to be cognitively superimposed onto one another. As for the expression "*to go down well with sb*", we must parallel acceptance by a society with cannibalism by eating a human being. All such simulations undoubtedly strengthen the cognitive integration, as well as humour. In a similar vein to the previously depicted scene, all the optimality principles are applicable in this case.

Diagram 5c. Strong Wind



Diagram 5d. Going down well with the natives



In this passage, the words unsporting and season become the centre of attention. They evoke a generic space and two mental spaces, which when blended produce the comic effects. Namely, the generic space involves participants, a behavioural pattern, and an occasion; input space 1 - the unfair murder of a fakir who was innocent (an understatement which further boosts the humour), crime, murderers, fakir's head, cruelty; 2 - the sports context, in which it is legal or fair to hunt, hunting as a sport itself, unsporting behaviour, i.e. hunting outside the season, and the prey (see Diagram 5e). Another generic space and two mental spaces, which are on this occasion connected with the word season are (generic space) time, participants, events; 1 - the time when something, such as a practice, or someone is allowed to exist without any objections, lawfulness; 2 - the hunting context, in which a season is the time when it is legitimate for hunters to kill certain species (See Diagram 5e: in this diagram both cognitive integration networks have been merged; i.e. A – murder scene (1) and illegal hunting (2) context as well as B – lawfulness (1) and legal hunting context (2)). According to the blending principles of composition, creation and elaboration, the input spaces are brought together in topological correspondences. The mappings are as follows: the fakir is treated not as a human being, as he should be, but rather as an animal that it is legal to hunt and kill. This is mapped with the time when it is allowed to kill fakirs, and also the mapping of these onto the criminal area of killing humans; sporting behaviour, i.e. hunting and killing animals when in season is mapped onto unsporting behaviour, i.e. hunting and killing fakirs outside the season, and all of this is also mapped onto the time of killing a person, which will always be considered illegal and criminal (see Diagram 5e is an examples of double scope shared topology networks). All these mappings are well integrated and create a net of tightly related associations. The shortening of the metonymic distance rule also applies, for example when the fakir and his head are projected as one relation to the blend. Also, the fakir and his head stand for any potential unsporting killing of fakirs in general, out of season certainly. Thus, we also encounter the compression which means the tightening of the topological relations from the inputs into the blend i.e. the fakir and his head are compressed (Part-Whole compression), while the killing of all fakirs outside season exemplifies Time and Space, and Cause and Effect compression. Finally, all the mappings are are transferred from inputs into the blend, which acquires a structure of its own, and is expanded by means of background or encyclopaedic associations. For instance, the fact that certain human species are allowed to be killed for sport and the treatment of what is effectively a murder as a game, or a sport. This provides further elements of incongruity, which again results in humour.

Diagram 5e. Unsporting behaviour



The fourth instantiation centres around the expression to *get plastered* which features as an inter-space connector. It relates to different mental spaces: 1 - to literally cover oneself with plaster (which happens to Lady Ruff-Diamond in the scene), 2 - to intoxicate oneself with alcohol (which also happens to Lady Ruff-Diamond at the same time), with a generic overall space and its elements incorporating: person, behaviour, and result. What follows is the topological integration of closely related elements: a person is mapped onto Lady RD, the action of being covered with plaster is mapped onto the action of becoming drunk, plaster is mapped onto the drink, while dirtiness and dust are mapped onto the state of intoxication. Metonymically, Lady Ruff-Diamond and her state, i.e. intoxication, are treated as one correspondence. These mappings are composed and combined to form the blend, which is later elaborated. The emergent structure may be enriched by the image of Lady Ruff-Diamond who puts more and more plaster on herself and thus becomes more and more drunk, until she is completely covered in it, and one cannot see her, which would be equal to her blacking out with intoxication, for example. All this is enabled by means of the online meaning creation principle. The structure of the blended space after elaboration becomes incompatible, and hence the comic is reinforced (see Diagram 5f – showing a double scope shared topology network). In this fragment, we also encounter compression of a simple kind. This time it regards the representation, to the extent that Lady Ruff-Diamond represents any person who getting plastered will actually get drunk. Actually, the compression is associated with the phrase *to get plastered*. In addition to that, we can easily observe the mental simulation in the sense that to perceive humour we must imagine getting covered in plaster as getting intoxicated, which is also part of the online meaning creation here.

Diagram 5f. Getting plastered



Diagram 5g. Carry on 3D



Bearing all the subparts of the dinner party scene in mind, it is possible now to provide a graphic representation which incorporates all the above-mentioned shots. Diagram 5g is a visual schema of how the comic is achieved with all the different subparts displayed. They, formulate a three-dimensional perspective on humour in the film fragment just described.

3.2.3. The Office moments

The 3-dimensional nature of humour, which is evident in Carry On, will also be central in the next comedy we use for analysis, i.e. The Office.

The Office is a modern British series with complex, multi dimensional representations of the comic. The office consisted of twelve episodes over two series, with an additional two episode Christmas special. Set in a fictional paper merchant's office, the action is filmed in a pseudo documentary style inter-cut with the on camera thoughts of employees. This parody of the working life of an office middle manager initially confused some uniformed viewers who believed this to be a real documentary, with real employees. The first scene to be shown will concern a situation when Tim - one of the main characters - plays a practical joke on Gareth - another leading figure of the movie, immersing Gareth's stapler in a yellow jelly. Gareth is very possessive of his stationary and would not wish anyone to borrow anything of his without prior asking, although the office equipment does not, actually, belong to him personally, and is a possession of the company. Because of this, Gareth is obviously furious at the sight of his stapler ruined by means of a jelly, especially as the situation unfolds in the presence of a new recruit, i.e. Ricky. On the micro level, the attempts by David Brent to be funny, which predominantly fail, when considered in a real life situation can sometimes be painful to watch. However, at the macro level, to a detached observer, especially one with experience of an office environment, what is presented to them on screen is humorous.

Having familiarised ourselves with the relevant background information, it is possible to analyse the concrete elements of this example that evoke a humorous response. In particular, there are various dimensions of humour that can be in focus. Firstly, the whole idea of immersing a stapler in jelly is a ridiculous one, as this is not an ordinary thing to do. Secondly, the phrases utilised by the witnesses to the incident create an even more ridiculous atmosphere, namely: 'How did you know it was me?' (Tim's words uttered while eating a piece of a yellow jelly), 'It truly is a trifling matter' and 'You should be taken into custardy' (Ricky's comment on the incident), and finally David Brent's unfulfilled desire for more puns: 'What other expressions are there with desserts?' These

all deepen the humorous effects, which will be explained in detail further in this section. Our aim, however, is to analyse humour with the aid of mental spaces. Therefore, it is possible to impose onto the whole occurrence a dimension of slapstick, where we shall have an ordinary day at the paper merchant's office with people working and performing their day-to-day chores, input space 1. A prank imposed upon this normal view serves as input space 2. Finally, it is possible to treat the series' perspective as input space 3. It is also possible to distinguish the generic sphere encompassing ingredients such as participants, place, objects, activities and behaviour patterns. The following elements comprise our three mental spheres of association: 1 – the ideal workplace, employees, taking orders of paper from potential customers over the phone and via the Internet, receiving phone calls, counting facts and figures, discussing progress, seriousness and preciseness, professionalism, dull and boring activities; 2 – a prank space with the elements such as joke scenes, pranksters thinking of potential jokes one can play on others, and using technology as a source of gathering information perhaps, contacting other pranksters via telephone or email, discussing how the prank shall be played, funny and interesting activities, clowning about, and silliness; 3 - paper merchant's, David Brent the manager, Tim, Gareth and Ricky as working personnel, playing a joke with the aid of yellow jelly, the joke, the stapler and conversation that has nothing to do with work and the tasks involved. These varying spaces shall be brought together by means of the Identification, Access and Topology principles until the analogies or mappings are established, and can then be projected onto the blended space as a closely connected set of correspondences that display office work as, for instance, as a joking environment where employees are pranksters that play jokes on each other (see Diagram 6a). Similarly, the mundane reality of office work could be juxtaposed with the jolly existence that playing around guarantees, all the duties of the latter being superimposed onto the activities connected with clowning around. In such a manner, we would establish, in accordance with the rules of composition, creation and elaboration, relationships of one dimension only, with a degree of incompatibility in the final emergent structure of the blended space, which would cause laughter. Later, when additional connotations have been brought to the scene by the conceptualiser, as was the case with the previously analysed example, the unpacking of the blend is forbidden, as it would distort the conceptual integration as well as comic effects.

Diagram 6a. Jelly Moment



The second humorous background to this scene from The Office is brought about by the purely verbal context, which is also analysable in terms of conceptual integration showing the versatility of the blending processes at the same time. First of all, Tim utters the following sentence directed at Gareth: 'How did you know it was me?' with a voice that does not show surprise at all. The whole utterance is a mockery in its own right, as it is clear from what happens in the office on a daily basis that Tim is the only person capable of annoying Gareth. One of the reasons for this is that they work in close proximity and, more importantly, that Gareth is a pain in the neck who does not wish to cooperate or be helpful. Furthermore, bearing in mind that the prank involved 'jellifying' the stapler, one also smiles at the nonsense remark made by the person who has just unwrapped and started eating a packet of jellies, and yellow in colour, too. Hence, Tim's remark acquires ironic effect, which may also be explicated via cognitive integration. We would have to present a generic space with elements such as: participants, speech acts, conversation, aim; and we would also have to distinguish between two mental spaces, again, the first one being an input space of reality, where what one tries to communicate is highly relevant and truthful, based on Grice's maxims of co-operation, and the second one being the unreal space of lying for the purpose of deception. These two input spaces would be united by their elements: the truthful person – Tim – from space 1 could be assigned to the deceiving side of Tim's personality in space 2; Gareth would be the naive person in both spaces, as he does not perceive the irony and humour, and does not laugh at the incident. Additionally, there is a jelly element that adds to the irony. To be more specific, in input space 1, it is permitted to comprehend jelly as part of everyday life and of truthful reality. However, the same jelly might be present also in input space 2, where it ceases to function as an ordinary culinary ingredient, and becomes a tool with which the prank is performed. Having presented the analogies in both spaces, it is only necessary to project the elements from them into the blend, and one finally superimposes a Tim – clown onto a real Tim, and a jelly fool onto a jelly tool (see Diagram 6b). Hence, the incongruity arises bringing with itself humour and irony, for what else is the irony, if not the statement of the untrue that is referred to the factual (for more discussion on irony see Wengorek-Dolecka 2002a &b, 2004, and 2005). The emergent structure might acquire some additional online meaning, i.e. jelly becomes a tool with which to fight silliness and pettiness, or treating Gareth as a big boy who is frightened of jelly because it wobbles, etc. Additionally, the optimality principles are secured, namely integration, web, metonymic shortening of distance, unpacking, no backwards projection, which allows for the formation of tight conceptual integration that can be manipulated, until the blend is formed.

Diagram 6b. How did you know it was me?



One more vital feature of CIT can be represented by the above-mentioned TV fragment. Precisely, what we have in mind is subjectiveness. Although the process of running the blend as such is automatic to a great extent, blends might also incorporate from prototypes, conventional and routine knowledge or scenarios. This is exactly what takes place every time we perform online meaning creation and add to the emergent structure of the blend. A case in point is the idea that jelly might become a powerful tool to scare Gareth – a Territorial army member who is petrified at the thought of its wobbling nature. Certainly, such subjective additions to the blend conform to what Fauconnier and Turner have called the rule of achieving human scale. However, there is one more dimension of subjectivity that is worth mentioning at this very moment. The human scale principle fits exceptionally well into the notion of humour and the fact that it is always individualistic and highly subjective as a notion, as depicted in chapter 2. This is another reason why CIT may be regarded as a significant humour theory.

Nonetheless, there is more to humour in the scene described. The utterance 'It truly is a trifling matter' opens up still more potential for the analysis of the comic, as well as another perspective on the situation in question. To explain the semantic message introduced by this citation, one must again refer to British cuisine, where a trifle is a common "culprit". A trifle is a dessert that is fairly popular with the British; consisting of sponge, jelly, custard and cream, with a good measure of sherry. However, there is also an expression, a trifling matter, which defines an event or an object that is of minor importance and does not bear any negative consequences. Here, the phrase is used in a witty fashion, to stress the culinary connotations which jelly might enhance within the whole incident. Moreover, there is a pun created by means of referring a real-life situation, which involves a culinary ingredient, to a more metaphorical expression, whose form hinges on a food item. In a similar manner as previously, we are capable of distinguishing a generic space with the following elements: participants, objects, conversation, speech act and aim; three input spaces: 1 – the reality with a joke played on an individual with the help of jelly; 2 – the space of the utterance which comments on reality, based on the lexical item trifle; 3 - the space to do with cooking, where a trifle is an ordinary and popular dessert. The input space 2 is, however, slightly lopsided, as compared to the other ones, namely it already draws on the blend. To be more specific, a trifling matter is a result of cognitive integration itself, where input space 1 is a real dessert and is topologically assigned to the metaphorical input sphere 2 – with trifling matter as a metaphorical extension denoting something as common and widespread as trifle - the dessert. Hence the blend appears, with the incongruity lying between the more literal and more figurative usages of trifle (see Diagram 6c). Now, coming back to the pun

of the story, trifling matter is projected into the blend to denote a food item – jelly; therefore, one might be tempted to say that this is, as if, a back projection of the metaphorical usage of trifling matter, which is, obviously, perfectly allowed in cognitive integration. In addition, the intermingling of diverse mental spaces only strengthens the incongruities present in the blends at hand, which simultaneously enhances the humour stemming from it. Further, the emergent structure of the blend acquires some more meaning with the elaboration that is performed with online meaning creation. Namely, one can add elements such as: different types of trifling matters, i.e. non-serious problems or worries which would be at the same level as a trifle and some other desserts; all such enhancements only improve the quality of the humour. This is what David Brent character tries to achieve in the scene, searching for more "dessert" phrases. Finally, it is also vital to mention that the optimality principles are fully secured, as well, which tightens the blended space and its relations.

Diagram 6c. Trifling Matter



There is one more humorous perspective of the jelly scene that centres around the phrase: 'Perhaps you should be taken into custardy' (Ricky's words). This statement may be treated in a manner similar to the previous trifle-related moment. Custody and custard have been merged here to form a funny hybrid; the generic space encompassing: participants, objects, speech acts and communication; input space 1 is associated with custody and imprisonment, whereas input space 2 refers to custard and culinary practices; while input space 3 is based on The Office perspective with Ricky's comment that blends custody and custard for the purpose of humour in the series. These elements are mapped onto each other and projected to the blended space, which adds to the comic due to its incompatibility (see Diagram 6d). It is crucial to notice, however, that custardy is also enhanced by trifling matter, the two being taken from one and the same mental space, i.e. the cuisine, as if the two statements were joined via the cuisine mental space: 'It truly is a trifling matter' with 'You should be taken into custardy'. Therefore, not only does custardy seem funny, but it is additionally humorous because of the inter-connotation with trifling matter and jelly, all of these associations being slightly inappropriate in the stapler moment.

Diagram 6d. Taken into Custardy



The multi-dimensional perspective in the fragment of The Office is quite elaborate, and hence displays that humour has a deeper insight than simply a pun, irony or slapstick. It acquires novel dimensions when different, yet altogether comic, mental spaces are superimposed onto one another, by means of cognitive integration, especially by its subjective rule of achieving human scale. Diagram 6e below displays the multi-level humour of the scene described, again using sub-levels and subcategories of the humour in here.

Consider now a totally new perspective, which exhibits the humour three-dimensionally: the training day in The Office. The whole episode could actually stand as a case in point, hence a short review. This is a normal day in the office, but the personnel are going to have their motivational skills improved. A qualified trainer, Rowan, is invited to lead the event. He prepares a few exercises for the staff, including David Brent the manager, in order to make the people realise that it is mainly team work that enables further progress. And from this moment onwards, the episode can be treated as an enormous blend.

There are two input spaces, the proper, role model ordinary motivational training being the first one, and the training at the office functioning as the second one (see Diagram 7a). Although the role model training day is an ideal, the incongruity may be formed by incongruity reversal. Namely, for some observers of the training scene the incongruity will stem from the ideal training and what they see in the film. However, for others, those who have experienced such trainings, the incongruity will originate from the confirmation of expected poor training day, as compared with their ideal perception of it that they have never experienced, though they still possess the ideal. Hence, it is possible to speak of the incongruity reversed. In input space 1 it is possible to enumerate the following elements: a role model trainer who has experience and adequate preparation confirmed by a diploma, role model trainees who are willing to learn and explore new techniques of development and the role model training exercises. In input space 2, we shall have a fully qualified trainer, Rowan, who does his best but is challenged, and cannot share his own abilities or knowledge with the trainees, because his authority is undermined, or perhaps even not recognised. There are also trainees who are unwilling to do anything, mainly through boredom. Among them all, there is David Brent who is the office manager and should not really be participating in the training with the regular employees, but who, nevertheless, claims to possess a vast knowledge resources on the subject, and what is more, tries to implement his own 'wisdom' into the training procedures. He is explicitly challenging the trainer and even provoking him, although in his judgement, his intentions are honourable and his only aim is to develop his employees. Additionally, Brent, who does not, actually, have any qualifications as a trainer, takes over

the training, in order to promote his image among the staff. Further, the training exercises in input space 2 are not just mundane tasks, they are distorted, mainly by Brent, who does not conform to the procedures. For example, exercise 1, i.e. watching a short movie on how to behave efficiently in a business situation, is interrupted by Brent who, on seeing a wad of money being burnt by the presenter in the movie, elaborates on the fact that the money cannot possibly be genuine because the Queen's image must not be destroyed or in any way altered. Then, as if it is not enough that he has completely disturbed the audience, he proceeds to a discussion about the fact that stamps are a legal tender in the UK and must be accepted by service providers, for instance bus or cab drivers. The whole discussion is propelled by Gareth, who participates in the exchange of thoughts, in his attempt to emulate Brent. Another exercise looses its status when the trainees are to state their secret wishes or dreams. Brent decides to elaborate on eternal life, whereas Gareth shares officially with everyone, to everyone's amazement and disgust, that his ultimate dream consists of two lesbians, preferably sisters, having sexual pleasures, with him solely as a witness. Exercise 3, where the trainees were divided into groups and the task is to solve the riddle of a farmer, as a cooperation practice, is also twisted, owing to the fact that Gareth is uncooperative with Tim and even decides to throw a comment about the task's main character, i.e. a farmer, who, as does not have a wife must obviously be gay, and so should not be allowed anywhere near animals, which again spoils the trainee's enjoyment.

Diagram 7a. Office Training Day



To provide more ridiculous behaviour examples we only have to quote Brent's attempt to show off as a singer during the official training day. Here the real trainer is dispensed of as a person who does not have much to convey. Another classic is Brent finally trying to comfort Dawn, who is breaking up with her long-term boyfriend, after having previously ignored her. He sings her a song that was devoted to the death of Princess Diana, claiming that Dawn's situation is almost mirrored by the lyrics, despite the fact that Dawn is still alive, while Princess D. has long been gone. All these examples provide the contents of input space 2, and can be joined topologically with their proper equivalents from input space 1. Thus we can distinguish the following exercises: watching a film and discussing its contents, explaining one's own wishes or dreams, solving a riddle based on pair work where the picture has to be discussed and the objective completed, discussing the meaning behind a picture that has a message and sums up the previous tasks, in terms of a motivational training. There should also be no interruptions from the trainees, but their factual engagement in the exercises. Diagram 7b presents all the distortions during exercise period taken together. Having projected the mappings from inputs into the blend, one arrives at a training day from hell that presents a lot of incongruities which are concentrated in the blended space, and these, in turn, prompt humour. Furthermore, the emergent blend also adds to the humour of the whole situation. The conceptualiser may expand the blended space by, for example, adding an association to do with a real training. Each trainee should receive a certificate or diploma after the training day, and thus one might imagine that the Office's employees still get papers certifying their knowledge on the subject of customer care, maybe even with distinction, despite their total disconnect with the whole event. Such emergent meanings, when the online semantics of the blend is created, certainly enhance the humour. Additionally, the whole complex blend exemplifies a mirror network, where the generic space and the inputs share the same organising frame. Specifically, it is the training day frame with its participants and activities that serve as a unifying frame; where the ideal training day, i.e. input space 1, is a higher-order example of the fatal training day, i.e. input space 2, both being subordinate to the generic space. The generic space, then, can be said to provide the backbone of the organising frame by means of its abstract elements, such as events, participants and activities which are specified or mirrored in the inputs. Similarly, the notion of mental simulation is present to the extent that the conceptualiser of the scene juxtaposes cognitively the different realisations of the event at once. Simultaneously, it is the Conceptualiser who experiences the compression of Time and Space, but also of (dis)analogous types that the ideal and fatal versions of the event represent. In particular, both training versions compress all the potential good and bad training procedures that can be experienced.

Diagram 7b. Participation in the training



Glancing back at the exercises from the spoof training day, one immediately notices that they in themselves could function as blends. One may present the following input spaces: 1A – the ideal manager of the office who participates in the training, and 1B – Brent who is arrogant enough to value his own knowledge above the trainer's allowing for the disruptions within the training; 2A – watching a customer care movie silently and trying to memorise the gist of it, and 2B – treating the film as grounds for ridiculous discussion; 3A – describing briefly one's dreams, 3B – confiding your own fantasies, however sick they may be, in the work mates; 4A – solving a riddle, 4B – treating a riddle as a pretext to state one's own, opinionated views (additionally confusing the idea of a gay man, with a man who uses animals for indecent practices, which could function as another small-scale blend); 5A – a boss who participates actively in the training and thus motivates his staff, 5B – David Brent's singing and performing aided by Gareth; and finally 6A – Princess Diana and her death illustrated by the song, 6B – Dawn and her problem. These inputs, and many more that were omitted, provide additional blends that further extend the humour dimension in the office training day, which is depicted by Diagram 7c a mirror network instance. Relevant to our discussion of humour is also the fact that the above-mentioned episode of The Office provides an example of another recently stressed blending feature, i.e. fusion. As described in chapter 1, fusion is based on entrenchment, or conventionalisation of the blend. This might, when fully rooted in a society, cease to carry the status of a novel blend and actually become the basis for some new, higher-order CIT networks. In this way, the whole episode of the training day functions as a novel blend based on a set of smaller -scale entrenched blends, such as the one referring to an arrogant boss similar to David Brent who does not know how an ideal boss ought to behave[59].

59 Large sections of the British population were surprised to discover, after the first episodes, that the Office was not a real documentary, which may be an illustration of the entrenchment.

Diagram 7c. Training Day 3D



What is more, the episodes of The Office discussed above make use of a fairly complex idea of compression, too, and simultaneously it is accompanied by decompression. Precisely, the conceptualiser must be able to decompress all the above mentioned relations in order to see them individually, e.g. David Brent viewed as a boss and all the other bosses alike; the workforce that is slack and lazy and all similar working environments, etc. As in the previous examples, the training day displays compression of the following types:

Time and Space – compressing reality with the film space, i.e. the spoof training day in the film and a potential training in reality

- Role category and Representation – where David Brent represents an arrogant boss that potentially stands for all such managerial roles in reality
- (Dis)analogy – comparing the ideal and spoof trainings, and perceiving different things in on-the-surface-only similar events
- Similarity – the ideal office trainees and the movie staff that could not care less
- Uniqueness – perhaps The Office space from the comedy is distinctive in relation to potential other offices

3.2.4. Comedy highlights from Extras

The complexity of the humour with its multi-level and three-dimensional nature, which has already been presented in The Office, is described once again, with reference to Extras.

By the writers of The Office, Extras is centred around two film 'supporting characters', Andy and Maggie, who are trying to make it as real actors, and Andy's part-time agent. Again produced over two series and a Christmas special, while the first series sees the main character struggling with his career, the second focuses on his success, after he writes his own sitcom. Each episode includes a number of recognisable actors and actresses playing cameo roles in which they poke fun at themselves. These include David Bowie, Patrick Stuart, Robert De Nero, Kate Winslet and Orlando Bloom.

The first scene from Extras centres around the fact that Andy Millman is accused of being cruel to a Down syndrome boy. The whole situation is focused on a night out at a restaurant with his friend, Maggie. Somehow, the incident is leaked to the press and the mass media blow it out of proportion.

Therefore, this scene can be analysed in terms of cognitive integration: There are two input spaces to be focused upon: 1 – the mental space of press release and 2 – the mental space of distorted press behaviour, i.e. the movie scene. The former would include the following elements: an unusual incident that can

become the source of news (i.e. in Extras, this will constitute the fact that Andy, a recognised TV personality, offended a Down syndrome boy); the public announcement of such news; the aim of publishing such news; the tackling of the story (i.e. in a honest publication of the news there must be a place for the truth, and the journalists will have to seek the truth. In Extras, the fact should be that Andy Millman did not intentionally offend anyone. The incident should have been classed as non-existent); the response that the incident provoked. The latter mental space would include elements such as: the incident that was blown out of proportion on purpose, the dishonest purpose behind the revelation of the incident (i.e. gaining public support for the newspaper, TV or radio station), the disrespectful handling of the story and letting the plot of the incident run loose to the extent that the incident depicted by the press does not resemble at all the event that actually took place, the response of the public that is unfair and even critical, but bears a resemblance to a witch-hunt. If these two input spaces and their topologies are brought together into a blend, they produce the emergent structure of the blend and novel correspondences that clash due to their incongruity, and hence produce humorous effects (see Diagram 8a – again a mirror network, like the previously described scene from The Office). The comedy is nonetheless facilitated by more online connotations that are brought up when attempting to comprehend the new blended relation. A case in point is the idea of the media going even further than the movie and exposing Brent's entire life to the public. This would definitely enrich the comical effects in the scene depicted, which follows the rule of achieving human scale as well as mental simulation. However, there is more to humour, again. It is only necessary to pay attention to the help that Andy's agent, Darren, offered in the distress.

Diagram 8a. The Press



A case in point constitutes Darren's efforts to clear Andy's image. Within the cognitive integration network this involves the following mental spaces:

1. – the mental space of true and honest help offered to a friend in their trouble: attracting the attention of the public and the media by a public appearance on TV, the proper explanation of what happened, perhaps even involving the "culprit" in it, so that the general image of that person is improved, or using the medium to get at the attackers, and thus gaining more publicity and fame
2. – the mental space of a selfish attempt to aid your friend but at the same time utilise the occurrence as a pretext to promote yourself or your own self interest, Darren's explanation that does not really present Andy in a good light, but rather casts shadows on him, not having Andy present at the TV station to defend himself and voice his own arguments. Worse still, Darren blatantly states that obviously it is difficult to recognise "these mongoloids" from the back and that Andy simply could not have known whom he was telling off; additionally, the word *mongoloids*, now considered derogative in nature, only shows how uncouth Darren is, and also Andy by association with his agent. Finally, Darren uses the opportunity of being on TV to promote his other client's latest album, namely Barry off Eastenders (or Sean, in real life), which is a mockery of the whole idea of helping Andy.

When the above-mentioned mental correspondences or topological associations are brought together and projected into the blend, the resulting new equivalents within the blended space clash, producing the comic effects, by their incongruity. Consequently, it is possible to extend this blend more, when we analyse the follow–up to the "*mongoloid*" scene, at the end of the episode, i.e. when the Richard and Judy show plays along with the challenge that Richard accepted from Darren, i.e. recognising a "*mongoloid*" from the back, which Richard fails to do. This brings another, more detailed dimension to the blend and makes it more unbelievable and surprising, which naturally enhances humour (see Diagram 8b). Nevertheless, the online perception of the blend allows for more farfetched connotations to be taken into account, e.g. doing more experiments with Down syndrome people in order to find out from what angles or perspectives one might easily recognise their condition, and what perspective would prevent a viewer from realising their nature. Such additional analogies, again conforming to the rule of subjectiveness, certainly boost the humour of the blend, because they are ridiculous. In this respect, Extras and The Office definitely go further than any previously described comedy, in that both serials present concretely the emergent structure and online meaning processes. It is as if their writers, i.e. Ricky Gervais and Stephen Merchant, utilised the CIT themselves for the purpose

of enhancing humour. What may seem paradoxical and confusing ought, in fact, to be treated as a revelation in the sense that it proves that CIT is a subconscious process that may explain humour via projections to the blend and the blend's elaborations. This certainly is a step forward in humour theorising.

Diagram 8b. "Mongoloids"



Having previously explained the Identity Principle, the running of the blend, the optimality principles, and the multidimensionality of humour, we shall now specifically concentrate on the conditions that must be satisfied in order for the blending to function properly, Apart from the CIT's optimality principles, Fauconnier and Turner have produced some more advanced rules that are to govern blending, and are based on optimality principles, which has already been discussed in chapter 1. To mention them briefly, CIT has been generalised into the following constraints:

> Intensifying vital relations
> *Compress what is diffuse by scaling a single vital conceptual relation or transforming vital conceptual relations into others. This is intensification of vital relations.*
> Maximizing vital relations
> *Create human scale structure in the blend by maximizing vital relations.* (…)
> Relevance
> *All things being equal, if an element appears in the blend, there will be pressure to find significance for this element. Significance will include relevant links to other spaces and relevant functions in running the blend.* (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 340-341)

We shall now look at how these are interpreted through a concrete example of blending. The example scene, with which to achieve this, comes from When the Whistle Blows, the sitcom series within Extras written by Andy Millman. When the Whistle Blows is a slapstick serial written for BBC2 viewers, which has a real time audience, and generates a lot of heated debate as to what is a good comedy and what is a shallow piece of comical work, too broad for intelligent people.

This episode of 'When the Whistle Blows' presents a moment when the members of the factory crew are gathered around a lunch table in a canteen, discussing various issues. One of the personnel, Gobbler, is slightly less talented, and does not understand nuances of verbal play or the art of reading between the lines. The staff use the word "*spanner*" that their boss turns against Gobbler, calling him a "*spanner*". What is interesting is that another member of the group, Brains, explicates the whole meaning to Gobbler using, probably subconsciously, the cognitive integration network. Brains presents two input spaces: the first one being the space of tools with a spanner as a piece of equipment, the second one being the space of a rather rude association, the sexual mental space, where the word "*spanner*" stands for a "*male reproductive appendage*", as Brains puts it (see Diagram 9 – a double scope network). These relations can be said to intensify vital relations in that the spanner is compressed and decompressed in the subtype of Part-Whole compression; where the male reproductive organ represents necessarily the male masculinity. Additionally, with the intensification of vital

relations, we automatically maximise them and hence achieve human scale rule in the blend. For these reasons, we may also talk about Relevance principle whereby all elements in the blend attain proper significance, i.e. the spanner understood as a tool does clash with the spanner comprehended as a male. All these simply enrich the humour stemming from the incongruity of the blend. Also, the composite blended structure acquires its own logic and new meanings are brought about to the scene, which do not stem from the input spaces as such. For instance, it could be assumed that a sizeable proportion of men can be referred to as 'spanners'. Similarly, online meaning creation brings about more connotations with the elements of the blended space, and hence we might add, for example, the image of Gobbler dressed up as a spanner, since this is what he was called, either with reference to its first or second input space, etc. Such sublime associations boost the humour within the blends. How this is achieved is through composition, completion and finally elaboration. Composition allows for all the elements from the inputs to form novel relations, particular to the blend. Completion activates other types of knowledge that a humour recipient will be able to incorporate into the scene, for instance cultural information or ICMs and frames of different kinds. In such a manner, a larger, self-sufficient blend is formed, which can then be elaborated.

Diagram 9. When the whistle blows



The recent development of CIT specifies the conditions that satisfy conceptual integration and make it a coherent process, which has just been presented in the above-mentioned humorous instance. However, there is another set of general regulations that oversee blending, stated as below:

> Non-disintegration
> *Neutralize projections and topological relations that would disintegrate the blend.*
> Non-displacement
> *Do not disconnect valuable web connections to inputs.*
> Non-interference
> *Avoid projections from input spaces to the blend that defeat each other in the blend.*
> Non-ambiguity
> *Do not create ambiguity in the blend that interferes with the computation.*
> Backwards projection
> *As the blend is run and develops emergent structure, avoid backward projection to an input that will disrupt the integration of the input itself.* (Fauconnier and Turner 2006: 355-359)

These principles have been discussed in chapter 1, section 1.1.8, but I would like to sum up their contents, in order to prepare grounds for another comedy and its analysis. Hence, it is enough to point to the fact that Fauconnier and Turner wish to bring clarity to CIT by the above mentioned set of rules, which inhibit contradiction and ambiguity in blending. It is therefore mandatory that in a given case of conceptual integration those projections that might endanger the integrity of the blend are to be rejected (non-disintegration), however, no valuable topologies shall be omitted (non-displacement). Further, projections that cancel one another must be dismissed (non-interference), just as the vagueness within the projected input must be avoided (non-ambiguity). Also, as the blend acquires its emergent structure, it is impossible to project backwards, as such an action would disintegrate the contents (backwards projection). In other words, all disruptive or distorting projections must be avoided. This is basically the generalisation from the optimality rules discussed in relation to previous humorous examples.

Having recapped the theoretical background, we shall now illustrate how these generalised principles pertain to another example of the comic, taken again from Extras. Let us consider the situation based around Daniel Radcliffe, who plays a Harry Potter like character.

In the episode that I am going to describe, Daniel Radcliffe plays a cameo role in another TV production to which Andy Millman and Maggie, the main characters of Extras, have also been invited. Daniel plays a young man at an impressionable age who is excessively interested in women and sex, attempting to

pick up any woman within his reach, no matter her age or marital status. Daniel chooses Maggie as his goal, and tries to chat her up. We see Daniel who joins Andy and Maggie at the canteen table. Maggie, to avoid Daniel's remarks, leaves on a pretext, and Andy is asked by Daniel to clear away as soon as she comes back. Andy asks Daniel what his plans are towards Maggie, and Daniel produces, from his pocket, an unravelled contraceptive protection and boasts that is might be too small for him while stretching the thing. Unfortunately, the stretched rubber jumps off Daniel's hand and lands on the head of Dame Diana Rigg, a famous British actress. Daniel obviously wants his possession back, not in the least embarrassed by the situation. He is somewhat uncomfortable, however, by what Dame Diana might say to him. Furthermore, Dame Diana herself does not seem to find the incident particularly odd; she is more absorbed in making Daniel use the proper name for the contraceptive, and also corrects Daniel's grammar and pronunciation.

It is even more bizarre that a famous actor - who created a character like Harry Potter - a public school boy with a posh accent, would have any problems with pronunciation or grammar of his utterances. The whole situation is farcical, which again can be explained by mental spaces. The first mental space will be the space of an ordinary film break in a canteen where real actors, such as Daniel Radcliffe or Dame Diana Rigg, but also extras in the person of Maggie and Andy might gather to relax, dine, joke and talk to each other, perhaps about the film that is being shot, or about their problems (input space 1). The second mental space here is the Extras' plane, where again there is a break in a canteen and real actors come here to rest. However, their behaviour is far from ordinary, or even dignified (input space 2). Radcliffe swears with his posh accent, and makes mistakes in English language usage. Dame Diana is not offended by a condom on her head, and ignores the barefaced insult, concentrating on correct grammar and pronunciation usage. If the varying topological relations are superimposed, and projected to create a novel emergent structure of the blend, their incongruity and impropriety incite humour (see Diagram 10 – a mirror network). However, online meaning creation of the blended relations allows for further connotations to be brought into the picture, which boosts the humour. A case in point is the elaboration of Daniel and the relationship with his mother. It is not inconceivable to assume that she treats Daniel as a little boy, doing everything for him and dismissing any criticism that might be relevant, in light of Daniel's behaviour (see the film fragment). Despite the fact that Daniel is blatant and rebellious, she still glorifies the boy's image. Following this clue, we might imagine the mother doing absolutely everything for the son, i.e. ranging from buying his clothes and choosing what he will wear on a daily basis, to choosing his friends

and doing his homework so that the son can devote himself to acting, without learning proper English and without realizing that his speech abilities border on the slang. Simultaneously, we might imagine that Daniel uses this situation, to descend even more into his little addictions. Also, we might contrast these potential scenarios with the real image of Daniel Radcliffe who is old and rich enough to lead his own life. Especially in view of the fact that 'Harry Potter' is quite a sophisticated and mature person speaking elegant and perfect English, and behaving in a distinguished manner. The juxtaposition of the two adds to humour in the example. A similar emergent structure may be created, disabling any retreat from the blend to the inputs, i.e. the backwards projection principle is satisfied here. Additionally, the remaining general principles safeguarding CIT from disintegration are secured, enabling a well-knit perception of the blending processes. In particular, the projections endangering the blend's unity in any way are simply discarded. For instance, an association with the real life Dame Diana Rigg, who knows Daniel Radcliffe very well, would certainly not focus on his faulty knowledge of English, when being hit on the head by a condom during a meal break. It is more likely for her to become angry and criticise Daniel's offensive behaviour. Such a possible connotation, if brought to the scene, could disintegrate the unity or produce ambiguity, and hence must be dismissed. This applies the rules of non-disintegration, non-ambiguity, and non-interference, in general. Therefore, we focus more on the film Dame Rigg as contrasted with her real life character. She is pictured as a distinguished and stiff-upper lip personality, who is above getting angry and prefers to keep her cool, even in so ridiculous a situation as the film presents.

Diagram 10. Harry Potter



3.3. Summary of humour analysis and conclusions

Having analysed some humorous cinematic scenes, which all bring about humour explicable by means of conceptual integration, it becomes apparent that blending and mental spaces allow for the description of humour in a consistent manner. All the above-mentioned instances were taken from a selection of British comedy productions ranging in their origin from the 70s classics, to the present. The range in publication years can only ensure that different types of comedies can be analysed in terms of the mental spaces theory proposed by Fauconnier and Turner. All the instances of humour were analysed in terms of certain features significant for CIT. The list of all the crucial blending characteristics is provided below, in the order used for the above analysis of humour:

- Access and Identification Principle, as well as running the blend
- Optimality Principles, i.e. Integration, Web, Unpacking, Topology, Backward Projection & Metonymy Projection
- The three-dimensional nature of humour, together with its complexity and multi-level structure.
- Cross-Space mapping, generic space, input spaces and blend with its emergent structure principles and online meaning construction
- more recently added features: (de)compression, simulation or fusion
- double-scope shared topology networks and mirror networks, as the majority of our analyses show
- general principles of CIT, or what we can call the novel 'optimality principles', i.e. Intensifying and Maximising vital relations and Relevance, as well as Non-disintegration, Non-displacement, Non-interference, Non-ambiguity and Backwards Projection.

In all the examples, it was actually possible to enumerate a generic space and two, or more, input spaces that served as a basis for the mappings and correspondences. These mappings were later projected into the blend and formed novel associations of their own, which frequently created incongruity. And precisely this incompatibility of equated relations, which first could seem congruous as they were conjoined, was always displayed in the blend, thus explaining the humour. Therefore, one might claim that cognitive integration and its processes form a necessary basis for any analysis of humorous effects. There is, nonetheless, the issue that arises on the basis of the above. Specifically, we come back here to the similar problem that RT and pragmatically-oriented theories of humour experience, i.e. the dichotomy of opposing renderings which is to explain humour. As stated before in the paper, the mere incongruity is not the ideal explication behind the comic. What is therefore a must is a further study into the nature of

such incompatibility. It would be profitable to establish the restrictions on this, for instance the type of incongruity or opposition that creates humour. Hence, further research must focus its attention on this issue.

Let us now, for the present moment, to focus briefly on two principles of blending, which appear to greatly enhance humour in itself, i.e. elaboration, and the notion of online meaning.

Online elaboration of semantic relations within the blended space seems to be of a fairly clear nature, at a first glance at least (see the last three examples of humour, with a special focus on the training day analysis). It can be defined as an on-the-spot, instant processing of mappings within the blend, which results in the fact that novel associations and correspondences are brought to the already blended space for further explanation. Through such expansion, more and more associations, not directly connected with a the particular humorous example are added, as the brain processes information. And it is exactly this cognitive processing, most probably performed in real-time, that greatly enhances the humorous effect. Online, or on-the-fly meaning construction might be shunned by some researchers, because of its complexity. Real-time information processing is regarded as time-consuming, and rather complex, hence the criticism that it is hard to believe in online meaning construction in humour, which must be instantaneous. It is nevertheless the function of future research to prove otherwise. Online meaning, which is associated through inputs and via blending, can be even further elaborated on and expanded, due to the fact that any conceptualiser of humour carries with himself the baggage of their experiences and knowledge of various kinds. Both of these influence the online construction of meaning in humour, in this way enriching the comedy substantially. The real-time aspect of blending is especially essential, as it allows the addition of random but always connected mappings instantly. It is as if the brain is further processing all the data, not only the information from the blend, but also all available domains and configurations of knowledge and experience in parallel, and finding additional, possible associations that also add to the comic effects. As Turner (2014) puts it, it is the human spark that is responsible for creativity, and unconsciously or not, the underlying task of the human brain is to look for any more possible blending while experiencing something. We can apply this to humour, braving the claim that the mind of the humour receiver will be put in the right frame for comedy, thus sustaining it, and more, via reinforcement of funniness. This occurs when we create the emergent structure of the blend and bring about more associations to the already funny picture. Additionally, I would also like to stress that such emergent structures will probably differ depending on the context in which the humour receiver is submerged. What I mean is that this pragmatic context will

necessarily incorporate elements such as society, culture, expectations, beliefs, knowledge (whether linguistic or not does not matter, all knowledge possesses by the person who experiences humour), intelligence, background, etc. Thus, for people who come from different contexts, the emergent structure must differ, sometimes probably in a significant manner. And here we encounter another problem with CIT that has already been discussed earlier in the paper. Namely, how to restrict emergent structure and the process of running the blend. If this is not achieved, the elaboration becomes a never ending story, which clearly must not be the case, as it would definitely kill all the humour, for a start. Still more, how to limit the selection from the input and the projection of correspondences into the blend taking into account the humour receiver and their context. Clearly, different people will perform elaborations in distinct ways, depending on their context. If we think of the earlier analysis of British comedies, I believe that native speakers would have different and more elaborate view on the matter, when compared and contrasted with my own perspective on such comedy. So, this knotty problem should be tackled by further research on humour.

As for optimality principles and their novel equivalents, defined in detail in chapter 1 and applied to the examples scrutinised, they are restrictions that are meant to keep the cognitive integration in order, so no random and haphazard associations are made. It is suggested that the distance between them be shortened and they be treated as one related projection. These regulations were added on to the CIT by Fauconnier and Turner to restrict the whole procedure, and to make blending a more tightly-organised process. I referred to these principles within my humour analyses in order to show that constraints are vital and play a major role in the whole integration as such. What comes with it is the fact that optimality principles work also for the construction of humour, so that it is not perceived as just a random process of associating concepts that form incompatible relations which then are seen as funny. Owing to these constraints, humorous examples defined by blending can form tight-knit associations which can be further manipulated, however only in a restricted manner. For this very reason, humour is not distorted or completely omitted, but enhanced in an appropriate fashion. Nevertheless, it is crucial to mention that even with the optimality principles at hand, there appears to be unlimited possibilities for the selection from inputs and also for the transfer from the inputs to the blend. Theoretically, this works really well, but when we think of our minds as processing humorous data by means of CIT, the brain cannot incessantly blend and search for more projections and elaborations of the already existing ones. Hence there is an urgent need to reformulate the optimality principles, or simple limit them even further, and this again is a task for research in future.

It is also important to look back at the material analysed in order to decide whether humour explained by means of CIT is always based on metaphor and metonymy as such. The conclusion that must be drawn is that there are no humorous examples in chapter 3 that would hinge their input relations on either metaphor or metonymy. It is true that we observe metaphor and metonymy in blending, yet this phenomenon is not underlying for CIT, nor is it underlying for humour. Metonymy is only used in the analysis in projecting from inputs into the blend, for the purpose of transferring relations of contiguity as one topological projection. It does not seem to hold true that CIT is based on the underlying metaphor and metonymy in its choice of topologies within the inputs. This is contrary to previous observations regarding purely verbal humour (see Jabłońska 2003 concluding remarks) where the verbalised comedy did seem to be of metaphorical or metonymic nature. So to reformulate, humour might actually hinge on projections to the blend, rather than on metaphor or metonymy in itself. The interesting thing would be to find out if such projections are basically comparison based similarities or maybe novel conceptualisations created on the fly due to humour discourse. Another important aspect for further reference would be to check the nature of the inputs that participate in humour creation in the blend. It might be likely that these are of certain type, e.g. spaces that are opposed in some way or perhaps partly contrary, or maybe not different in any substantial way, but rather related on the basis of some element that seems to be unifying. This only proves that there needs to be more research conducted into the nature of the comic as explained by CIT to reach definitive answers. Nonetheless, the earlier analysis of comedies in this chapter would appear to support the argument of CIT proponents that there are various species of CIT which are all explicable by blending:

> What we have previously regarded as separate phenomena and even separate mental operations – counterfactuals, framings, categroizations, metonymies, metaphors, etc. - are consequences of the same basic human ability for double-scope blending. More specifically, these phenomena are all products of integration networks under the same general principles and overarching goals. They are separable neither in theory nor in practice: the majority of cases involve more than one kind of integration. The resulting products can belong simultaneously to any (or none) of the surface types "metaphors", "counterfactuals," "analogies[60]", "framings," "categroizations," or "metonymies" (Fauconnier and Turner 2008 online).

60 An interesting perspective on analogy and similarity is presented by Gertner and Markman (2000: 128). It is advocated that both these processes of comparison will involve the alignments of structure (and not objects or relations as such) as well as mappings between

What the quotation stipulates, then, is the fact that it is rather CIT that is more basic and primary than metaphor or metonymy, and that blending ought to be given priority as a universal procedure of the human mind which accounts for many 'species' as Fauconnier and Turner refer to it. Also, proponents advocate that the theory of metaphor, hence also by analogy the theory of metonymy, ought to be revised with the particular emphasis on CIT, which would support their claim that metaphors truly incorporate more than just two spaces. Precisely, they require multiple spaces and emergent structures of blending so as to be accounted for exhaustively (Fauconnier and Turner 2008 online). If we were to apply the same reasoning to humour, it is feasible to claim that humour might also be the outcome of blending, especially the blending as empowered by elaboration and emergent structure enriched on the fly as a dynamic add on to the comedy stemming from some discourse type.

One more observation regarding humour definition must be allowed. Precisely, in chapter 2 we have proposed a set of systematic characteristics to be used for the purpose of defining the comic, namely:

- humour is a cognitive, superordinate category with its range of subordinate members (some better, some worse instances of humour)
- humour has a linear dimension encompassing its different types that again form a spectrum
- humour is a means of combining these two lines of reasoning, i.e. horizontal and vertical
- humour is any instantiation of language; whether verbal, written, gesture-oriented or graphic; that provides a stimulus, in its linguistic form; whether verbal, written, gesture-oriented or graphic; to which a response[61] follows in the form of humour appreciation
- the humour appreciation can range from a smile to laughter, including even a nod of the head, as long as it is accompanied by the mental comprehension of the humorous (however, it is necessary to remember that such understanding

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mental representations of compared entities. Additionally, comparing things makes use of commonalities and related differences, which can prove crucial for humour studies, too (Gertner and Gunn 2001: 565). Thus, analogy and similarity could possibly be analysed by means of CIT and it is possible that metaphor and metonymy seen in this light, as analogy or similarity process, would be proved to be less vital than blending in understanding of the world around.

61 As mentioned above, both stimulus and response are not always obligatorily present in humour (see section 2.1.4) and ought to be regarded respectively as follows: stimulus takes the form of an instantiation of language, whatever its form might be, whereas response assumes the role of humour appreciation, again irrespective of its form.

of the humorous may be invisible to the human eye, i.e. may be a cognitive understanding
- humour exists in a particular context, and suggests the presence of a humorist and an audience, whether implicit or explicit, who produce humour and respond to it
- humour is subjective, as well as context-oriented.

In light of this analysis, I would like to propose that the above set of characteristics is relevant for humour studies, as it can be applied to our examples without any exception. In particular, humour is a truly superordinate category that incorporates its lower-level instances, i.e. the multidimensionality of the analysed data illustrates the point (especially the 3D or 4D humour, see chapter 3 and analyses for details). In a similar vein we can observe that both vertical and horizontal taxonomies of humour constitute an acceptable hypothesis. Needless to say, the subjectivity, context-orientation and stimulus-response interrelation all play a vital role in the processing of humour. However, there must also be other elements that extend the above working definition of humour in general. Firstly, we need to introduce the pragmatic notion of the speaker and the hearer, or a more general humour creator and cogniser. In any discourse, comedy does not just happen for no apparent reason. Certainly, there are cases of incidental humour, but predominantly comedy is aimed at and constructed by someone. Hence, the need to introduce such participants into any humour research by means of CIT. Following Turner (2014&2015) on this, we might safely state that creativity of blending as applied to humour needs the creator who performs blending. However implicit the participants of blending in a humorous discourse might be for Turner's part, his suggestion that CIT indirectly mentions the joint view and attention of a situation participants might well be verbalised into one of the principles, definitely in humour studies as conducted by means of CIT. Further, as stipulated by Turner (2014&2015), humans are creative, and humour can also be regarded as a creative process. Hence, it might be possible to apply Turner's idea of parabolic understanding to humour. In particular, it might be said that humour is like parabol, it blends ideas in some conflict with each other (irrespective of what the opposition of these ideas is based on) to provide amusement. Humour is one such representation of human spark, i.e. human creativity. According to Turner (on-line 2014a&b), parabole is putting together things that do not belong together for better comprehension. People have such an ability and they use it to represent their ideas to others, which could be safely applied to the notion of humour. Just as humans exchange ideas with the help of blending, it is possible to perceive humour as a matter of ideas exchange for

a particular purpose – so it could be viewed as an interaction procedure. But as parabolic thinking is closely connected with diversity and creativity on the part of humans, the same can be said about humour. Seen in this light, we could explain by means of advanced blending, as Turner proposes it (on-line 2014b), that humour can join conflicting ideas of different type for the purposes of funniness, or others, such incongruity relating to subjectivity of humour creators and cognisers, too. Hence, the complexity of the notion in question and the difficulty in studying it. Also, perceived as a representation of human creativity with recourse to blending, humour can achieve a more human-scale in the research and can be studied in close relation to interaction and context-dependency, which again is proposed in this paper as a future perspective on the comic to be assumed.

At this moment, I would also like to express a great need for humorous research to follow the current trends in language studies, i.e. multi-modality. I strongly recommend that numerous distinctive approaches to humour should be united in their common search for humour explanation. It seems necessary to me that different perspectives on humour that focus on different things in humour might well start working together and sharing the results of their experiment. Specifically, I would say that CIT could do with a more pragmatic approach to humour. Certainly there is a need for distinguishing humorous situation participants in any further tests with blending (see above). It should be the speaker and the hearer, or the speaker and a wider audience, etc. depending on the type of humour analysed. If we stick to comedies, there certainly is a wider audience, that can further be specified by nationality, culture, society, beliefs that they have etc. Perhaps it would also be possible to talk about a prototypical wider audience. Certainly in case of English humour, such a prototypical wider audience would include native speakers who have been brought up within English culture, ideally in the UK, and with the set of standard expectations that an English native would exhibit. Such a prototypical audience would be capable of understanding English humour and it its full extent, due to society and culture awareness. The nuances that the comedies I have depicted show would be spotted and appreciated without any trouble. In a similar vein, we could say that a less prototypical wider audience would include all varieties of speakers of the English language whose background is not necessarily native, but who might be neo-native or non-native at all however possessing enough knowledge of the English culture to be able to recognise at least some humour in the comedies, if not most of it. Still the least prototypical wider audience would include people who are non-natives with little exposition to English culture and society. These would probably not appreciate the humour presented in this paper at all. I am of an opinion, that such a prototypical view of the humour receiver/hearer/

audience (whichever name is most suitable) would greatly profit the studies on comedy, as they would restrict the fail responses to humour, or at least allow for their prediction. In addition to that, it is vital to highlight the fact that in comedies we actually faced with the speaker who simultaneously is the director of the comedy series or sketch, and also with the speaker/speakers who are projections of his thoughts, i.e. characters in comedy. This dichotomy might be of use when analysing visual humour of sitcoms or sketches. As for a different discourse type, for instance jokes, there needs to be a notion of the hearer/receiver of the joke, which again would be of a prototypical kind. So basically, any type of humorous discourse will call for a slightly different receiver of humour, which can be tackled in a prototypical way. Another pragmatic related element of any potential humour situation might be the search for a more interactive and on-the-fly analysis, which would necessitate collecting data from conversations or real life communications that are of comical type. This would allow for a more practical study on humour, rather than relying exclusively on theoretical premises. Also, it would be exposed to a particular context and culture, which again would profit the multidimensional level of humour studies, resulting in a more true to life conclusions on the nature of humour. I obviously realise the obstacles that would be in the way of such data collection, however, I believe it would be of enormous value for future reference on humour. Similarly, there is a need to try and work on computational research in humour studies, since its algorithmic application provides an effective way of checking the parameters of humour creation. Because computers require precise delimitations, if we were to apply CIT to more computer-generated humour projects, as Turner (2014&2015) himself suggests, we could benefit from critical feedback with recourse to CIT's rules and theoretical hypotheses, as tested in practical terms. Further, I believe that other theories of humour which have been tested such as salience hypothesis by Giora or Ritchie's proposals carry more valuable remarks in relation to comedy, as they can be further developed post-experimentally. There is not doubt that checking up theories in psycholinguistic experiments that relate to dynamic real life reception of humour provides for more objective conclusions, and hence enables the scholar to progress in the specific area of study, following Chiaro & Norrick on this (2009). I also am of an opinion that CIT could well be related to Giora's (1999a&b, 2002, 2011) theory of meaning, where salience prevails. I realise that her research is mainly in relation to irony, however, for my part, adapting the salience of meaning hypothesis with blending might prove enlightening pertaining to humour. It would certainly be beneficial to verify if the inputs' contents does not apply salience, for example, and if we are not actually selecting from the input spaces on the basis of salience, for the further projection to the blend.

Also, the multi-modal approach to humour research in future, encompassing extra-linguistic information such as gestures or prosody, might provide fuller insight into the nature of humour, too. Specifically, it would be of value to study how gestures or intonation, if at all, influence the reception of humour interpreted by means of CIT, and if these can strengthen it, or simply allow it to happen in certain cases. Therefore, all these provisional parameters are suggested to be accepted and open to extension, from any future humour research.

Having stated the importance of blending in accounting for humour, it is necessary to point out that all the above-presented diagrams fit into a more general pattern, which could be pinpointed as a schema theorising about the creation of humour. In particular, below I present this recurring pattern within humorous instances:

Figure 14. A general schema for humour explanation



It is suggested that figure 14 can be applied to any instance of comedy, irrespective of its nature, in order to show what procedures are incorporated into the creation of the comic effects, and how to interpret them. Firstly, humour is a cognitive phenomenon, therefore the biggest square of the graph represents the brains in which the whole process takes place. Secondly, starting from the top, we proceed through the elements of conceptual integration from generic space, via inputs into the blended formation in accordance with blending regulations, as defined in chapter 1. The blend becomes the focal point of our attention when we compose (i.e. formulate), compress (i.e. unify), and eventually elaborate (i.e. broaden) on it. Thus, the blend's incongruous topology undergoes further changes, which involve the following spheres:

(W) the world which is understood as a language user's encyclopedic knowledge, which varies from person to person.
(B) the body, which stands for our individual and personal experience and also varies from person to person, and suggests embodiment and situated (or grounded) cognition[62].
(CS) culture and society which represent the national background of a language user with their traditions, customs, superstitions, beliefs, etc.
(T) taste, which signifies the different likes and dislikes on the part of a language user, which in fact relates to subjectivity, that will also be of major significance for humour studies.

All the above mentioned factors influence the blend with an individual's perspective until it is complete and add to its results even more incompatibility between the blended elements. Thus humour is fully attained. Or should we really talk about construction of humour? As Turner (2014&2015) advocates, the ingenuity of the human brain results from the fact that it blends the information at hand

62 The notion of grounded cognition is closely associated with embodiment and it has long been known in linguistics, yet it has not been fully realised or accepted until recently (Barsalou 2010). This term presupposes that the environment, the body and the simulations within a human brain modal system ground the central representations in cognition. This basically means that our cognitive system uses the surroundings and the body as external information structures that collaborate and complete the internal cognitive representations in the brain. Perceived from this perspective, humour can also be viewed as a type of grounded cognition, where a particular language user constructs hypotheses about what is funny and what is not on the basis of the environment and embodiment in its general sense. That would definitely account for sociocultural elements in comedy, as well as for subjectivity and broadly understood context-dependence.

and in a parabolic fashion searches for more blending at all times. Thus, any meaning is constructed as a result of blending ideas together. Hence, in a similar vein within humour studies, it is possible to talk about humour construction, as a blending process with the humour cogniser who processes humorous data in a given discourse situation, using all that CIT has to offer, e.g. compression, simulation, fusion, emergent structure, etc.

Nonetheless, I wish to explain one more element of the graph relating to humour, i.e. time. If one really wants to provide a novel approach to humour, one needs to refer to the fact that timing of the comic is both vital and variable. Every language user will differ in respect of time; for some, understanding a joke might take a few seconds, others will appreciate the same joke in a few days or weeks, or perhaps even longer, or never. This time dimension allows for an appreciation of a 4D human perspective, as accessed via CIT (see chapter 3 and particular analyses).

Furthermore, online meaning creation should be related to time in varying ways, and we should assume that the notion of online meaning creation and time intermingle with each other. To be precise, the online phase of the mind in search of humorous meaning, will be totally dependent on the time that an individual language user needs to select that one meaning of possibly many that is funny; irrespective of how long this state might take (i.e. one minute, an hour or a whole day!). Specifically, it is feasible to assume that the prototypical humour cogniser, i.e. the native speaker of English, and even more, the British person who is exposed to the comedies presented here in chapter 3 will take much less time in their humour search that the non-prototypical humour receiver (even the American viewers must be considered less prototypical as an audience of inherently British comedies, hence the USA has been offered a chance of watching their own version of the Office comedy, due to contextual differences).

To conclude, it can be stated that conceptual integration provides a powerful tool for a concise explanation of humour and issues connected with it, and if further elaborated with modern interdisciplinary and pragmatic twist, it might prove very useful in any future humour research.

Chapter 4: Concluding remarks

The purpose of the present study has been to explore the notion of humour with the help of the conceptual integration theory developed by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner. Blending has, over recent years, become a widespread linguistic theory used to explain numerous phenomena, as diverse as, for example, counter factuality, music, or painting (see for more detail the final remarks of chapter 1). Humour has already been tackled by conceptual integration (more on irony or Wengorek-Dolecka 2002a & b, 2004 and 2005, on cartoons in Jabłońska 2003, and on verbal humour in Jabłońska-Hood 2007). Nevertheless, the film comedy has not been previously analysed and explained through conceptual integration. Of particular interest has been humour as shown by British film productions, including *The Best of Ronnie Barker*, *Carry On Up the Khyber*, *The Office* and *Extras*. The above-mentioned productions vary in respect of their creation date, from the older to the more recent, with the intention of showing that mental spaces theory has the capacity to explain British humour, irrespective of its origin date.

The mechanism(s) of humour within films by means of mental spaces theory and CIT have been described. Simultaneously, so too has the related research associated with other humour studies or theories, by such prominent figures as Giora, Attardo and Ritchie. More specifically, the examples that were dealt with have been analysed in terms of conceptual integration with a degree of success. Therefore, one can state that it is possible for conceptual integration to account for the complexity of the verbal and scene humour in films. Additionally, conceptual integration provides the basis for input mental spaces in the case of each individual comedy. Although such inputs differ with regard to their subject, they are likely to be united in the blend by means of topological associations formed between those input spaces. Within the blend, the elements undergo composition and compression with closely connected topologies, such as each other's referents. This results in the creation of the blended structure. However, the blend is only completed when the process of elaboration is accomplished. Elaboration involves extending the blended topologies with regard to a language user's context through online meaning creation. Subsequently, the blend shows a considerable amount of incongruity in respect of such mental creation. Thus, humour, which is either of verbal or slapstick nature, is triggered, it would appear, via the incompatibility of some kind (for issues connected with incompatibility and its reading see concluding remarks of chapter 3 above).

Consequently, it might be claimed that never before has there been a theory such as mental spaces theory and CIT that would explain humour in a holistic manner. In SSTH or GVTH, as specified in chapter 2, the generative perspective would not be capable of incorporating phenomena such as the emergent structure of the blend or its online meaning elaboration, especially in a complex notion of a film medium. Primarily used for jokes, to explain the manipulation of their meaning, SSTH and GVTH prove insufficient to deal with the contemporary idea of what British humour may be. Similarly, the pragmatic theories may be rendered inappropriate to tackle the visual and slapstick humour of the British comedies, as they lack substance, contrary to CIT which possesses an elaborate enough methodology so as to provide for humour in all its instances. On the other hand, the pragmatic notion of discourse participants has proved useful and it should be well incorporated into any future study of humour by means of CIT.

Previous studies of the comic have drawn similar conclusions to these, in that there must have always been at least two opposing values or things, whose opposing nature was responsible for laughter. Cognitive integration goes one step further. Not only does it show how such opposing associations are formed in a cognitive way, it also provides certain limitations which a humour analyst must come to terms with. And although the limitations could do with more restrictive patterns (see section above, chapter 3 conclusive remarks), this is a good beginning for a more thorough general humour theory. The state of research into humour, as presented in chapter 2, was not so specific as to the oppositions in the comedy. It was simply stated that the factors which create comedy must be, in some manner, in opposition to one another. Blending, however, presents restrictions to mental spaces and their manipulation in the form of optimality principles. Because of such principles, humour perceived through blending, gains a more refined status. It ceases to be a vague opposition, and it actually takes on particular, described limitations, which will account for the cases were there simply exists no humour present. Nonetheless, the need to study both humorous and non-humorous discourse that would be explicable by means of CIT still remains, the results of which would possibly redefine the elements that distinguish between such varying contexts (see Ritchie's remarks, section 2.2.4.3 chapter 2). In a similar vein, such experiments could also verify the restrictions of the processes of selection from the inputs and projections to the blend, which seems of unending kind so far. A similar criticism can be applied to emergent structure of the blend and its extensions, hence the pressing need for further reanalysis and reformulation in this respect.

Below I present the schematic representation of contemporary humour research, with the aim of simplifying the complexity of the perceived issue (see chapter 2 for more information on each theory)

	INCONGRUITY	INCONGRUITY	INCONGRUITY
	cognitive field	social field	psychoanalytical field
LINGUISTIC	Latta's theory ncongruity-resolution theories (Rothbard) perceived incongruity (La Fave et al.) SSTH by Raskin GTVH by Raskin & Attardo Köestler's bisociation Misattribution theory detection of mistaken reasoning		
PHILOSOPHICAL		Bergson's theory	Freud / Spencer (physiological theory)
		ontic-epistemic theory by Marteinson benign violation theory (Veteach/ MacGraw & Wallace)	
SOCIAL		Hobbs	
COMPUTATIONAL	Ritchie's theory of humour neural connectionist theory by Katz pattern recognition theory by Clarke		
PRAGMATIC	based on Grice, Austin, Sperber and Wilson Giora's theory of irony		

In light of the graphic representation of humour theories presented just above, it can be stated that humour is by no means a light-hearted issue to deal with. Firstly, there are a multitude of theories all claiming to explain how comedy is produced, although when looked at in more detail, we can merely distinguish a very well-chosen few paradigms (e.g. Raskin, Attardo or Ritchie) which actually specify how humour is created, but usually in a narrow sense of the meaning of humour (i.e. jokes or puns); whereas the majority simply refers to vague notions of opposition, superiority or even such physiological factors as laughter/ smiling. It is easy to talk about opposition without precisely giving details about

the kind of opposition it could be that triggers comic effects. Similarly, is all opposition humour-oriented? Further questions to be ask regard also superiority or laughter – do these always result in humour? And if not, when can they lead to comedy? These and other similar queries need addressing, if one is serious about humour research. Secondly, the division of humour theories in itself poses problems. Specifically, the manner in which the theories are incorporated under the three mainstream types of humour framework is not mutually exclusive, as many of them can be labelled by more than one of the humour variations. A case in point might be misattribution theory that relates both to incompatibility as well as disparagement. What is more, some of the theories incorporate all three elements that result in the division of humour theories, such as Ritchie's theory which can relate to incongruity, superiority as well we release of pent-up emotions via jokes, whether computer generated or not, at the same time. Finally, I would like to propose that CIT be treated as one such humour theory which is capable of explicating in general terms any humour instance, whatever the origin of the comic might be. Be it incongruity, belittlement or release of negative emotions; I propose that all types of humour can to some extent be described by conceptual integration, as it refers to all the issues addressed by all the different enumerated theories altogether. The methodology is as such that no element of humour is left out from the studies, no matter if we analyse witty remarks, stand-up comedy or one-liners. Assuming the position of CIT's proponents, blending is omnipresent, and it is a basic operation of the human brain. Why not regard humour as such a similar process? If people think by means of blends and thus are creative and ingenuous (Turner 2014), why can we not presume that humorous thinking is also originated via mental spaces and their blending? Certainly, more research is needed here, especially with the potential issues that need resolving within CIT (see conclusive remarks of chapter 3), yet the possibility seems too interesting to ignore.

Advocating the use of CIT for humorous purposes, it is necessary to stress the value of its online meaning creation, which again has not yet been proposed by any of the earlier humour researchers. More specifically, the notion of online meaning refers to the fact that humour stemming from an expression or a certain situation does not hinge merely on their incompatibility. Through the cognitive processing of the data already given, an individual filters and singles out additional ideas or concepts, which are not directly taken from the blend. Such additions could be brought to the blended structure, from the stored resources of the background or encyclopaedic knowledge, otherwise known as a wider context. Hence, online meaning can further, and significantly enhance the humour based on the blend's incompatibilities.

Hopefully it has been demonstrated, drawing on the analyses presented here, as well as the studies conducted by other authors, that a varied and complex phenomenon such as humour can be explained adequately by means of conceptual integration, if the theory were to be slightly adjusted and perhaps enriched by the notion of humour participants. Humorous conceptualisations fit very well into the pattern of mental spaces, by means of which some values from humorous instances are mapped as topological correspondences, and hence projected as one-to-one relationships into the blended space. In the blend, such associations acquire the status of incompatibility, which partially accounts for humour, and are further elaborated on via the online meaning principle, this attracting even more indirect connotations which boost the comic effects considerably. Moreover, the optimality principles, i.e. integration (states that the blend must be a tight-knit structure easily manipulated as a whole) web (states that manipulation of the blend must bear straightforward relations to the inputs), unpacking (states that the conceptualiser must be able to reconstruct, or unpack, the blended space back to the original inputs), topology (assumes that correspondences from inputs are moved to the blend as topological relations) backward projection (states that one must not go back after the blend has been integrated and elaborated on), and finally, the projection principle (based on the metonymic associations projected from inputs to the blend, i.e. if there are two elements that are metonymically related from one and the same input, it is advisable that the distance between them is shortened and they are treated as one related projection) serve as useful constraints on the comic, and prevent the humour connoisseur from reaching a distorted image of what is funny. Again, if these were to be even further tightened, the selection from inputs, projections to the blend and the creation of online meaning in the emergent structure would certainly be of a more realistic nature, with recourse to humour.

Similarly, compression and decompression, i.e. the tightening and the releasing of the relation between mappings of the blended space, further facilitate humour and allow for its 3-D multilevel nature. To these ends, CIT also provides us with simulation, entrenchment and fusion, subjectiveness and achieving human scale. If boosted by the pragmatic context-dependency and the notion of humour-oriented cogniser, it would provide us with a vital tool in humour studies.

It could be argued that CIT with its complex structure and rules can explicate humour in a holistic manner. Chapter 3 has proposed a general diagram of how humour creation might be interpreted as well as explained, with the fundamental basis on mental spaces and blending. The presented pattern accounts for other, non-linguistic data, such as online meaning or the notion of a conceptualiser who experiences humour, for example, which has not be proposed before, either.

Nonetheless, a far greater degree of research and analysis is required in order to support the above-mentioned hypothesis. Therefore, it is maintained that there ought to be further research conducted into the nature of humour, based on conceptual integration. Different types of humour should be examined, which have not yet been inspected in terms of blending. Only a more systematic examination of this kind could help to provide an answer to a question whether conceptual integration can be applied to overall humour, in all its instantiations, which would constitute a positive initial step forward. Apart from the examinations mentioned above, it is especially important to concentrate on the multidimensionality of humour, i.e. any future analyses would have to incorporate the great body of experiments performed so far, but also in this light, focus upon the potential possibility of encompassing other, non-linguistic factors that impact on humour, such as an individual person's perspective. Secondly, to ensure a wider perspective on the comedy spectrum requires the fusion of studies from many different fields, such as psychology, philosophy, sociology and cognitive linguistics in collaboration, for the purpose of a more plausible humour account. Another aspect of humour that must be addressed is the issue of opposition. From this and many earlier analyses of the comic (see chapter 2), it is apparent that humour results from a certain opposition. Although the nature of this opposition is partly referred to by CIT (the blend's incongruity), there needs to be more research into specifying exactly what opposition in the blend will be humorous, since not all opposing topologies within blends will generate humour. Also, humour regarded in terms of a projection from inputs to the incongruous blended space has been suggested in this paper as a potential humour theory, which again needs verifying against a wider scope of data. Finally, a complete inspection of the comic ought to specifically state what place must be assigned to the following segments of humour, such as gestures, intonation, behaviour, facial expressions or visual representations. The present study leaves those issues open for future research.

Interestingly, one further remark must be delivered considering the definition of humour. In chapter 2 (section 2.1.7) we have presented a provisional defining parameters of humour, which have been proved relevant for our analysis of the British comedies (see chapter 3). Therefore, it is proposed that these characteristics should be treated as a potential definition of what humour is in any future humour research. To briefly summarise, humour constitutes an extensive cognitive category of a superordinate order, which subsumes underneath a wide range of subordinate types of the comic, e.g. slapstick, jokes or wit, some of them more central, while some others more peripheral members of humour. Additionally, humour is context oriented and subjective, i.e. British humour as in the analysed examples involves absurd or nonsensical behaviour, which might not be

characteristic for other nationalities. Apart from the context predetermination and subjectivity, it is always stimulus-response based, in the sense that there is a visual or verbal stimulus which provokes some response, most commonly in the form of laughter. And additionally, the pragmatic notion of a humour creator and cogniser with their context brought to the humour discourse might be included in the working humour definition for future reference.

If we also incorporate Turner's remarks (2014&2015) on creativity and origin of ideas into the humour studies, we might as well state that humour is an example of parabolic understanding on the part of language users, where humans creatively blending conflicting ideas for the purpose of funniness, or some other, which is a reflection of their ingenuity. Seen in this light, humour becomes more of a human procedure discerned from a specific context and subjectivity of thinking processes of humour creators as well as cognisers.

An example of how we could apply the CIT into future research might be computational humour within the realm of artificial intelligence. Specifically, some experiments could be conducted with computer programmes that analyse the comic. Whereas beforehand such experimentation was used to point to already humorous pieces of text, where data concerning what humour is was introduced into the system, this time, thanks to CIT it could perhaps be possible to actually introduce into the system the relevant data that is supposed to measure how humorous, if at all, a piece of text would be. Applying CIT data to computers would be a good way of checking if it really works as a humour theory, both in humour studies and in artificial intelligence perspective. Especially when we take into account what Lakoff (2012) says about mental spaces, operating as a neural simulation procedure, with blending also functioning as a partitioned simulation. This perspective makes CIT-based humour studies in relation to computational models and CIT a bit less of a sci-fi concept, and a bit more of a reality check for scholars who doubt neural applications of cognitive theories (see the whole article for details). Such CIT-based programming research into humour could also have further uses in human-computer interface or education, where computers could attempt at simple and potentially funny interaction with humans, or at explaining basic concepts to young learners, perhaps with the aid of humour, especially language (e.g. interactive education). Specifically, taking into account the fact that there already are quite a number of experiments linking both humour and computer programming language, e.g. Tom Swiftly generator by Lessard and Levinson (1992) or the WISCRAIC pun builder by McKay (2000 & 2002) (Ritchie online). Furthermore, humour-oriented artificial intelligence studies could provide us with the insight into practical uses of various humour theories and thus into human intelligence indirectly, too (Ritchie online).

Another application is closely connected with the notion of ambiguity. If we hypothesise and assume, at a start, that humour centres on ambiguous opposition, in its very narrow sense, we could apply CIT to the mechanical explanation of such double-meaning. In this way, blended and incompatible mental spaces would present a useful tool for elaboration of ambiguous humour, simultaneously explaining perhaps what type of ambiguity does lead to comedy, and what does not.

Generally, it is feasible to say that any study of humour, as based on CIT being the way in which the human mind works, will definitely allow access to the fuller comprehension of not only how our brain processes data, but also to the manner in which we categories reality and the surrounding world. Moreover, it will boost the understanding of how people think creatively, how they reason and interact with each other; all these certainly being of interest to any cognitive researcher. And when we combine, in a multi-modal fashion, CIT with the RT, for example, for the exclusive purposes of humour studies, there might be interesting conclusions to be made. Precisely, what is clear to any pragmatic scholar is the fact that when people communicate, they look for optimum relevance in the discourse they take part in. Communication is all about intentions as well as their recognition and interpretation. Each utterance in discourse is regarded as a piece of encoded linguistic message to be deciphered by the recipient (hence the inferential model of communication, just as in Grice's theory and Sperber and Wilson's RT), who is to maximise the relevance search with the least cognitive effort involved. To be more specific, the relevance theory assumes, after Grice, that the speaker provides clues as to what he intends his utterance to mean, but in RT, as proposed by Sperber and Wilson, it is obtained by means of relevance (instead of sticking to maxims of conversation). This, on the other hand, raises some expectations in the hearer, thus providing him with the essential clues as to the possible renderings of discourse involved. All this theoretical framework can be applied to humour studies, and also simplified in the manner of the following equation, which was put forward by Goatly:

$$\text{relevance} = \frac{\text{contextual effects}}{\text{processing efforts}}$$

(Goatly 2011, p. 143)

According to the formula, the greater the contextual effects of any given discourse piece, in the form of the most valid cognitive interpretation achieved via the processing of the data in question, with recourse both to the input and context, the greater the relevance. All this needs to be combined with the minimal

processing effort required on the part of the hearer, which benefits the relevance search. Thus, it is feasible to treat humour in pretty much the same way, as an efficiency mechanism for meaning construction, where the greater the contextual effects of the comic discourse in question, the greater the humorous relevance and the easier the comic meaning construction. For my part, the joint venture of the two approaches, i.e. CIT as well as RT, would greatly profit the humour studies and it would also most likely point to some other issues within humour as treated as discourse, which on the whole could profit the broad humour paradigm in general.

One more perspective should also be mentioned, i.e. the philosophical nature of humour studies based on CIT. Namely, the cognitive framework of blending can allow the access to the logical thinking possibilities, via a more pragmatic analysis of humour in terms of lying and its truthfulness, likelihood and falsehood. Such discrete categories can be analysed with reference to humorous blends and it could shed light on how humans think and perceive situations (il)logically.

Before I draw any conclusions, there is a need to add a few crucial remarks for further humour investigation. Firstly, humour is not an isolated phenomenon, and therefore it cannot be holistically evaluated if it is not placed in a right context. Having this in mind, it is mandatory that comedy studies should incorporate the social, historical and cultural perspective. What I mean by that is the inclusion into any humour research of the wider context, for instance via the notion of audience. It would be interesting to see how the humour is received via diverse kinds of audience. Specifically, if we study English humour, it would profit any linguistic research to relate to both native speakers and non-native speakers and the success, or the lack of it, with which they find the comic material funny. In addition to that, it would be ideal to elicit from the humour audience the list of potential factors that might enhance humour, or disturb humour comprehension. It would also prove vital to investigate humour as seen through the eyes of different age groups, with reference to both native and non-native speakers. This could provide us with more factors that have an impact on humour (mis)understanding, such as differences in reception of the comic with regard to time line as well as cultural customs with a given society. Further, it could be interesting also to investigate the reception of humour via different ethnic groups of the English society, if we deal with English humour. Again, it would hopefully throw more light on the extent to which our culture, experience and background hamper or enhance comedy.

Secondly, having conducted such research, the results of it could be used to relate to the purely linguistic interpretation of humour and how it originates. Then it would be possible to finally conclude whether subjective notions such as our culture or origin have any influence on the humour and its creation. It

would answer many pressing questions with reference to humour, for example: does humour creation, from the perspective of its instigator, have anything to do with the so-called social, historical or cultural element? Linguistically, it is feasible to assume that the speaker who produces humour does not need to take into account the audience, as they just wish to make a joke. However, it needs to be supported by evidence. For if it were so, the obvious conclusion would point to the fact that to explain the nature of humour and how it operates would require no reference to extra-linguistic factors.

I appreciate that the idea of CIT as a potential humour theory has its strengths and weaknesses in application. As for the latter, a potential critique could be levelled with regard to the emergent structure of the blend and online meaning creation where an individual processing humour produces and adds onto the comedy present their own associations. This will particularly be so in relation to CIT's application to future computer generated humour. On the other hand, the strengths of CIT lie in its application to computational humour. This theory can be applied both on a micro and on a macro level, and the varying ranges in between. This feature of CIT can be compared to zooming in and out of a humorous text or situation, with the detailed focus on a verbal humour context (i.e. zooming in), and a wider perspective of it with all the contexts and mental spaces applicable (i.e. zooming out), and any possible spaces in between. CIT's application will, however, be more precise on the micro level than on a macro one, in part due to the far greater potential for associations at the macro range.

In conclusion, it seems that the conceptual integration theory describes the nature of British comedy humour in a successful manner. Not only does it appear to incorporate into its research the meaning creation of linguistic units that trigger laughter, but is also seems to take into account extra-linguistic spheres of human life such as pragmatics, culture, society, or intimate and personal experience of the world. And further reformulated to encompass the pragmatic notion of the humour conceptualiser and the context-dependency which they bring with themselves into humour discourse, it could become a better theory with a wider application range. The apparatus of blending seems to be adequate for the description of complex humour mechanisms. This could well be supported by the words of CIT's authors, Fauconnier and Turner, who view blending as a basic operation of the human mind, and regard the notion of projection as a fundamental issue in cognition:

> Conceptual integration is strongly conservative: It always works from stable inputs and under the constitutive and governing principles. But conceptual integration is also creative, delivering new emergent structure that is intelligible because it is tied to stable

> structures. The bubble chamber of the brain runs constantly, making and unmaking integration networks. Cultures, too, running a bubble chamber over the collection of their members' brains, develop integration networks that can be disseminated because the members of the culture all have the capacity for double-scope integration. Very few of the networks tried out in these bubble chambers of brain and culture actually survive. A network that does survive takes its place in individual or collective memory and knowledge.
>
> From weaponry to ideology, language to science, art to religion, fantasy to mathematics, human beings and their culture have, step by step, made blends, unmade them, re-blended them, and made new blends, always arriving at human-scale blends that they can manipulate directly. This progression from blends to newer blends, blending and de-blending, compressing and decompressing, is the pattern of child learning, also.
>
> The story of human beings-50,000 years ago, now, for the infant, the child, the adult, the novice, the expert, for the many different cultures we have developed-is always the same story, with the same operations and principles [i.e. conceptual integration]. (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 396)

Seen from this perspective, pragmatically-oriented CIT, as applied to humour creation and explanation ceases to function as a far-fetched sci-fi concept, and formalises itself as a human-scale prototypical operation of the brain.

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